In an attempt to test the limits of the current interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which microscopic systems are always in a superposition of states, A. Leggett has proposed the thesis of macrorealism, according to which quantum mechanical superpositions of macroscopically distinct states never occur. Leggett has also shown the basic features of some experimental tests that would decide definitively between quantum mechanics and macrorealism. In this paper I develop an interpretation of macrorealism from which the experimental results can be understood as examples of violations of the principle of induction in which macrorealism rests, opening the door for solving the tension between QM and macrorealism in terms of the backwards causation. According to this interpretation there is no need for appealing to any special role played by either observers or measurement apparatuses in order to explain what differentiates quantum systems from macroscopic ones, a difference that could now be defined partly in terms of their causal and temporal directionality.
In an attempt to test the limits of the current interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which microscopic systems are always in a superposition of states, A. Leggett has proposed the thesis of macrorealism, according to which quantum mechanical superpositions of macroscopically distinct states never occur. Leggett has also shown the basic features of some experimental tests that would decide definitively between quantum mechanics and macrorealism. In this paper I develop an interpretation of macrorealism from which the experimental results can be understood as examples of violations of the principle of induction in which macrorealism rests, opening the door for solving the tension between QM and macrorealism in terms of the backwards causation. According to this interpretation there is no need for appealing to any special role played by either observers or measurement apparatuses in order to explain what differentiates quantum systems from macroscopic ones, a difference that could now be defined partly in terms of their causal and temporal directionality.
While quantum theory has been tested to an incredible degree on microscopic scales, quantum effects are seldom observed in our everyday macroscopic world. The curious results of applying quantum mechanics to macroscopic objects are perhaps best illustrated by Erwin Schrödinger's famous thought experiment, where a cat can be put into a superposition state of being both dead and alive. Obviously, these quantum predictions are in stark contradiction to our common experience. Even with plenty of theoretical explanations put forward to explain this discrepancy, a large number of questions about the frontier between the quantum and the classical world remain unanswered. To distinguish between classical and quantum behavior, two fundamental concepts inherent to classical physics have been established over the years: The world view of local realism limits the power of classical experiments to establish correlations over space, while the world view of macroscopic realism (or macrorealism) restricts temporal correlations. Necessary conditions for both world views have been formulated in the form of Bell and Leggett-Garg inequalities, and Bell inequalities have been shown to be violated by quantum mechanics through increasingly conclusive experiments. Furthermore, many challenging steps towards convincing violations of macrorealism have been taken in a number of recent experiments. In the first part of this thesis, conditions for macrorealism are analyzed in detail. Two necessary conditions for macrorealism, the original Leggett-Garg inequality and the recently proposed no-signaling in time condition, are presented. It is then shown that a combination of no-signaling in time conditions is not only necessary but also sufficient for the existence of a macrorealistic description. Finally, an operational formulation of no-signaling in time, in terms of positive-operator valued measurements and Hamiltonians, is derived. In the next part, we argue that these results lead to a suitable definition of classical behavior. In particular, we provide a formalism to judge the classicality of measurements and time evolutions. We then proceed to apply it to a number of exemplary measurement operators and Hamiltonians. Finally, we argue for the importance of spontaneously realized Hamiltonians in our intuition of classical behavior. Next, differences between local realism and macrorealism are analyzed. For this purpose, the probability polytopes for spatially and temporally separated experiments are compared, and a fundamental difference in the power of quantum mechanics to build both types of correlations is discovered. This result shows that Fine's theorem, which states that a set of Bell inequalities is necessary and sufficient for local realism, is not transferable to macrorealism. Thus, (Leggett-Garg) inequalities are in principle not well-suited for tests of macrorealism, as they can never form a necessary and sufficient condition, and unnecessarily restrict the violating parameter space. No-signaling in time is both better suited and more strongly motivated from the underlying physical theory. In the final part of this thesis, a concrete experimental setup for implementing quantum experiments with macroscopic objects is proposed. It consists of a superconducting micro-sphere in the Meißner state, which is levitated by magnetic fields. Through its expelled magnetic field, the sphere's center-of-mass motion couples to a superconducting quantum circuit. Properly tuned, ground state cooling can be realized, since the sphere's motion is extremely well isolated from the surrounding environment. This setup therefore is a promising candidate for the observation of quantum effects in macroscopic systems.
It is brought forward that viable theories of the physical world that have no variable at all that can play the role of time, do not exist; some notion of time is one of the very first ingredients a candidate theory should possess. Almost by definition, time has an arrow. In contrast, time reversibility, or even the possibility to run the equations of motion backwards in time, is not at all a primary requirement. This means that the direction of the arrow of time may well be uniquely defined in the theory, even locally. It is explained that a rigorous definition of time, as well as a formulation of the causality and locality concepts, can only be given when one has a model for the physical phenomena described. The only viable causality condition is one that is symmetric under time reversal. We explain these statements in terms of the author’s favoured deterministic cellular automaton interpretation of quantum mechanics, also to be referred to as 'vector space analysis', and expand on these ideas. It is also summarised how our more rigorous causality condition affects Bell’s theorems. What distinguishes quantum systems from classical ones is our fundamental inability to control the microscopic details of the initial state when phenomena are studied in the light of some theoretical model.
Macrorealism formalizes the seemingly intuitive notion that, in contrast with the principles of quantum mechanics, a physical system can be in a definite state at any given time and moreover its dynamical evolution is independent of the measurements performed on it. In this study, we carry out a comparative analysis between three-time Leggett--Garg-type inequalities and the conditions of no-signaling-in-time and arrow-of-time for macrorealism within the context of meson oscillations. Our findings indicate that, under given initial conditions, no violations of Leggett--Garg inequalities are observed. However, no-signaling-in-time conditions are found to be violated, thereby revealing the impossibility of applying a macrorealistic description to the physics of meson oscillations.
According to the world view of macrorealism, the properties of a given system exist prior to and independent of measurement, which is incompatible with quantum mechanics. Leggett and Garg put forward a practical criterion capable of identifying violations of macrorealism, and so far experiments performed on microscopic and mesoscopic systems have always agreed with quantum mechanics. However, a macrorealist can always assign the cause of such violations to the perturbation that measurements effect on such small systems, and hence a definitive test would require using noninvasive measurements, preferably on macroscopic objects, where such measurements seem more plausible. However, the generation of truly macroscopic quantum superposition states capable of violating macrorealism remains a big challenge. In this work we propose a setup that makes use of measurements on the polarization of light, a property that has been extensively manipulated both in classical and quantum contexts, hence establishing the perfect link between the microscopic and macroscopic worlds. In particular, we use Leggett-Garg inequalities and the criterion of no signaling in time to study the macrorealistic character of light polarization for different kinds of measurements, in particular with different degrees of coarse graining. Our proposal is noninvasive for coherent input states by construction. We show for states with well-defined photon number in two orthogonal polarization modes, that there always exists a way of making the measurement sufficiently coarse grained so that a violation of macrorealism becomes arbitrarily small, while sufficiently sharp measurements can always lead to a significant violation.
The problem of measurement taken at face value shows clearly that there is an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism.The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution to it.A widely debated question is to decide between two different interpretations.The first one is to consider that the decoherence process has the effect to actually project a superposed state into one of its classically interpretable component, hence doing the same job as the reduction postulate.For the second one, decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic superposed state can be observed and so, to explain the classical appearance of the macroscopic world, while the quantum entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment never disappears.In this case, explaining why only one single definite outcome is observed remains to do.In this paper, we examine arguments for and against both interpretations and defend a position according to which the outcome that is observed is relative to the observer in close parallel to the Everett interpretation.
On the basis of our recent model of a one-dimensional (1D) completed scattering we argue that Leggett's principles of macroscopic realism must and can be extended onto the level of single electrons and atoms. These principles need three quite feasible innovations in quantum mechanics (QM): (1) at the conceptual level, QM must treat a pure time-dependent one-particle state to involve two or more macroscopically distinct alternatives for a particle as a pure {\it combined} one - the intermediate link between a pure {\it elementary} state (indecomposable into macroscopically distinct parts) and statistical mixture; (2) at the mathematical level, QM must provide the presentation of the pure time-dependent combined state as a coherent superposition of macroscopically distinct elementary states (MDESs); (3) at the experimental level, QM must provide for such states two types of measurements - those for observing the interference pattern resulting from the joint action of MDESs, and non-demolishing 'which-way' measurements for scanning the individual properties of MDESs.