Based on the standard axioms of quantum theory, we provide a counter-example which invalidates the full compatibility between consciousness and quantum theory. In particular, we present an example of a natural phenomenon in which an observer's the mental state can be fully described in mathematical terms analogous to the state vector that is being observed. This mathematical description of the observer's mental state enables us to examine consciousness within the standard axioms of quantum theory. The separation between the observing party and the physical system being observed, imposed by the axiom of quantum theory, poses a problem when the observer is observing his own mental state, i.e., self-observing consciousness.
Based on the standard axioms of quantum theory, we provide a counter-example which invalidates the full compatibility between consciousness and quantum theory. In particular, we present an example of a natural phenomenon in which an observer's the mental state can be fully described in mathematical terms analogous to the state vector that is being observed. This mathematical description of the observer's mental state enables us to examine consciousness within the standard axioms of quantum theory. The separation between the observing party and the physical system being observed, imposed by the axiom of quantum theory, poses a problem when the observer is observing his own mental state, i.e., self-observing consciousness.
Based on the standard axioms of quantum theory, we provide a counter-example which invalidates the full compatibility between consciousness and quantum theory. In particular, we present an example of a natural phenomenon in which an observer's the mental state can be fully described in mathematical terms analogous to the state vector that is being observed. This mathematical description of the observer's mental state enables us to examine consciousness within the standard axioms of quantum theory. The separation between the observing party and the physical system being observed, imposed by the axiom of quantum theory, poses a problem when the observer is observing his own mental state, i.e., self-observing consciousness.
In [NeuroQuantology 6, 46 (2008): arXiv:0706.4180], a certain natural phenomenon of self-observing consciousness was shown to be incompatible with the standard axioms of quantum theory. In order to consider a possibility of removing this inconsistency, which arises due to the separation between an observing party and a state vector being observed stated in the quantum theory axioms, we provide a conjecture where ‘being’, or existence, is identified with the experience of observing the state vector. That is, the observer is not observing the state vector in terms of the relative difference between reference frames, instead, the experience of observing the state vector should define the observer, or being. It is shown that the Heisenberg picture provides a natural description of this conjecture. 1
In [arXiv:0706.4180], a certain natural phenomenon of self-observing consciousness was shown to be incompatible with the standard axioms of quantum theory. In order to consider a possibility of removing this inconsistency, which arises due to the separation between an observing party and a state vector being observed stated in the quantum theory axioms, we provide a conjecture where ‘being ’ is identified with the conscious experience of observing the state vector. That is, the observer is not observing the state vector in terms of the relative difference between reference frames, instead, the conscious experience of observing the state vector should define the observer, or being. It is shown that the Heisenberg picture provides a natural description of this conjecture. 1
1 In (Georgiev, 2008), Georgiev claims to have spotted a critical mathematical error in the paper (Song, 2008) showing the incompatibility between quantum theory and consciousness. This note's goal is to show that Georgiev's claim comes from a simple misunderstanding of the paper. The whole point of (Song, 2008) was to show that quantum theory's existing standard axioms cannot consistently describe the phenomenon presented as (N2), which describes a case where an observer in the mental reference frame e is observing his own reference frame's unitary evolution. This phenomenon can be pictured as follows: consider a closed system with an observer and a qubit. The observer can choose or change the measurement basis for the given qubit. Moreover, the observer can still have or change this basis choice e even when the closed system contains no qubit. Philosophy literature widely discusses self-observation, i.e., the observer observing his own mental state, which is also known as reflexive selfconsciousness or simply reflexive consciousness (for example, see (Halliday, 1989; Velmans, 2008)). (N2) considers a case when subject and the object being observed are identical, i.e., both correspond to a single vector, e , rather than two vectors pointing in the same direction. Let us now discuss the fallacy in Georgiev's argument (Georgiev, 2008).
In collapse theories of quantum mechanics, there exist quantum observers who are observers being in a superposition of different result branches. In this paper, I analyze the mental state of a quantum observer. First, I argue that the mental state of a quantum observer is not the usual state of recording one of the results in the superposition, but it is definite. Second, I argue that the mental state of a quantum observer is determined by both the amplitudes and relative phases of the result branches of the superposition, and the mental content is composed of every result. Third, I argue that there are new mental properties which are lack for classical observers and determined by the amplitude and relative phase. In particular, the mental property determined by the amplitude may be a certain property of vividness of the mental content; the bigger the amplitude of a result branch, the more vivid the result is in the whole mental content. Finally, I argue that the new experience of a quantum observer, which violates quantum mechanics, implies that consciousness is not physically reducible or emergent but fundamental in collapse theories.
In quantum theory as it is currently formulated the measurement of an observable quantity of a physical system is the occasion for a change of state of the system, except when the state prior to the measurement is an eigenstate of the observable. Two proposals for interpreting this kind of change are examined in detail, and several variant proposals are considered briefly. According to the interpretation proposed by von Neumann, and by London and Bauer the change of state is completed only when the result of the observation is registered in the observer's consciousness. Although this interpretation appears to be free from inconsistencies, it is not supported by psychological evidence and it is difficult to reconcile with the inter subjective agreement of several independent observers. According to the interpretation proposed by Bohr, the change of state is a consequence of the fundamental assumption that the description of any physical phenomenon requires reference to the experimental arrangement. Bohr's proposals are valuable as practical maxims in scientific theory, but they are shown to involve the renunciation of any ontological framework in which all types of events – physical and mental, microscopic and macroscopic – can be located. It is concluded that a satisfactory account of the observation of microphysical quantities is unlikely if the present formulation of quantum theory is rigorously maintained. INTRODUCTION There are two distinct problems concerning the relationship between physical objects and consciousness.