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The open universe: An argument for indeterminism

Karl Popper

Published Jan 1, 1982• 290 citations
OpenAlex

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THE INDETERMINATE PRESENT: AN ESSAY ON QUANTUM MECHANICS AND THE OPEN FUTURE

Cristian Mariani

The dissertation is a defense of the following conditional claim: if there are objective collapses of the wavefunction, then the future is genuinely open. Although this is no radically new idea, the strategy I shall use to defend it is a new one. It proceeds in two main steps. First, building upon the recent literature on metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum mechanics, I argue for the view that systems in superposition have be interpreted as objectively indeterminate state of affairs. Second, I propose an alternative way to think of openness, according to which the future is open as of t, if and only if there is an indeterminate state of affair S at t, and S becomes determinate at t? (with t? later than t). To argue for the second step, I will give an analysis of the objective collapses of the wavefunction as the becoming determinate of previously indeterminate systems. Furthermore, in developing my arguments, I will also make some remarks concerning the ontology of objective collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, the issue of whether metaphysical indeterminacy can be at some derivate level of reality, and the possibility of the openness of the future being an emergent phenomenon.

•Jan 27, 2020•0 citations
The dissertation is a defense of the following conditional claim: if there are objective collapses of the wavefunction, then the future is genuinely open. Although this is no radically new idea, the strategy I shall use to defend it is a new one. It proceeds in two main steps. First, building upon the recent literature on metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum mechanics, I argue for the view that systems in superposition have be interpreted as objectively indeterminate state of affairs. Second, I propose an alternative way to think of openness, according to which the future is open as of t, if and only if there is an indeterminate state of affair S at t, and S becomes determinate at t? (with t? later than t). To argue for the second step, I will give an analysis of the objective collapses of the wavefunction as the becoming determinate of previously indeterminate systems. Furthermore, in developing my arguments, I will also make some remarks concerning the ontology of objective collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, the issue of whether metaphysical indeterminacy can be at some derivate level of reality, and the possibility of the openness of the future being an emergent phenomenon.