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Lecture notes in computer science

On the Necessary and Sufficient Assumptions for UC Computation

Ivan Damgård, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Claudio Orlandi

Published Jan 1, 2010• 19 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_8

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We present a unified framework for obtaining general secure computation that achieves adaptive-Universally Composable (UC)-security. Our framework captures essentially all previous results on adaptive concurrent secure computation, both in relaxed models (e.g., quasi-polynomial time simulation), as well as trusted setup models (e.g., the CRS model, the imperfect CRS model). This provides conceptual simplicity and insight into what is required for adaptive and concurrent security, as well as yielding improvements to set-up assumptions and/or computational assumptions. Moreover, using our framework we provide first constructions of concurrent secure computation protocols that are adaptively secure in the timing model, and in the non-uniform simulation model. Conceptually, our framework can be viewed as an adaptive analogue to the recent work of Lin, Pass and Venkitasubramaniam [STOC ‘09], who considered only non-adaptive adversaries. Their main insight was that stand-alone non-malleability was sufficient for UC-security. A main conceptual contribution of this work is, quite surprisingly, that it is indeed the case even when considering adaptive security. A key element in our construction is a commitment scheme that satisfies a new notion of nonmalleability.

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Abstract. We study the necessary and sufficient assumptions for universally composable (UC) computation, both in terms of setup and computational assumptions. We look at the common reference string model, the uniform random string model and the key-registration authority model (KRA), and provide new results for all of them. Perhaps most interestingly we show that: – For even the minimal meaningful KRA, where we only assume that the secret key is a value which is hard to compute from the public key, one can UC securely compute any poly-time functionality if there exists a passive secure oblivious-transfer protocol for the stand-alone model. Since a KRA where the secret keys can be computed from the public keys is useless, and some setup assumption is needed for UC secure computation, this establishes the best we could hope for the KRA model: any non-trivial KRA is sufficient for UC computation. – We show that in the KRA model one-way functions are sufficient for UC commitment and UC zero-knowledge. These are the first examples of UC secure protocols for non-trivial tasks which do not assume the existence of public-key primitives. In particular, the protocols show that non-trivial UC computation is possible in Minicrypt. 1
Algorithmic progress and future technological advances threaten today’s cryptographic protocols. This may allow adversaries to break a protocol retrospectively by breaking the underlying complexity assumptions long after the execution of the protocol. Longterm secure protocols, protocols that after the end of the execution do not reveal any information to a then possibly unlimited adversary, could meet this threat. On the other hand, in many applications, it is necessary that a protocol is secure not only when executed alone, but within arbitrary contexts. The established notion of universal composability (UC) captures this requirement. This is the first paper to study protocols which are simultaneously long-term secure and universally composable. We show that the usual set-up assumptions used for UC protocols (e.g., a common reference string) are not sufficient to achieve long-term secure and composable protocols for commitments or zero-knowledge protocols. We give practical alternatives (e.g., signature cards) to these usual setupassumptions and show that these enable the implementation of the important primitives
We present a unified framework for obtaining general secure computation that achieves adaptive-Universally Composable (UC)-security. Our framework captures essentially all previous results on adaptive concurrent secure computation, both in relaxed models (e.g., quasi-polynomial time simulation), as well as trusted setup models (e.g., the CRS model, the imperfect CRS model). This provides conceptual simplicity and insight into what is required for adaptive and concurrent security, as well as yielding improvements to set-up assumptions and/or computational assumptions. Moreover, using our framework we provide first constructions of concurrent secure computation protocols that are adaptively secure in the timing model, and in the non-uniform simulation model. Conceptually, our framework can be viewed as an adaptive analogue to the recent work of Lin, Pass and Venkitasubramaniam [STOC ‘09], who considered only non-adaptive adversaries. Their main insight was that stand-alone non-malleability was sufficient for UC-security. A main conceptual contribution of this work is, quite surprisingly, that it is indeed the case even when considering adaptive security. A key element in our construction is a commitment scheme that satisfies a new notion of nonmalleability.