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Lecture notes in computer science

Tolerating Generalized Mobile Adversaries in Secure Multiparty Computation

Kannan Srinathan, Chandrasekharan Pandu Rangan

Published Jan 1, 2000• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/3-540-44495-5_12

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Most of this book has considered two-party and multiparty computation with security with (unfair) abort. This security notion allows the adversary to force the honest parties to abort even depending on the outputs of corrupted parties. (Note, however, that the adversary is not allowed to bias the output of honest parties in any other manner.) This relaxation of security is necessary if one wishes to tolerate arbitrarily many corruptions. A further relaxation considers computational security, where the adversary is assumed to be computationally bounded, e.g., probabilistic polynomial time. In this setting, any circuit can be securely realized even when arbitrarily many parties are corrupted, as long as one is willing to sacrifice fairness and robustness.