It has been frequently said that "Quantum Mechanics is Magic".e real fact is just the opposite: quantum mechanics is not magic, it is rather one of the best scientific theories in terms of the amplitude and exactness of its predictions.Quantum Mechanics surprises us as it does not satisfy some a priori principles usually considered to be necessary preconditions to build up physics (as Einstein dixit).As these principles are also the basis of some important philosophical theories of science, these philosophical theories cannot be well founded.After criticizing them, we offer the preliminary lines of a methodology of physics adapted to the formalism of quantum mechanics.
It has been frequently said that "Quantum Mechanics is Magic".e real fact is just the opposite: quantum mechanics is not magic, it is rather one of the best scientific theories in terms of the amplitude and exactness of its predictions.Quantum Mechanics surprises us as it does not satisfy some a priori principles usually considered to be necessary preconditions to build up physics (as Einstein dixit).As these principles are also the basis of some important philosophical theories of science, these philosophical theories cannot be well founded.After criticizing them, we offer the preliminary lines of a methodology of physics adapted to the formalism of quantum mechanics.
During the past two or three centuries western philosophy and science have confirmed each other in their ontological attitude towards external reality. The particular opinion that physical objects have an existence completely independent of observation was established as the necessary basis for all scientific investigation. The discovery in quantum physics that the phenomena ultimately constituting the stability of the material world cannot be separated from the instruments of observation was necessarily felt disastrous to the scientific world-picture, and many philosophers and scientists, including celebrated physicists, are still trying by all means to save ontology in quantum physics. The motive power behind this activity is the belief that the objectivity of science can be maintained only if the elementary particles of matter can be objectified in the usual way. The present chapter deals with the fundamental conditions in quantum physics which entail a complete breakdown of the conceptual frame of classical mechanics
Quantum mechanics is our most successful physical theory. It underlies our very detailed understanding of atomic physics, chemistry, and nuclear physics, and the many technologies to which physical systems in these regimes give rise. Additionally, relativistic quantum mechanics is the basis for the standard model of elementary particles, which very successfully gives a partial unification of the forces operating at the atomic, nuclear, and subnuclear levels. However, from its inception the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, and the fact that “quantum measurements” in the orthodox formulation appear to require the intervention of non-quantum mechanical “classical systems,” have led to speculations by many physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers of science that quantum mechanics may be incomplete. Among the Founding Fathers of quantum theory, Einstein and Schrödinger were both of the opinion that quantum mechanics is in some way unsatisfactory, and this view has been amplified in more recent profound work of John Bell, among others. In an opposing camp, many others in the physics, mathematics, and philosophy communities have attempted to provide an interpretational foundation in which quantum mechanics remains a complete and self-contained system. Among the Founding Fathers, Bohr, Born, and Heisenberg maintained that quantum mechanics is a complete system, and a number of recent proposals have been made to improve upon or to provide alternatives to their “Copenhagen Interpretation.” The debate continues, and has spawned an enormous literature.
Introduction Quantum mechanics is based on the intuition that the essential difference between atomic physics and classical physics is the occurrence of discontinuities (see in particular [1,4,58–63]). Quantum mechanics should thus be considered a direct continuation of the quantum theory founded by Planck, Einstein and Bohr. Bohr in particular stressed repeatedly, already before the birth of quantum mechanics, that the discontinuities must lead to the introduction of new kinematical and mechanical concepts, so that indeed classical mechanics and its corresponding conceptual scheme should be abandoned [1,4]. Quantum mechanics tries to introduce the new concepts through a precise analysis of what is ‘observable in principle’. In fact, this does not mean setting up the principle that a sharp division between ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ quantities is possible and necessary. As soon as a conceptual scheme is given, one can infer from the observations to other facts that are actually not observable directly, and the boundary between ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ quantities becomes altogether indeterminate. But if the conceptual scheme itself is still unknown, it will be expedient to enquire only about the observations themselves, without drawing conclusions from them, because otherwise wrong concepts and prejudices taken over from before will block the way to recognising the physical relationships [Zusammenhänge].
The principle aim of this dissertation is to investigate the philosophical application of quantum information theory to interpretational issues regarding the theory of quantum mechanics. Recently, quantum information theory has emerged as a potential source for such an interpretation. The main question with which this dissertation will be concerned is whether or not an information-theoretic interpretation can serve as a conceptually acceptable interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will be argued that some of the more obvious approaches - that quantum information theory shows us that ultimately the world is made of information, and quantum Bayesianism - fail as philosophical interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, the information-theoretic approach of Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson introduces Einstein's distinction between principle theories and constructive theories, arguing that quantum mechanics is best understood as an information-theoretic principle theory. While I argue that this particular approach fails, it does offer a viable new philosophical role for information theory. Specifically, an investigation of interpretationally successful principle theories such as Newtonian mechanics, special relativity, and general relativity, shows that the particular principles employed are necessary as constitutive elements of a framework which partially defines the basic explanatory concepts of space, time, and motion. Without such constitutive principles as preconditions for empirical meaning, scientific progress is hampered. It is argued that the philosophical issues in quantum mechanics stem from an analogous conceptual crisis. On the basis of this comparison, the best strategy for resolving these problems is to apply a similar sort of conceptual analysis to quantum mechanics so as to provide an appropriate set of constitutive principles clarifying the conceptual issues at stake. It is further argued that quantum information theory is ideally placed as a novel conceptual framework from which to conduct this analysis.
Probably no theory in the history of science has produced such a profound cultural and scientific revolution as is determined by quantum mechanics. Founded around 1920 by illustrious physicists, all Nobel Prize winners, it has completely subverted the conception of matter and the universe. The theory that all matter is made up of atoms has already been formulated by Greek philosophers, starting with Democritus. Quantum mechanics provided a description based on a new conception of the elementary structure of atoms, and formulated the fundamental laws to which atoms obey. Quantum theory has obtained the unanimous and shared consent of the scientific world, although some aspects have not been definitively confirmed. Strengthened by the universal acceptance of his theories, quantum mechanics claims its intellectual primacy over all the other sciences, and the scientific world seems to grant it, so much so as to archive all the knowledge and achievements gathered in its thousand-year history. From the epistemological point of view all established theories are worthy of consideration and must be shared and accepted until proven groundless. Dating, quantum mechanics still enjoys the consent of many scientists, but this does not mean that it can claim to be the repository of all truth, based on an unacceptable and anti-scientific syllogism for which: A) all organic and inorganic matter is formed by atoms and molecules; B) quantum mechanics has founded theories and formulas to which atoms and molecules obey; C) accordingly quantum mechanics can control all universal matter. But the presumption of its predominance goes further than willing to dominate living matter. In this article we are going to examine with a sharp criticism, the aberrant and anti-scientific claim of this discipline to dominate not only science but also universal matter. We propose a more moderate and considered vision of the observable natural phenomena and consider them events in continuous evolution, and to adapt our hypotheses and theories with an equal evolutionary approach.