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Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics

Experimental quantum key distribution using macroscopic non-classical optical pulses

Andrew Funk, Michael G. Raymer, Dominic William Berry

Published Jan 1, 2004• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We present experimental results for a proof-of-principle demonstration of a quantum key-distribution system using macroscopic non-classical optical pulses. The results show a bit error rate of less than the 11% threshold required for absolute security.
DOI
10.1364/iqec.2004.ituj4

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