Introduction Cosmologists, even more than laboratory physicists, must find the usual interpretive rules of quantum mechanics a bit frustrating: ‘… any result of a measurement of a real dynamical variable is one of its eigenvalues …’ ‘… if the measurement of the observable … is made a large number of times the average of all the results obtained will be …’ ‘… a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured …’ It would seem that the theory is exclusively concerned with ‘results of measurement’ and has nothing to say about anything else. When the ‘system’ in question is the whole world where is the ‘measurer’ to be found? Inside, rather than outside, presumably. What exactly qualifies some subsystems to play this role? Was the world wave function waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer for some more highly qualified measurer – with a Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to anything but idealized laboratory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less ‘measurement-like’ processes are going on more or less all the time more or less everywhere? Is there ever then a moment when there is no jumping and the Schrödinger equation applies?
Introduction Cosmologists, even more than laboratory physicists, must find the usual interpretive rules of quantum mechanics a bit frustrating: ‘… any result of a measurement of a real dynamical variable is one of its eigenvalues …’ ‘… if the measurement of the observable … is made a large number of times the average of all the results obtained will be …’ ‘… a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured …’ It would seem that the theory is exclusively concerned with ‘results of measurement’ and has nothing to say about anything else. When the ‘system’ in question is the whole world where is the ‘measurer’ to be found? Inside, rather than outside, presumably. What exactly qualifies some subsystems to play this role? Was the world wave function waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer for some more highly qualified measurer – with a Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to anything but idealized laboratory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less ‘measurement-like’ processes are going on more or less all the time more or less everywhere? Is there ever then a moment when there is no jumping and the Schrödinger equation applies?
The foundations of quantum mechanics are reconsidered in relation to the measurement problem. We define two kinds of quantities. The type A quantities are observables obtained experimentally from a single measurement. A dynamical variable is a type A quantity whose measurement selects a set of eigenvalues (EVs) as c-numbers. The type B quantities represent theoretical quantities related to probabilities. State vectors, the wave function, and the probability distribution (PD) are type B quantities. They are derived from an eigenvalue equation such as the Schrödinger equation. A quantum jump (QJ) is the measurement of a dynamical variable to select a set of EVs. The wave function is a theoretical quantity that persists throughout an experiment and therefore does not collapse. After a QJ, a selected set of EVs persists until it becomes macroscopic. However, an eigenstate is a theoretical notion irrelevant to a single measurement and does not exist in reality after a QJ. One experiment is complete when an ensemble of EVs has been obtained and compared with the theoretically predicted PD. To obtain an ensemble, repeated measurements are required in general, but there are some exceptions, like a Bose-Einstein condensate system, for which a single measurement yields a real ensemble. We comment on the relation between the reality of the wave function and the derivation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics from relativistic quantum field theory.
Foundations of quantum mechanics are reconsidered in relation to the measurement problem. We define two kinds of quantities. The type A quantities are observables obtained experimentally from a single measurement. A dynamical variable is a type A quantity whose measurement selects a set of eigenvalues (EVs) as c-numbers. The type B quantities represent theoretical quantities related to probabilities. State vectors, wave function, and the probability distribution (PD) are type B quantities. They are derived from an eigenvalue equation such as Schrödinger equation. A quantum jump (QJ) is the measurement of a dynamical variable to select a set of EVs. The wave function is a theoretical quantity which persists throughout an experiment and therefore it does not collapse. After a QJ, a selected set of EVs persists until it becomes macroscopic. However, an eigenstate is a theoretical notion irrelevant to a single measurement and it does not exist in reality after a QJ. One experiment is complete when an ensemble of EVs has been obtained and compared with the theoretically predicted PD. To obtain an ensemble, repeated measurements are required in general, but there are some exceptions like a Bose-Einstein condensate system for which a single measurement yields a real ensemble. We discuss the relation between the reality of the wave function and the derivation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics from quantum field theory.
Foundations of quantum mechanics are reconsidered in relation to the measurement problem. We define two kinds of quantities. The type A quantities are observables obtained experimentally from a single measurement. A dynamical variable is a type A quantity whose measurement selects a set of eigenvalues (EVs) as c-numbers. The type B quantities represent theoretical quantities related to probabilities. State vectors, wave function, and the probability distribution (PD) are type B quantities. They are derived from an eigenvalue equation such as Schrödinger equation. A quantum jump (QJ) is the measurement of a dynamical variable to select a set of EVs. The wave function is a theoretical quantity which persists throughout an experiment and therefore it does not collapse. After a QJ, a selected set of EVs persists until it becomes macroscopic. However, an eigenstate is a theoretical notion irrelevant to a single measurement and it does not exist in reality after a QJ. One experiment is complete when an ensemble of EVs has been obtained and compared with the theoretically predicted PD. To obtain an ensemble, repeated measurements are required in general, but there are some exceptions like a Bose-Einstein condensate system for which a single measurement yields a real ensemble. We discuss the relation between the reality of the wave function and the derivation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics from quantum field theory.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
The subject–object distinction is indeed at the very root of the unease that many people still feel in connection with quantum mechanics. Some such distinction is dictated by the postulates of the theory, but exactly where or when to make it is not prescribed. Thus in the classic treatise of Dirac we learn the fundamental propositions: … any result of a measurement of a real dynamical variable is one of its eigenvalues …, … if the measurement of the observable ξ for the system in the state corresponding to | x 〈 is made a large number of times, the average of all the results obtained will be 〈 x |ξ| x 〉 …, … a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured …. So the theory is fundamentally about the results of ‘measurements’, and therefore presupposes in addition to the ‘system’ (or object) a ‘measurer’ (or subject). Now must this subject include a person? Or was there already some such subject–object distinction before the appearance of life in the universe? Were some of the natural processes then occurring, or occurring now in distant places, to be identified as ‘measurements’ and subjected to jumps rather than to the Schrödinger equation? Is ‘measurement’ something that occurs all at once? Are the jumps instantaneous? And so on.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical