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Bulletin of the American Physical Society

Implementation of an attack scheme on a practical QKD system

Antı́a Lamas-Linares, Qin Liu, Ilja Gerhardt, Vadim Makarov, Christian Kurtsiefer

Published May 26, 2010• 0 citations
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