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The frontiers collection

Why QBism Is Not the Copenhagen Interpretation and What John Bell Might Have Thought of It

N. David Mermin

Published Nov 15, 2016• 76 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-38987-5_4

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Why QBism is not the Copenhagen interpretation and what John Bell might have thought of it

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Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack have developed a way of understanding science, which, among other things, resolves many of the conceptual puzzles of quantum mechanics that have vexed people for the past nine decades. They call it QBism. I speculate on how John Bell might have reacted to QBism, and I explain the many ways in which QBism differs importantly from the orthodox ways of thinking about quantum mechanics associated with the term "Copenhagen interpretation."

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In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote, " 'I' is not the name of a person, nor 'here' of a place, .... But they are connected with names. ... [And] it is characteristic of physics not to use these words." This statement expresses the dominant way of thinking in physics: Physics is about the impersonal laws of nature; the "I" never makes an appearance in it. Since the advent of quantum theory, however, there has always been a nagging pressure to insert a first-person perspective into the heart of physics. In incarnations of lesser or greater strength, one may consider the "Copenhagen" views of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli, the observer-participator view of John Wheeler, the informational interpretation of Anton Zeilinger and Caslav Brukner, the relational interpretation of Carlo Rovelli, and, most radically, the QBism of N. David Mermin, Ruediger Schack, and the present author, as acceding to the pressure. These views have lately been termed "participatory realism" to emphasize that rather than relinquishing the idea of reality (as they are often accused of), they are saying that reality is more than any third-person perspective can capture. Thus, far from instances of instrumentalism or antirealism, these views of quantum theory should be regarded as attempts to make a deep statement about the nature of reality. This paper explicates the idea for the case of QBism. As well, it highlights the influence of John Wheeler's "law without law" on QBism's formulation.

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In general, Albert Einstein as one of "the founding fathers of quantum mechanics" had some problems to accept especially the Copenhagen dominated interpretation of quantum mechanics. Einstein's dissatisfaction with Copenhagen's interpretation of quantum mechanics, the absence of locality and causality within the Copenhagen dominated quantum mechanics lead to the well known Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen thought experiment. According to Einstein et al., the Copenhagen dominated quantum mechanics cannot be regarded as a complete physical theory. The Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen thought experiment was the origin of J. S. Bell's publication in 1964; known as Bell's theorem. Meanwhile, some dramatic violations of Bell's inequality (by so called Bell test experiments) have been reported which is taken as an empirical evidence against local realism and causality at quantum level and as positive evidence in favor of the Copenhagen dominated quantum mechanics. Thus far, Quantum mechanics is still regarded as a "strictly" non-local theory. The purpose of this publication is to refute Bell's original theorem. Thus far, if we accept Bell's theorem as correct, we must accept that +0> = +1. We can derive a logical contradiction out of Bell's theorem, Bell's theorem is refuted.

AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2012•15 citations
In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote, " 'I' is not the name of a person, nor 'here' of a place, .... But they are connected with names. ... [And] it is characteristic of physics not to use these words." This statement expresses the dominant way of thinking in physics: Physics is about the impersonal laws of nature; the "I" never makes an appearance in it. Since the advent of quantum theory, however, there has always been a nagging pressure to insert a first-person perspective into the heart of physics. In incarnations of lesser or greater strength, one may consider the "Copenhagen" views of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli, the observer-participator view of John Wheeler, the informational interpretation of Anton Zeilinger and Caslav Brukner, the relational interpretation of Carlo Rovelli, and, most radically, the QBism of N. David Mermin, Ruediger Schack, and the present author, as acceding to the pressure. These views have lately been termed "participatory realism" to emphasize that rather than relinquishing the idea of reality (as they are often accused of), they are saying that reality is more than any third-person perspective can capture. Thus, far from instances of instrumentalism or antirealism, these views of quantum theory should be regarded as attempts to make a deep statement about the nature of reality. This paper explicates the idea for the case of QBism. As well, it highlights the influence of John Wheeler's "law without law" on QBism's formulation.
In general, Albert Einstein as one of "the founding fathers of quantum mechanics" had some problems to accept especially the Copenhagen dominated interpretation of quantum mechanics. Einstein's dissatisfaction with Copenhagen's interpretation of quantum mechanics, the absence of locality and causality within the Copenhagen dominated quantum mechanics lead to the well known Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen thought experiment. According to Einstein et al., the Copenhagen dominated quantum mechanics cannot be regarded as a complete physical theory. The Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen thought experiment was the origin of J. S. Bell's publication in 1964; known as Bell's theorem. Meanwhile, some dramatic violations of Bell's inequality (by so called Bell test experiments) have been reported which is taken as an empirical evidence against local realism and causality at quantum level and as positive evidence in favor of the Copenhagen dominated quantum mechanics. Thus far, Quantum mechanics is still regarded as a "strictly" non-local theory. The purpose of this publication is to refute Bell's original theorem. Thus far, if we accept Bell's theorem as correct, we must accept that +0> = +1. We can derive a logical contradiction out of Bell's theorem, Bell's theorem is refuted.