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New Journal of Physics

The SECOQC Quantum-Key-Distribution Network in Vienna

Momtchil Peev, Christoph Pacher, Romain Alléaume, C Barreiro, J Bouda, W Boxleitner, Thierry Debuisschert, Eleni Diamanti, Mehrdad Dianati, J F Dynes, S Fasel, Simon Fossier, M Fürst, J-D Gautier, O Gay, N Gisin, Philippe Grangier, A Happe, Y Hasani, M Hentschel, H Hübel, G Humer, T Länger, M Legré, R Lieger, Jérôme Lodewyck, Thomas Lorünser, N Lütkenhaus, A Marhold, T Matyus, O Maurhart, L Monat, S Nauerth, J-B Page, A Poppe, E Querasser, G Ribordy, S Robyr, Louis Salvail, A W Sharpe, A J Shields, D Stucki, M Suda, C Tamas, T Themel, Rob Thew, Y Thoma, A Treiber, P Trinkler, Rosa Tualle-Brouri, F Vannel, Nino Walenta, H Weier, Harald Weinfurter, I Wimberger, Z L Yuan, H Zbinden, Anton Zeilinger

Published Jan 1, 2009• 83 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we present the quantum key distribution (QKD) network designed and implemented by the European project SE cure CO mmunication based on Q uantum C ryptography (SECOQC) (2004–2008), unifying the efforts of 41 research and industrial organizations. The paper summarizes the SECOQC approach to QKD networks with a focus on the trusted repeater paradigm. It discusses the architecture and functionality of the SECOQC trusted repeater prototype, which has been put into operation in Vienna in 2008 and publicly demonstrated in the framework of a SECOQC QKD conference held from October 8 to 10, 2008. The demonstration involved one-time pad encrypted telephone communication, a secure (AES encryption protected) video-conference with all deployed nodes and a number of rerouting experiments, highlighting basic mechanisms of the SECOQC network functionality. The paper gives an overview of the eight point-to-point network links in the prototype and their underlying technology: three plug and play systems by id Quantique, a one way weak pulse system from Toshiba Research in the UK, a coherent one-way system by GAP Optique with the participation of id Quantique and the AIT Austrian Institute of Technology (formerly ARCAustrian Research Centers GmbH—ARC is now operating under the new name AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH following a restructuring initiative.), an entangled photons system by the University of Vienna and the AIT, a continuous-variables system by Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and THALES Research and Technology with the participation of Université Libre de Bruxelles, and a free space link by the Ludwig Maximillians University in Munich connecting two nodes situated in adjacent buildings (line of sight 80 m). The average link length is between 20 and 30 km, the longest link being 83 km. The paper presents the architecture and functionality of the principal networking agent —the SECOQC node module , which enables the authentic classical communication required for key distillation, manages the generated key material, determines a communication path between any destinations in the network, and realizes end-to-end secure transport of key material between these destinations. The paper also illustrates the operation of the network in a number of typical exploitation regimes and gives an initial estimate of the network transmission capacity, defined as the maximum amount of key that can be exchanged, or alternatively the amount of information that can be transmitted with information theoretic security, between two arbitrary nodes.

DOI
10.1088/1367-2630/11/7/075001

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In this paper, we present the quantum key distribution (QKD) network designed and implemented by the European project SE cure CO mmunication based on Q uantum C ryptography (SECOQC) (2004–2008), unifying the efforts of 41 research and industrial organizations. The paper summarizes the SECOQC approach to QKD networks with a focus on the trusted repeater paradigm. It discusses the architecture and functionality of the SECOQC trusted repeater prototype, which has been put into operation in Vienna in 2008 and publicly demonstrated in the framework of a SECOQC QKD conference held from October 8 to 10, 2008. The demonstration involved one-time pad encrypted telephone communication, a secure (AES encryption protected) video-conference with all deployed nodes and a number of rerouting experiments, highlighting basic mechanisms of the SECOQC network functionality. The paper gives an overview of the eight point-to-point network links in the prototype and their underlying technology: three plug and play systems by id Quantique, a one way weak pulse system from Toshiba Research in the UK, a coherent one-way system by GAP Optique with the participation of id Quantique and the AIT Austrian Institute of Technology (formerly ARCAustrian Research Centers GmbH—ARC is now operating under the new name AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH following a restructuring initiative.), an entangled photons system by the University of Vienna and the AIT, a continuous-variables system by Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and THALES Research and Technology with the participation of Université Libre de Bruxelles, and a free space link by the Ludwig Maximillians University in Munich connecting two nodes situated in adjacent buildings (line of sight 80 m). The average link length is between 20 and 30 km, the longest link being 83 km. The paper presents the architecture and functionality of the principal networking agent —the SECOQC node module , which enables the authentic classical communication required for key distillation, manages the generated key material, determines a communication path between any destinations in the network, and realizes end-to-end secure transport of key material between these destinations. The paper also illustrates the operation of the network in a number of typical exploitation regimes and gives an initial estimate of the network transmission capacity, defined as the maximum amount of key that can be exchanged, or alternatively the amount of information that can be transmitted with information theoretic security, between two arbitrary nodes.
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A global Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) network, as the one developed in the European project SECOQC [1] is an infrastructure capable of realizing long-distance secret key establishment with information-theoretic security. Due to the specificity of their physical layer, the structure and the principle of operation of QKD networks will however significantly differ from the solutions adopted for “classical ” networks. The deployment of QKD networks is indeed far from being straightforward: it implies the con-ception of a network architecture connecting multiple users that may possibly be very far away from each other, all of this while QKD links are currently point-to-point only and intrinsically limited in distance. We will describe the logical architecture we have adopted for QKD networks with the SECOQC project. It is based on the original concept of maintaining a dedicated “network of secrets ” in order to distribute and manage the secret key material produced by QKD devices. We will alo present specific issues related to the development of a stack of network protocols adapted to the specific constraints of such infrastructures [2]. We have also considered QKD networks from a topology viewpoint and study analytically how cost minimization arguments impact on the optimal working points of individual QKD links [3]. We show in particular that, in the perspective of QKD networks, individual QKD links should be operated at an optimal working distance that can be significantly shorter than the maximum distance imposed by detector dark counts. We explain why such results motivate the research of new experimental compromise in practical QKD systems, and illustrate that point by considering the example of the recently developped DPSK QKD system [4].
The European Quantum Communication Infrastructure (EuroQCI) initiative is fostering the deployment of national quantum key distribution (QKD) testbeds across the European Union. In this context, we report on the design, implementation, and evaluation of the Austrian testbed, with a particular focus on advances in key management and applicationlevel integration of QKD. First, we introduce a hybrid key management system (KMS) that combines QKD-derived keys in a decentralized architecture with post-quantum authenticated key exchange, enabling end-to-end hybrid keys while reducing trust assumptions in intermediate nodes. Second, we present three QKD-enabled applications: (i) a secure secret-sharing-based storage system leveraging QKD-protected share distribution, (ii) a QKD-integrated extension of Jitsi employing ETSI GS QKD 014 group keys to reduce overhead in multi-party communication, and (iii) a hybrid QKD/PQC WireGuard-based VPN enabling QKD-secured HSM backup operations without requiring modifications to proprietary HSM protocols. Finally, we describe the deployment of these solutions in a national network comprising a four-node metropolitan testbed and a 200 km long-distance link with trusted nodes, and provide performance measurements for both the network and the hybrid KMS. Together, these results demonstrate the feasibility of integrating QKD into heterogeneous applications and hybrid cryptographic infrastructures.
Abstract A point‐to‐point quantum key distribution (QKD) system takes advantage of the laws of quantum physics to establish secret keys between two communicating parties. Compared to the classical methods, such as public‐key infrastructures, QKD offers unconditional security, which makes it attractive for very high security applications. However, this unprecedent level of security is mitigated by the inherent constraints of quantum communications, such as the limited rates and ranges of an individual point‐to‐point QKD link. A QKD network, which can be built by combining multiple point‐to‐point QKD devices, can alleviate the constraints and enable point‐to‐multi‐point key distribution based on QKD technology. The European project, secure communication based on quantum cryptography (SeCoQC) aims at deploying a prototype QKD network, which will be demonstrated in September 2008, by developing the architecture and the protocols, as well as the specific hardware for long‐range QKD networks. This paper discusses the important aspects of the architecture and the network layer protocols of the SeCoQC QKD network. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.