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Lecture notes in computer science

Entity authentication and authenticated key transport protocols employing asymmetric techniques

Simon Blake-Wilson⋆⋆, Alfred Menezes

Published Jan 1, 1998• 64 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bfb0028166

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Entity Authentication and Authenticated Key Transport Protocols Employing Asymmetric Techniques

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Abstract Authentication of the entity is the initial step toward secure transaction over the internet. The evolution in the nature and types of attacks have forced the commerce industry to move from single factor to multi‐factor authentication technique largely employing biometric codes for human based entity. These biometric codes are unique and therefore, are synonymous to a user identity in the digital world. Hence, safeguarding the Biometric data becomes important for the user. Also, the classical authentication techniques relying on public key encryption schemes are no longer considered safe in the post quantum era. The research in this paper therefore, proposes a quantum based mutual authentication user‐server protocol which employs the principles of quantum mechanics to carry out secure exchange and storage of confidential data. The mathematical formulae validated through demonstration of properties of quantum mechanics verifies the ability of the protocol to work in compromised channel. The detailed security analysis carried out further quantifies the same and builds in confidence to adopt the quantum based mutual authentication protocol for critical user‐server data exchange.
A recent primitive known as asymmetric group key agreement (AGKA) allows a group of users to negotiate a common encryption key which is accessible to any entities and corresponds to different decryption keys, each of which is only computable by one group member. This concept makes it easy to construct distributed and one-round group key agreement protocols. However, this existing instantiation depends on public key infrastructure (PKI) associated with certificate management, or it is only secure against passive adversaries. This paper addresses this concern by designing a certificateless authenticated AGKA scheme, which does not require certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys yet avoids the inherent escrow problem of identity-based cryptosystems. Using simple binding techniques, the proposed scheme can be raised to the same trust level as that using the traditional PKI. We show that the proposed protocol is secure provided that the underlying k-bilinear Diffie–Hellman exponent problem is hard.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols are essential for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of data communications. Mutual authentication between client and server is crucial in high-security scenarios such as finance and government. However, existing TLS protocols typically rely on certificate-based public key infrastructures (PKI) for client authentication, which increases deployment complexity and introduces risks associated with third-party trust. In contrast, password-authenticated TLS protocols use memorable passwords for client authentication, offering advantages in simplicity and usability. Nonetheless, such protocols remain vulnerable to server compromise and fail to provide sufficient security against quantum adversaries.To address these challenges, we propose a novel TLS protocol based on asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE). The protocol employs an asymmetric PAKE mechanism wherein only password-derived information is stored on the server, while the client derives its private key from the password. This design effectively mitigates the risk of server leakage attacks. The protocol further integrates two types of post-quantum secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs): an OW-ChCCA (One-Way Checkable against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks) secure KEM for server key exchange and authentication, and an OW-PCA (One-Way Plaintext-Checkable Attacks) secure KEM for binding the client’s password-derived private key to enable client authentication. Both KEMs support multi-user, multi-challenge settings and admit tight, post-quantum secure instantiations.Furthermore, this paper provides a formal security analysis of the proposed protocol within an optimized multi-stage key exchange model. By combining the random oracle and ideal cipher models with a game-based proof methodology, we demonstrate that the protocol achieves mutual authentication and forward secrecy, while also providing tight security bounds and post-quantum resilience. This work thus presents a promising solution for constructing post-quantum password-authenticated TLS protocols.