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Lecture notes in computer science

Trading correctness for privacy in unconditional multi-party computation

Matthias Fitzi, Martin Hirt, Ueli M. Maurer

Published Jan 1, 1998• 64 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bfb0055724

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Trading Correctness for Privacy in Unconditional Multi-Party Computation

Matthias Fitzi, Martin Hirt, Ueli M. Maurer

. This paper improves on the classical results in unconditionally secure multi-party computation among a set of n players, by considering a model with three simultaneously occurring types of player corruption: the adversary can actively corrupt (i.e. take full control over) up to ta players and, additionally, can passively corrupt (i.e. read the entire information of) up to tp players and fail-corrupt (i.e. stop the computation of) up to tf other players. The classical results in multi-party computation are for the special cases of only passive (ta = tf = 0) or only active (tp = tf = 0) corruption. In the passive case, every function can be computed securely if and only if tp ! n=2. In the active case, every function can be computed securely if and only if ta ! n=3; when a broadcast channel is available, then this bound is ta ! n=2. These bounds are tight. Strictly improving these results, one of our results states that, in addition to tolerating ta ! n=3 actively corrupted players, pr...

•Jan 1, 1998•5 citations
. This paper improves on the classical results in unconditionally secure multi-party computation among a set of n players, by considering a model with three simultaneously occurring types of player corruption: the adversary can actively corrupt (i.e. take full control over) up to ta players and, additionally, can passively corrupt (i.e. read the entire information of) up to tp players and fail-corrupt (i.e. stop the computation of) up to tf other players. The classical results in multi-party computation are for the special cases of only passive (ta = tf = 0) or only active (tp = tf = 0) corruption. In the passive case, every function can be computed securely if and only if tp ! n=2. In the active case, every function can be computed securely if and only if ta ! n=3; when a broadcast channel is available, then this bound is ta ! n=2. These bounds are tight. Strictly improving these results, one of our results states that, in addition to tolerating ta ! n=3 actively corrupted players, pr...