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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: A neurophysical model o f mind/brain interaction

Henry Pierce Stapp, Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Mario Beauregard

Published Jun 1, 2004• 7 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human beings about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual structure for describing neural processes.

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Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human beings about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual structure for describing neural processes.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g., ''feeling,'' ''knowing,'' and ''effort'') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classical physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, due to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analyzing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classical-physics-based predecessor is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics, and is able to represent more adequately than classical concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. 'feeling', 'knowing' and 'effort') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.
The cognitive frame in which most neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior is conducted contains the assumption that brain mechanisms per se fully suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms must therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. One consequence of this stance is that psychological terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (terms such as "feeling," "knowing," and "effort") have not been included as primary causal factors in neuropsychological research: insofar as properties are not described in material terms they are deemed irrelevant to the causal mechanisms underlying brain function. However, the origin of this demand that experiential realities be excluded from the causal base is a theory of nature that has been known for more that three quarters of a century to be fundamentally incorrect. It is explained here why it is consequently scientifically unwarranted to assume that material factors alone can in principle explain all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience. More importantly, it is explained how a key quantum effect can be introduced into brain dynamics in a simple and practical way that provides a rationally coherent, causally formulated, physics-based way of understanding and using the psychological and physical data derived from the growing set of studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.
There have been numerous neurobiological theories positing that quantum mechanics is importantly responsible for certain psychological phenomena, such as consciousness and conscious decision-making. In this respect, such theories understand the relevant aspects of the brain to be “quantum mechanical.” Although it is highly questionable whether any of these theories have the requisite or sufficient empirical evidence strictly within the domain of neuroscience to appropriately justify their views, a different approach to arguing that quantum mechanics is importantly relevant to human decisionmaking will be discussed. By putting various puzzle pieces together of empirical evidence in psychology that quantum probability models describe certain human cognitive decision-making processes, I contend that human decision-making overall is best described by quantum mechanical processes. Finally, I at times provide a novel defense of this view from a number of objections.
Quantum physics, a branch of physics that deals with the behavior of particles at the smallest scales, has long fascinated scientists with its counterintuitive principles. In recent decades, the intersection of quantum physics and neuroscience has become an area of intense research interest, offering novel insights into the workings of the human brain and the complexities of the mind. This paper explores the role of quantum physics in neuroscience and its potential implications for the future of psychology.