Similar problems keep reappearing in both the discussion about the “hard ” problem of consciousness and in fundamental issues in quantum theory. We argue that the similarities are due to common problems within the conceptual foundations of both fields. In quantum physics, the state reduction marks the “coming into being” of a new aspect of reality for which no causal explanation is available. Likewise, the self-referential nature of consciousness constitutes a “coming into being ” of a new quality which goes beyond a fully causal account of reality. Both subjects require a categorical scheme which is significantly richer then the one used in addressing factual aspects of reality alone. While parts of this categorical scheme are realized in the formalism of quantum theory, they are seldom applied in the context of consciousness. We show what the structural limitations of a classical categorical framework are, how a richer framework can be developed, and how it can be applied to both quantum physics and consciousness. Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as “necessities of thought”, “a priori givens”, etc. The path of scientific progress is often made impassable for a long time by such errors. Therefore it is by no means an idle game if we become practiced in analyzing long-held commonplace concepts and showing the circumstances on which their justification and usefulness depend, and how they have grown up, individually, out of the givens of experience. Thus their excessive authority will be broken. They will be removed if they cannot be properly legitimated, corrected if their correlation with given things be far too superfluous, or replaced if a new system can be established that we prefer for whatever reason.
Similar problems keep reappearing in both the discussion about the “hard ” problem of consciousness and in fundamental issues in quantum theory. We argue that the similarities are due to common problems within the conceptual foundations of both fields. In quantum physics, the state reduction marks the “coming into being” of a new aspect of reality for which no causal explanation is available. Likewise, the self-referential nature of consciousness constitutes a “coming into being ” of a new quality which goes beyond a fully causal account of reality. Both subjects require a categorical scheme which is significantly richer then the one used in addressing factual aspects of reality alone. While parts of this categorical scheme are realized in the formalism of quantum theory, they are seldom applied in the context of consciousness. We show what the structural limitations of a classical categorical framework are, how a richer framework can be developed, and how it can be applied to both quantum physics and consciousness. Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as “necessities of thought”, “a priori givens”, etc. The path of scientific progress is often made impassable for a long time by such errors. Therefore it is by no means an idle game if we become practiced in analyzing long-held commonplace concepts and showing the circumstances on which their justification and usefulness depend, and how they have grown up, individually, out of the givens of experience. Thus their excessive authority will be broken. They will be removed if they cannot be properly legitimated, corrected if their correlation with given things be far too superfluous, or replaced if a new system can be established that we prefer for whatever reason.
This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
The hard problem in consciousness is the problem of understanding how physical processes in the brain could give rise to subjective conscious experience. In this paper, I suggest that in order to understand the relationship between consciousness and the physical world, we need to probe deeply into the nature of physical reality. This leads us to quantum physics and to a second explanatory gap: that between quantum and classical reality. I will seek a philosophical framework that can address these two gaps simultaneously. Our analysis of quantum mechanics will naturally lead us to the notion of a hidden reality and to the postulate that consciousness is an integral component of this reality. The framework proposed in the paper provides the philosophical underpinnings for a theory of consciousness while satisfactorily resolving the interpretation problem in quantum mechanics without the need to alter its mathematical structure. I also discuss some implications for a scientific theory of consciousness.
Introduction We saw in Part I that in addition to explaining consciousness there is another hard problem for the modern scientific worldview – understanding what quantum physics is telling us about reality. And if anything this one is harder. In philosophy of mind there is at least consensus enough for an orthodox position to exist (materialism), and a widespread expectation that it will be vindicated by future neuroscience. By contrast, in philosophy of physics all sides understand that quantum theory is compatible with a variety of metaphysical interpretations, and have little hope that new empirical discoveries will settle the matter. But both problems are “hard” in the sense that, despite tremendous intellectual effort over many decades, no clear progress has been made toward solving them. The basic idea of quantum consciousness theory is that bringing the two problems into contact may be the key to solving both (though I will be addressing only the mind–body problem in what follows). That this could be a novel idea attests to the fact that their philosophical discussions have evolved quite separately. While philosophers of physics have long been interested in the role of consciousness in the measurement process, they have engaged little with the mind–body problem per se; and philosophers of mind have been almost unanimous in dismissing the suggestion that consciousness has anything interesting to do with quantum physics. Social scientists might echo such skepticism, wondering how adding the problem of interpreting quantum theory to the problem of consciousness will help them . Besides piling up jargon and arcane debates, in moving to the sub-atomic level we are now even farther removed from the human world, and seemingly poised to engage in the most vulgar reductionism. Yet, naïvely one might expect the two problems to be related, for two reasons. The first is the intriguing analogies mentioned in Chapter 1 between the mental and quantum domains.
Abstract Underlying any physical theory is a layer of conceptual frames. They connect the mathematical structures used in theoretical models with the phenomena, but they also constitute our fundamental assumptions about reality. Many of the discrepancies between quantum physics and classical physics (including Maxwell's electrodynamics and relativity) can be traced back to these categorical foundations. We argue that classical physics corresponds to the factual aspects of reality and requires a categorical framework which consists of four interdependent components: boolean logic, the linear‐sequential notion of time, the principle of sufficient reason, and the dichotomy between observer and observed. None of these can be dropped without affecting the others. However, quantum theory also addresses the “status nascendi” of facts, i.e., their coming into being. Therefore, quantum physics requires a different conceptual framework which will be elaborated in this article. It is shown that many of its components are already present in the standard formalisms of quantum physics, but in most cases they are highlighted not so much from a conceptual perspective but more from their mathematical structures. The categorical frame underlying quantum physics includes a profoundly different notion of time which encompasses a crucial role for the present. The article introduces the concept of a categorical apparatus (a framework of interdependent categories), explores the appropriate apparatus for classical and quantum theory, and elaborates in particular on the category of non‐sequential time and an extended present which seems to be relevant for a quantum theory of (space)‐time.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness, articulated by David Chalmers, remains the central, unresolved challenge in the scientific study of mind. It questions how and why subjective, qualitative experience arises from objective, physical processes. Mainstream materialism, which posits consciousness as an emergent property of complex computation in the brain, has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, leading to what is often termed an "explanatory gap." This thesis examines a radical alternative: Quantum Information Panpsychism (QIP), a theory proposed by physicist and microprocessor pioneer Federico Faggin in collaboration with theoretical physicist Prof. Giacomo Mauro D'Ariano. QIP posits that consciousness is not emergent but fundamental, a primary aspect of reality intrinsic to the dynamics of quantum fields. In this framework, the physical universe is composed of conscious, self-knowing quantum processes, and what we perceive as our individual consciousness is a complex, integrated stream derived from this fundamental ground. This thesis will delineate the philosophical and scientific foundations of QIP, contrast it with prevailing materialist and emergentist models, explore its proposed solutions to the Hard Problem and the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, analyze its testable predictions, and evaluate its profound implications for our understanding of reality, free will, and the human condition. 1. Introduction: The Crisis of Consciousness and the Quantum Turn For over three centuries, since the dawn of the Newtonian scientific revolution, the dominant worldview has been one of mechanistic materialism. In this view, the universe is a vast, clockwork-like system of mindless particles governed by deterministic laws. Life and mind are seen as late-arriving epiphenomena, complex but ultimately accidental byproducts of blind physical forces. The brain, according to this paradigm, is a classical computer, and consciousness is the software that miraculously "boots up" when its neural circuitry reaches a sufficient level of complexity. Despite its dominance, this materialist paradigm faces an insurmountable obstacle: the Hard Problem of Consciousness. While science has made tremendous progress on the "easy problems" (e.g., correlating brain activity with specific perceptions, reporting mental states, focusing attention), it remains utterly silent on why any of this processing should be accompanied by subjective experience at all. Why does the firing of C-fibers feel like pain? Why do certain wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation manifest as the subjective quality of "redness"? As Thomas Nagel famously argued, there is something it is like to be a bat, or a human, and no amount of objective, third-person physical description seems capable of capturing that "what-it-is-likeness." This explanatory gap has led a growing number of philosophers and scientists to reconsider a class of theories known as panpsychism—the view that mind, or consciousness, is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. Panpsychism, in its ancient and modern forms, suggests that the mental does not emerge from the non-mental but is instead present at the most basic levels of reality. However, traditional panpsychism often struggles with the "combination problem": how do the minuscule conscious experiences of fundamental particles (e.g., electrons, quarks) combine to form the rich, unified consciousness of a human being? It is at this juncture that the theory of Quantum Information Panpsychism (QIP), proposed by Federico Faggin and Giacomo D'Ariano, makes its entrance. Faggin is no ordinary theorist; as the designer of the world's first commercial microprocessor (the Intel 4004) and developer of the silicon gate technology that underpins modern computing, he possesses a deep, practical understanding of information processing systems. His disillusionment with the computational theory of mind, based on his firsthand knowledge of what computers can and cannot do, propelled him on a decades-long quest to find a more coherent theory of consciousness. Partnering with D'Ariano, a leading expert in quantum foundations and information theory, they have formulated a sophisticated model that marries a specific interpretation of quantum mechanics with a novel form of panpsychism. This thesis will argue that QIP represents a profound and potentially revolutionary framework that addresses the core deficiencies of materialism, offers elegant solutions to long-standing puzzles in both neuroscience and quantum physics, and, most importantly, provides a scientifically-grounded path toward re-integrating mind back into the fabric of physical reality. 2. The Architects of a New Paradigm: Faggin and D'Ariano Understanding the provenance of QIP is crucial to appreciating its substance. Federico Faggin is an engineer and physicist by training, whose work is literally the bedrock of the digital age. His intimate familiarity with the deterministic, algorithmic nature of classical computation led him to a critical insight: consciousness cannot be computation. He argues that computers, no matter how complex, manipulate symbols according to predefined rules without any understanding of their meaning or any inner experience. The "intelligence" of AI is a simulation, a sophisticated pattern matching devoid of sentience. This conviction forced him to look beyond classical physics for the origins of consciousness. Prof. Giacomo Mauro D'Ariano, on the other hand, brings the weight of modern theoretical physics to the partnership. A proponent of the Quantum Darwinism and agent-based interpretations of quantum mechanics, D'Ariano's work focuses on reconstructing quantum theory from first principles related to information. Together, they form a unique interdisciplinary team: one, a master architect of the classical world, seeking the source of his own consciousness; the other, a theoretical physicist probing the deepest nature of reality. Their collaboration ensures that QIP is not merely philosophical speculation but is grounded in a rigorous, if speculative, interpretation of quantum theory. 3. Deconstructing the Prevailing Paradigm: The Failures of Materialism and Emergentism Before delving into QIP, it is essential to articulate why the prevailing paradigm is considered inadequate by its critics. 3.1 The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) and the Hard Problem The CTM is the dominant materialist model, viewing the brain as a biological computer and the mind as its software. Faggin’s critique is devastatingly simple: computation is a syntactic process (manipulation of symbols based on form), while consciousness is semantic (it involves meaning and understanding). A computer processing the word "red" has no access to the qualitative experience of redness. The Hard Problem highlights this chasm; we can know everything about the neurophysiology of vision without making any progress on understanding why such physiology is accompanied by a visual experience. The emergence of consciousness from complex computation is presented as a brute fact, an unexplained miracle. 3.2 The Combination Problem for Classical Panpsychism Classical panpsychism, which attributes elementary consciousness to particles, runs aground on the combination problem. If an electron has a modicum of experience, how do trillions of such experiences, mediated by classical electromagnetic and chemical signals, sum together to form my unified field of awareness? The classical world is one of external relations; objects interact by exchanging force carriers, but their interiors remain separate. There is no known mechanism in classical physics by which internal subjective states could "add up." This renders classical panpsychism seemingly incoherent, as it cannot bridge the gap between micro-experience and macro-experience. 3.3 The Measurement Problem in Quantum Mechanics In parallel to the consciousness problem, quantum mechanics has its own foundational crisis: the measurement problem. The Schrödinger equation describes quantum systems as existing in superpositions of multiple states (e.g., a particle being both here and there). Yet, when we measure such a system, we find it in one definite state. The standard Copenhagen interpretation postulates a mysterious "collapse of the wave function" caused by measurement, but it leaves the terms "measurement" and "observer" undefined and vaguely classical. This introduces a dualism into physics: a quantum realm governed by wave-like probabilities and a classical realm where definite reality appears, with no clear boundary between them. As Eugene Wigner and others suggested, this points toward consciousness itself playing a role in collapsing the wave function, a notion that materialism fiercely resists. QIP arises as a direct response to these three profound failures. 4. The Core Tenets of Quantum Information Panpsychism (QIP) Faggin and D'Ariano's theory is built upon several interlocking principles that redefine the relationship between consciousness, information, and matter. 4.1 Consciousness as a Fundamental Property of Quantum Fields The central axiom of QIP is that consciousness is not a product of matter but a fundamental property of the universe, akin to space-time, mass, or charge. More specifically, they identify consciousness with the intrinsic nature of quantum fields. In modern physics, the fundamental constituents of reality are not particles but fields whose excitations we perceive as particles. QIP posits that these fields are not blind, mechanical entities. Instead, they are intrinsically conscious. Every quantum process involves a modicum of subjective experience. This is a form of cosmopsychism or universal panpsychism—the entire universe is conscious, and what we call "matter" is simply its external, measurable aspect, while "mind" is its internal, subjective aspect. 4.2 Quantum Information as the Bridge The key conceptual bridge is the notion of information. In QIP, reality is fundamentally composed of "quantum information." However, this is not the classical, Shannonesque information of bits (0s and 1s). It is quantum information—qubits—which can be in superpositions and can become entangled. Faggin and D'Ariano propose that this quantum information has two inseparable sides: The Physical Side: The objective, measurable state of the quantum system (e.g., spin, position). The Mental Side: The subjective, qualitative experience of that system—its "what-it-is-likeness." This is a modern incarnation of Spinoza's dual-aspect monism, where the mental and the physical are two perspectives on the same underlying substance. The substance is conscious quantum information. 4.3 The Self as a Quantum Process: Free Will and the Quantum-Classical Machine This is perhaps the most distinctive and provocative aspect of QIP. Faggin proposes that a fundamental property of these conscious quantum fields is a primitive, spontaneous capacity for choice or free will. This is not a libertarian free will that violates physical law, but one that is integral to it at the quantum level. The "free will" of a quantum system is its inherent, non-algorithmic spontaneity to actualize one potentiality from a superposition of possibilities. In this model, our physical body and brain are exquisitely crafted "quantum-classical machines." The brain contains structures (potentially within microtubules in neurons, as suggested by Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose, or other quantum-coherent systems) that are sensitive to and can amplify these fundamental quantum choices. Our stream of consciousness is the integrated readout of a vast number of these microscopic, conscious decisions being made by the quantum fields within our brain. We are not the machine; we are the consciousness that operates the machine. Our sense of a unified self is the result of the brain's sophisticated mechanism for integrating these myriad quantum choices into a single, coherent narrative. This elegantly reframes the mind-body problem. The brain does not produce consciousness; it transduces, filters, and integrates a pre-existing, fundamental consciousness. It is a receiver and amplifier, not a generator. 5. 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