A conception of the Correspondence Principle which Bohr deployed implicitly in developing a new theory of atomic constitution in 1913, is made explicit through an extensive examination of his classic paper of that year. Arguments are considered which purport to show that the application of the principle must be restricted to few isolated cases. These arguments are either defused or rejected. In particular an extensive review of issues concerning the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is made to counter the claims that an insurmountable conceptual gap exits between the tenets of this theory and those of Classical Mechanics which makes it logically impossible for the latter to be regarded as the 'limiting case' of the former. In the light of a particular interpretation adopted and defended, a proposal is made that suggests that the Hamilton-Jacobi formulation of Classical Mechanics, as well as Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, can be viewed as 'limiting cases' of Quantum Mechanics. Having established a case for the global validity of the requirement imposed on physics by the Correspondence Principle, it is then argued that this requirement is indispensable if a particular brand of realism is adopted for the interpretation of theories in physics. Taking on board the assumption that an ultimate theory exists which mirrors the underlying physical constitution of the world, it is subsequently argued that the intertheory order established by the global imposition of the principle in physics, can be used to solve the problem of rational theory choice for this brand of realism.
A conception of the Correspondence Principle which Bohr deployed implicitly in developing a new theory of atomic constitution in 1913, is made explicit through an extensive examination of his classic paper of that year. Arguments are considered which purport to show that the application of the principle must be restricted to few isolated cases. These arguments are either defused or rejected. In particular an extensive review of issues concerning the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is made to counter the claims that an insurmountable conceptual gap exits between the tenets of this theory and those of Classical Mechanics which makes it logically impossible for the latter to be regarded as the 'limiting case' of the former. In the light of a particular interpretation adopted and defended, a proposal is made that suggests that the Hamilton-Jacobi formulation of Classical Mechanics, as well as Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, can be viewed as 'limiting cases' of Quantum Mechanics. Having established a case for the global validity of the requirement imposed on physics by the Correspondence Principle, it is then argued that this requirement is indispensable if a particular brand of realism is adopted for the interpretation of theories in physics. Taking on board the assumption that an ultimate theory exists which mirrors the underlying physical constitution of the world, it is subsequently argued that the intertheory order established by the global imposition of the principle in physics, can be used to solve the problem of rational theory choice for this brand of realism.
Niels Bohr’s “correspondence principle” is typically believed to be the requirement that in the limit of large quantum numbers (n→∞) there is a statistical agreement between the quantum and classical frequencies. A closer reading of Bohr’s writings on the correspondence principle, however, reveals that this interpretation is mistaken. Specifically, Bohr makes the following three puzzling claims: First, he claims that the correspondence principle applies to small quantum numbers as well as large (while the statistical agreement of frequencies is only for large n); second, he claims that the correspondence principle is a law of quantum theory; and third, Bohr argues that formal apparatus of matrix mechanics (the new quantum theory) can be thought of as a precise formulation of the correspondence principle. With further textual evidence, I offer an alternative interpretation of the correspondence principle in terms of what I call Bohr’s selection rule. I conclude by showing how this new interpretation of the correspondence principle readily makes sense of Bohr’s three puzzling claims.
Abstract It is well known that the experimental facts of atomic physics necessitate a departure from the classical theory of electrodynamics in the description of atomic phenomena. This departure takes the form, in Bohr’s theory, of the special assumptions of the existence of stationary states of an atom, in which it does not radiate, and of certain rules, called quantum conditions, which fix the stationary states and the frequencies of the radiation emitted during transitions between them. These assumptions are quite foreign to the classical theory, but have been very successful in the interpretation of a restricted region of atomic phenomena. The only way in which the classical theory is used is through the assumption that the classical laws hold for the description of the motion in the stationary states, although they fail completely during transitions, and the assumption, called the Correspondence Principle, that the classical theory gives the right results in the limiting case when the action per cycle of the system is large compared to Planck’s constant h, and in certain other special cases. In a recent paper Heisenberg puts forward a new theory, which suggests that it is not the equations of classical mechanics that are in any way at fault, but that the mathematical operations by which physical results are deduced from them require modification. All the information supplied by the classical theory can thus be made use of in the new theory.
Bohr's 1913 trilogy marks a turning point in the history of quantum physics for its introduction of the planetary model of the atom and its derivation of the Balmer formula for the hydrogen spectrum. It has been studied in the seminal study 1 and is discussed more recently by 2-4. Famously, Bohr's classical paper made two utterly non-classical assumptions, according to which electrons orbited the nucleus in stationary states without losing energy while they emitted radiation only in transitions between these states. As I will argue in this paper, Bohr's 1913 trilogy made a third crucial major assumption, which entailed key elements of the correspondence principle formulated five years later. This third assumption postulated a relation between the mechanical frequency of a stationary state and the radiation frequency in analogy with classical radiation theory. Though this relation was in direct conflict with the key assumptions of stationary states and transitions, Bohr's reasoning—as I want to show—relied heavily on it, and a major part of his initial work was devoted to clarifying how the connection of radiation and motion, the stationary states and the transitions were interrelated. The main aim of Bohr's 1913 trilogy was to derive the Balmer formula from the newly-proposed atomic model. After the introduction of the stationary states and the frequency condition, the derivation follows a three-step recipe consisting of the calculation of the energy from classical mechanics, the quantization of the energy and finally the calculation of the spectral frequencies via the Planck Relation . Given the simplicity of the system considered and the assumption of the stationary states and the frequency condition, the first and last step did not call for an extended argument and Bohr simply gave the relevant equations. As Bohr explicitly acknowledged, the classical radiation mechanism was replaced entirely by the fundamental assumptions of his model: radiation is produced through a transition between stationary states. Though 1 was in direct conflict with the physical assumptions of his model, Bohr's thinking nonetheless depended crucially on it. This is emphasized by the fact that Bohr knew that he could quantize the orbits on the assumption that the angular momentum of the atom is equal to .1 While 1 could not be interpreted as a description of a physical process in a classical sense, Bohr kept the equation and explored its conceptual significance within his new quantum theory of the atom. This was a vital concern for Bohr, first, because he needed a justification; second, because he hoped for insights on how to develop the theory by investigating which parts of classical radiation theory could still be used within the new model. The investigation of this question loomed large in Bohr's 1913 paper and continued to play an important role in his early work on the quantum theory of the atom. For the preceding argument Bohr justified the radiation-motion relation by means of a comparison between the radiation process and the motion of the electron before and after the radiation process. This justification itself was not very convincing: it rested solely on its empirical success and the questionable mean-value argument, and Bohr decided to give a second derivation of the Balmer formula to add further plausibility to 1. Already his first hand waving argument, however, points to some of the central aspects of his attempt to connect radiation and electronic motion: In light of the missing radiation mechanism in quantum theory, Bohr tried to recover a relation between radiation and electronic motion within quantum theory analogous to the one in classical radiation theory. He refrained from proposing a new hypothetical radiation mechanism and shied away from such assumptions until 1924. Instead he resorted to experimental, mathematical and intertheoretical arguments to construct a formal relation between radiation and matter and aimed to get insights into the properties of a radiation mechanism yet to be found. In order to be equivalent to the empirical Balmer formula this function has to be , as Bohr showed by comparing the frequency of a quantum transition and the orbiting frequencies of the stationary states in the case of high quantum numbers, in which classical electrodynamics and quantum theory predict the same numerical value for the radiation frequency. This result implied the consistency of his major assumptions, the radiation-motion connection and the Balmer formula, which entered as an empirical constraint. For the argument the high quantum number limit plays an important role as it renders the condition for the consistency precisely and shows that the assumption of a relation between radiation and motion within quantum theory leads to the agreement of quantum theory and classical theory in this limit. The possibility of an emission of a radiation of such a frequency may also be interpreted from analogy with ordinary electrodynamics, as an electron rotating round a nucleus in an elliptical orbit will emit a radiation which according to Fourier's theorem can be resolved into homogeneous components, the frequencies of which are [5, 14]. This recapturing of the relation between orbital frequency and the radiation frequency is part of Bohr's conclusion: While classical electrodynamics in general is in contradiction with the basic assumptions of the Bohr model, the classical relation between the frequency of radiation and the mechanical frequency can be established at least in the classical limit as a formal relation. To show this is as important to Bohr as to show that his new model predicts the correct Balmer formula. As such the classical relation between motion and radiation is indispensable for Bohr's early work as a touchstone for his two derivations and it is of vital concern in the attempt to explore the break and the continuity with classical radiation theory. The radiation-motion relation continued to play an important role in Bohr's works following the 1913 trilogy; after he had finished his initial papers Bohr adapted his model to account for the Stark and Zeeman effects. The relation between radiation and motion played a major role in the initial work establishing the Bohr model and its extension to the Stark and Zeeman effect. Stemming from classical radiation theory this relation was in contradiction with the major assumptions of the new model of the atom; nonetheless, Bohr's thinking relied heavily on the radiation-motion connection both in establishing his results and in clarifying the foundations of the new model. Compared with his later statements on the correspondence principle there is a remarkable resemblance between the statements in 1913/1914 and the correspondence idea between 1918 and 1923: In both cases the relation between the orbiting frequency and the frequency of radiation and the asymptotic limit between quantum theory and classical electrodynamics were at the core of Bohr's reasoning. Also the idea of the Fourier series is mentioned, which would become ever more important in the development of the correspondence idea.5 While the core elements of the later principle are already apparent in the early phase, they are used very differently in both phases. This shift in the usage of the basic correspondence relation was due to the development of the quantum theory of the atom as a whole. The physicists who developed Bohr's initial model mainly extended the description of the stationary states to more complicated systems with the help of celestial mechanics. In this context the relation between the radiation frequency and the orbiting frequency was replaced by Sommerfeld's quantum condition: . The new relation did not involve any assumptions on the radiation process or the interaction between radiation and matter, it was a statement about the action of a mechanical system and its quantization. The fruitfulness of this new quantization condition led physicists including Bohr to abandon the early quantization procedure. Through this abandonment, the frequency condition became the sole relation of radiation theory, which was needed to determine the series formulae describing atomic spectra. Whereas the loss of the classical radiation mechanism had been a vital concern for Bohr in his early works, this was no longer the case in the development of the quantum theory of the atom. The relation should, however, resurface in Bohr's thinking about the transitions in quantum theory and in this form led to the formulation of the correspondence principle.
I reinterpret Bohr's attitude towards quantum mechanical formalism and its empirical content, based on his understanding of the correspondence principle and its approximate applicability. I suggest that Bohr understood complementarity as a limitation imposed by the commutation relations upon the applicability of the idealizations which had grounded the use of the correspondence principle. By discussing this interpretation against the contemporary background of discussions regarding “naïve realism” about operators (as observables), I suggest that a Bohrian view on the empirical content of quantum mechanical operators may provide a middle ground between complete contextualism and an untenable realism about quantum properties.
The so-called “orthodox” interpretation of quantum physics attributed to Niels Bohr is commonly regarded as abandoning realism. I have already opposed this view elsewhere (Folse 1985) but partially in response to criticism of my position (Shimony 1985), here I propose to relate Bohr’s realism to recent contributions to the realism debate given by Hacking (1983), Cartwright (1983), and Ellis (1985). Specifically, I argue that Bohr’s complementarity viewpoint requires a causal entity realism. Furthermore, labeling Bohr an anti-realist with respect to theories is misleading because it assumes the correspondence theory of truth that Bohr holds quantum theory forces us to reject. Although there are many realist views, I take the root of realism to be the quest for knowledge about the reality producing the phenomena we experience. It is realism in this sense that Bohr defended and that makes science significant to metaphysics.
Conceptual and formal problems Many of the problems surrounding the interpretation of quantum mechanics stem from the absence of a sufficiently general and physically transparent analysis of the connection with the domain in which classical concepts are assumed to apply. It is the purpose of this chapter to describe with the aid of a few examples how the quantum potential approach provides a context within which the conceptual and formal issues raised by this problem may be clarified. A key question is to explain how the state or context dependence which is so characteristic of the quantum domain turns into state independence at a certain level, characterized as ‘classical’. To illustrate one aspect of the conceptual problem we recall that in Bohr's interpretation the validity of classical concepts is already presupposed since, it is suggested, it is only in terms of these that one can unambiguously communicate the results of experiments in the quantum domain. Thus, classical physics must be considered as prior to quantum mechanics and the latter is a generalization of the former in that it provides a new set of laws governing the application of classical concepts. According to this view, any procedure by which classical mechanics is recovered from quantum mechanics as a mathematical limit can only be a demonstration of consistency with the already postulated epistemological relation between the two theories and not as a ‘derivation’ of classical mechanics from quantum mechanics (George, Prigogine & Rosenfeld, 1972).