Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

Susceptible Two-Party Quantum Computations

Andreas Jakoby, Maciej Liśkiewicz, Aleksander Mądry

Published Aug 12, 2008• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-85093-9_14

Related papers

Application of Blind Quantum Computation to Two-Party Quantum Computation

Zhiyuan Sun, Qin Li, Fang Yu +1 more

International Journal of Theoretical Physics•Mar 13, 2018•8 citations

Round-Efficient Composable Two-Party Quantum Computation

Vipul Goyal, Xiao Rong Liang, Omkant Pandey +2 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Dec 7, 2025•0 citations

Fortified Multi-Party Computation: Taking Advantage of Simple Secure Hardware Modules

Brandon Broadnax, Alexander Koch, Jeremias Mechler +3 more

Abstract In practice, there are numerous settings where mutually distrusting parties need to perform distributed computations on their private inputs. For instance, participants in a first-price sealed-bid online auction do not want their bids to be disclosed. This problem can be addressed using secure multi-party computation (MPC), where parties can evaluate a publicly known function on their private inputs by executing a specific protocol that only reveals the correct output, but nothing else about the private inputs. Such distributed computations performed over the Internet are susceptible to remote hacks that may take place during the computation. As a consequence, sensitive data such as private bids may leak. All existing MPC protocols do not provide any protection against the consequences of such remote hacks. We present the first MPC protocols that protect the remotely hacked parties’ inputs and outputs from leaking. More specifically, unless the remote hack takes place before the party received its input or all parties are corrupted, a hacker is unable to learn the parties’ inputs and outputs, and is also unable to modify them. We achieve these strong (privacy) guarantees by utilizing the fact that in practice parties may not be susceptible to remote attacks at every point in time, but only while they are online, i.e. able to receive messages. To this end, we model communication via explicit channels. In particular, we introduce channels with an airgap switch (disconnect-able by the party in control of the switch), and unidirectional data diodes. These channels and their isolation properties, together with very few, similarly simple and plausibly remotely unhackable hardware modules serve as the main ingredient for attaining such strong security guarantees. In order to formalize these strong guarantees, we propose the UC with Fortified Security (UC#) framework, a variant of the Universal Composability (UC) framework.

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies•Jul 23, 2021•5 citations

Secure Two-Party Computation in a Quantum World

Niklas Büscher, Daniel Demmler, Nikolaos P. Karvelas +5 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2020•15 citations

Implementing Diffie-Hellman key exchange using quantum EPR pairs

Sayonnha Mandal, Abhishek Parakh

This paper implements the concepts of perfect forward secrecy and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using EPR pairs to establish and share a secret key between two non-authenticated parties and transfer messages between them without the risk of compromise. Current implementations of quantum cryptography are based on the BB84 protocol, which is susceptible to siphoning attacks on the multiple photons emitted by practical laser sources. This makes BB84-based quantum cryptography protocol unsuitable for network computing environments. Diffie-Hellman does not require the two parties to be mutually authenticated to each other, yet it can provide a basis for a number of authenticated protocols, most notably the concept of perfect forward secrecy. The work proposed in this paper provides a new direction in utilizing quantum EPR pairs in quantum key exchange. Although, classical cryptography boasts of efficient and robust protocols like the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, in the current times, with the advent of quantum computing they are very much vulnerable to eavesdropping and cryptanalytic attacks. Using quantum cryptographic principles, however, these classical encryption algorithms show more promise and a more robust and secure structure for applications. The unique properties of quantum EPR pairs also, on the other hand, go a long way in removing attacks like eavesdropping by their inherent nature of one particle of the pair losing its state if a measurement occurs on the other. The concept of perfect forward secrecy is revisited in this paper to attribute tighter security to the proposed protocol.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•May 21, 2015•7 citations

Secure Two-Party Computation Based on Blind Quantum Computation

Yaqing Zhu, Qin Li, Chengdong Liu +3 more

International Journal of Theoretical Physics•May 6, 2020•2 citations
Abstract In practice, there are numerous settings where mutually distrusting parties need to perform distributed computations on their private inputs. For instance, participants in a first-price sealed-bid online auction do not want their bids to be disclosed. This problem can be addressed using secure multi-party computation (MPC), where parties can evaluate a publicly known function on their private inputs by executing a specific protocol that only reveals the correct output, but nothing else about the private inputs. Such distributed computations performed over the Internet are susceptible to remote hacks that may take place during the computation. As a consequence, sensitive data such as private bids may leak. All existing MPC protocols do not provide any protection against the consequences of such remote hacks. We present the first MPC protocols that protect the remotely hacked parties’ inputs and outputs from leaking. More specifically, unless the remote hack takes place before the party received its input or all parties are corrupted, a hacker is unable to learn the parties’ inputs and outputs, and is also unable to modify them. We achieve these strong (privacy) guarantees by utilizing the fact that in practice parties may not be susceptible to remote attacks at every point in time, but only while they are online, i.e. able to receive messages. To this end, we model communication via explicit channels. In particular, we introduce channels with an airgap switch (disconnect-able by the party in control of the switch), and unidirectional data diodes. These channels and their isolation properties, together with very few, similarly simple and plausibly remotely unhackable hardware modules serve as the main ingredient for attaining such strong security guarantees. In order to formalize these strong guarantees, we propose the UC with Fortified Security (UC#) framework, a variant of the Universal Composability (UC) framework.
This paper implements the concepts of perfect forward secrecy and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using EPR pairs to establish and share a secret key between two non-authenticated parties and transfer messages between them without the risk of compromise. Current implementations of quantum cryptography are based on the BB84 protocol, which is susceptible to siphoning attacks on the multiple photons emitted by practical laser sources. This makes BB84-based quantum cryptography protocol unsuitable for network computing environments. Diffie-Hellman does not require the two parties to be mutually authenticated to each other, yet it can provide a basis for a number of authenticated protocols, most notably the concept of perfect forward secrecy. The work proposed in this paper provides a new direction in utilizing quantum EPR pairs in quantum key exchange. Although, classical cryptography boasts of efficient and robust protocols like the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, in the current times, with the advent of quantum computing they are very much vulnerable to eavesdropping and cryptanalytic attacks. Using quantum cryptographic principles, however, these classical encryption algorithms show more promise and a more robust and secure structure for applications. The unique properties of quantum EPR pairs also, on the other hand, go a long way in removing attacks like eavesdropping by their inherent nature of one particle of the pair losing its state if a measurement occurs on the other. The concept of perfect forward secrecy is revisited in this paper to attribute tighter security to the proposed protocol.