Cryptographic Complexity Classes and Computational Intractability Assumptions
Hemanta K. Maji, Manoj Prabhakaran, Mike Rosulek
Which computational complexity assumptions are inherent to cryptography? We present a broad framework to pose and investigate this question. We first aim to understand the “cryptographic complexity ” of various tasks, independent of any computational assumptions. In our framework the cryptographic tasks are modeled as multi-party computation functionalities. We consider a universally composable secure protocol for one task given access to another task as the most natural complexity reduction between the two tasks. Some of these cryptographic complexity reductions are unconditional, others are unconditionally non-existent, but the vast majority appear to depend on computational assumptions; it is this relationship with computational assumptions that we study. In our detailed investigation of large classes of 2-party functionalities, we find that every reduction we are able to classify turns out to be unconditionally true or false, or else equivalent to the existence of one-way functions (OWF) or of semi-honest (equivalently, standalone-secure) oblivious transfer protocols (sh-OT). This leads us to conjecture that there are only a small finite number of distinct (i.e., black-box separable) computational assump-tions that are inherent among the infinite number of different cryptographic reductions in our framework. On moving to 3-party functionalities, there does exist a natural computational assumption, distinct from the OWF and sh-OT assumptions (namely, the existence of a key agreement protocol) that manifests itself as a cryptographic
International Conference on Supercomputing•Jan 1, 2009•13 citations