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Lecture notes in computer science

Enhancements to Prepare-and-Measure-Based QKD Protocols (Transcript of Discussion)

Peter Y. A. Ryan

Published Jan 1, 2013• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-41717-7_15

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Publisher’s Note: This paper, originally published on 10/24/2016, was replaced with a corrected/revised version on 11/8/2016. If you downloaded the original PDF but are unable to access the revision, please contact SPIE Digital Library Customer Service for assistance. In the late 1980s, Aharonov and colleagues developed the notion of a weak measurement of a quantum observable that does not appreciably disturb the system.1, 2 The measurement results are conditioned on both the pre-selected and post-selected state of the quantum system. While any one measurement reveals very little information, by making the same measurement on a large ensemble of identically prepared pre- and post-selected (PPS) states and averaging the results, one may obtain what is known as the weak value of the observable with respect to that PPS ensemble. Recently, weak measurements have been proposed as a method of assessing the security of QKD in the well-known BB84 protocol.3 This weak value augmented QKD protocol (WV-QKD) works by additionally requiring the receiver, Bob, to make a weak measurement of a particular observable prior to his strong measurement. For the subset of measurement results in which Alice and Bob's measurement bases do not agree, the weak measurement results can be used to detect any attempt by an eavesdropper, Eve, to correlate her measurement results with Bob's. Furthermore, the well-known detector blinding attacks, which are known to perfectly correlate Eve's results with Bob's without being caught by conventional BB84 implementations, actually make the eavesdropper more visible in the new WV-QKD protocol. In this paper, we will introduce the WV-QKD protocol and discuss its generalization to the 6-state single qubit protocol. We will discuss the types of weak measurements that are optimal for this protocol, and compare the predicted performance of the 6- and 4-state WV-QKD protocols.

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The goal of this work is to provide a largely self-contained, rigorous proof of the security of quantum key distribution in the finite key regime. For our analysis we consider an entanglement-based protocol based on BBM92 as well as a prepare-and-measure protocol based on BB84. Our presentation differs from previous work in that we are careful to model all the randomness that is used throughout the protocol and take care of all the transcripts of the communication over the public channel. We hope that this work will be a good starting point for readers interested in finite key analysis of protocols in quantum cryptography.
The prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution (QKD) has the merits of fast speed, high key generation rate, and easy implementation. However, the detector side channel attacks greatly undermine the security of the key bits. The eavesdropper, Eve, exploits the flaws of the detectors to obtain illegal information without violating quantum principles. It means that she can intervene in the communication without being detected. A prepare-and-measure Bell test protocol will be proposed. By randomly carrying out Bell test at the side of the information receiver, Bob, Eve's illegal information gain within the detector side channel attack can be well bounded. This protocol does not require any improvement on the detectors used in available prepare-and-measure QKD. Though we only illustrate its application in the BB84 protocol, it is applicable for any prepare-and-measure QKD.
Publisher’s Note: This paper, originally published on 10/24/2016, was replaced with a corrected/revised version on 11/8/2016. If you downloaded the original PDF but are unable to access the revision, please contact SPIE Digital Library Customer Service for assistance. In the late 1980s, Aharonov and colleagues developed the notion of a weak measurement of a quantum observable that does not appreciably disturb the system.1, 2 The measurement results are conditioned on both the pre-selected and post-selected state of the quantum system. While any one measurement reveals very little information, by making the same measurement on a large ensemble of identically prepared pre- and post-selected (PPS) states and averaging the results, one may obtain what is known as the weak value of the observable with respect to that PPS ensemble. Recently, weak measurements have been proposed as a method of assessing the security of QKD in the well-known BB84 protocol.3 This weak value augmented QKD protocol (WV-QKD) works by additionally requiring the receiver, Bob, to make a weak measurement of a particular observable prior to his strong measurement. For the subset of measurement results in which Alice and Bob's measurement bases do not agree, the weak measurement results can be used to detect any attempt by an eavesdropper, Eve, to correlate her measurement results with Bob's. Furthermore, the well-known detector blinding attacks, which are known to perfectly correlate Eve's results with Bob's without being caught by conventional BB84 implementations, actually make the eavesdropper more visible in the new WV-QKD protocol. In this paper, we will introduce the WV-QKD protocol and discuss its generalization to the 6-state single qubit protocol. We will discuss the types of weak measurements that are optimal for this protocol, and compare the predicted performance of the 6- and 4-state WV-QKD protocols.