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AIP conference proceedings

Comments on a Discrepancy Between the Relativistic and the Quantum Concepts of Light

Claudia Pombo, Guillaume Adenier, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov, PEKKA J. LAHTI, Vladimir I. Man’ko, Theo M. Nieuwenhuizen

Published Jan 1, 2007• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The realist point of view of a physical theory assumes that physical concepts must have a correspondent in the phenomenological world. We adopt a slightly modified form of realism, based on Carnap's separation of languages, in which only the observational concepts, belonging to the observational language, have a phenomenological correspondent. Other physical concepts, belonging to a theoretical language, do not correspond to entities in the physical world. This point of view is named observational realism. Based on these ideas, we review the notions of relativistic and quantum observation, independently from measurement, and show that there is a discrepancy between the concepts of wave light in relativity and in quantum mechanics.

DOI
10.1063/1.2827327

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The realist point of view of a physical theory assumes that physical concepts must have a correspondent in the phenomenological world. We adopt a slightly modified form of realism, based on Carnap's separation of languages, in which only the observational concepts, belonging to the observational language, have a phenomenological correspondent. Other physical concepts, belonging to a theoretical language, do not correspond to entities in the physical world. This point of view is named observational realism. Based on these ideas, we review the notions of relativistic and quantum observation, independently from measurement, and show that there is a discrepancy between the concepts of wave light in relativity and in quantum mechanics.
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
Realism - the idea that the concepts in physical theories refer to `things' existing in the real world - is introduced as a tool to analyse the status of the wavefunction. Although the physical entities are recognized by the existence of invariant quantities, examples from classical and quantum physics suggest that not all the theoretical terms refer to the entities: some terms refer to properties of the entities, and some terms have only an epistemic function. In particular, it is argued that the wavefunction may be written in terms of classical non-referring and epistemic terms. The implications for realist interpretations of quantum mechanics and on the teaching of quantum physics are examined.
How can we explain the strange behavior of quantum and relativistic entities? Why do they behave in ways that defy our intuition about how physical entities should behave, considering our ordinary experience of the world around us? In this article, we address these questions by showing that the comportment of quantum and relativistic entities is not that strange after all, if we only consider what their nature might possibly be: not an objectual one, but a conceptual one. This not in the sense that quantum and relativistic entities would be human concepts, but in the sense that they would share with the latter a same conceptual nature, similarly to how electromagnetic and sound waves, although very different entities, can share a same undulatory nature. When this hypothesis is adopted, i.e., when a conceptuality interpretation about the deep nature of physical entities is taken seriously, many of the interpretational difficulties disappear and our physical world is back making sense, though our view of it becomes radically different from what our classical prejudice made us believe in the first place.
How can we explain the strange behavior of quantum and relativistic entities? Why do they behave in ways that defy our intuition about how physical entities should behave, considering our ordinary experience of the world around us? In this article, we address these questions by showing that the comportment of quantum and relativistic entities is not that strange after all, if we only consider what their nature might possibly be: not an objectual one, but a conceptual one. This not in the sense that quantum and relativistic entities would be human concepts, but in the sense that they would share with the latter a same conceptual nature, similarly to how electromagnetic and sound waves, although very different entities, can share a same undulatory nature. When this hypothesis is adopted, i.e., when a 'conceptuality interpretation' about the deep nature of physical entities is taken seriously, many of the interpretational difficulties disappear and our physical world is back making sense, though our view of it becomes radically different from what our classical prejudice made us believe in the first place.
The origin and elaboration of our fundamental theories like quantum theory, the theory of relativity and the quantum field theories can be traced to the study of light and its properties. While developing these theories, several notions on the behaviour of light have been hypothesized as well as asserted, sometimes without any direct or compelling empirical evidence. In the context of quantum physics, there is a widespread belief that experiments on quantum correlations establish nonlocality as an essential aspect of nature. Another unshakable belief without direct empirical support is the absolute constancy of the speed of light relative to moving observers. In this paper, I argue that no experiment on quantum correlations of spatially separated photons necessitates the concept of nonlocality, and that there is no direct empirical proof of nonlocality. I also comment on the need to modify established notions on quantum light, in the context of a clear conflict between cosmology and the zero point energy of quantum electrodynamics. Then I describe the first experiments on the measurement of the true one-way speed light relative to a reference platform that is in inertial motion. The results are at variance with the belief that the speed of light is independent of the velocity of the observer.
I suggest a contextual realist interpretation of Carlo Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics. The principal point is a correct understanding of the concept of reality and taking into account the categorical distinction between the ideal and the real. Within my interpretation, consciousness of the observer does not play any metaphysical role. The proposed approach can also be understood as a return to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, corrected within the framework of contextual realism. The contextual realism allows one to get rid of the metaphysical problems encountered by various interpretations of quantum mechanics, including the relational one. A wave function neither literally reflects an “exterior reality”, nor is it merely a predictive mathematical tool. In particular, an entangled wave function can be viewed as the formal cause of quantum correlations whose reality is contextual. The reduction of a wave function is not a real physical process. And there are no autonomous quantum events which would be different from the facts of their representation. The quantum measurement problem results from a confusion between the categories of the ideal and the real. It is dissolved logically. The quantum theory plays the role of a Wittgensteinian rule (norm), “measuring” physical reality within a language game of its application.