From a fundamental point of view we must acknowledge that, since about 1935, our conceptual understanding of quantum mechanics has not progressed so much. Really new ideas are few and far between – except of course the major line initiated by the contribution of Bell [6]. This is in big contrast with the rest of physics, where new theoretical and experimental discoveries in many fields have flourished, very often with the help of the tools of quantum mechanics. The fantastic evolution of the experimental techniques has completely changed the situation. At the beginning of quantum mechanics, the observation of the tracks of single particles in Wilson chambers [348] played the essential role in the introduction of the postulate of state vector reduction, but otherwise it was impossible to observe continuously a single electron, atom, or ion; the experiments that theorists were proposing in discussions on the principles of quantum measurement were therefore “thought experiments” (“Gedanken Experiment”), as for instance in the famous Solvay meetings [1, 21]. But nowadays, after almost of century of experimental progress, experiments that were then unthinkable have become a reality. A huge number of contemporary experiments involves the laws of quantum mechanics in general; several books would not be sufficient to describe all of them. Nevertheless, in the majority of experiments, what is really observed is the sum over a very large number of particles of one individual microscopic observable (sum of atomic dipoles for instance), which is accurately described by the average value of this observable.
From a fundamental point of view we must acknowledge that, since about 1935, our conceptual understanding of quantum mechanics has not progressed so much. Really new ideas are few and far between – except of course the major line initiated by the contribution of Bell [6]. This is in big contrast with the rest of physics, where new theoretical and experimental discoveries in many fields have flourished, very often with the help of the tools of quantum mechanics. The fantastic evolution of the experimental techniques has completely changed the situation. At the beginning of quantum mechanics, the observation of the tracks of single particles in Wilson chambers [348] played the essential role in the introduction of the postulate of state vector reduction, but otherwise it was impossible to observe continuously a single electron, atom, or ion; the experiments that theorists were proposing in discussions on the principles of quantum measurement were therefore “thought experiments” (“Gedanken Experiment”), as for instance in the famous Solvay meetings [1, 21]. But nowadays, after almost of century of experimental progress, experiments that were then unthinkable have become a reality. A huge number of contemporary experiments involves the laws of quantum mechanics in general; several books would not be sufficient to describe all of them. Nevertheless, in the majority of experiments, what is really observed is the sum over a very large number of particles of one individual microscopic observable (sum of atomic dipoles for instance), which is accurately described by the average value of this observable.
The founding fathers of quantum mechanics had already perceived the essence of the difficulties of quantum mechanics; today, after almost a century, the discussions are still lively and, if some very interesting new aspects have emerged, at a deeper level the questions have not changed so much. What is more recent, nevertheless, is a general change of attitude among physicists: until about 1970 or 1980, most physicists thought that the essential questions had been settled, and that “Bohr was right and proved his opponents to be wrong”. This was probably a consequence of the famous discussions between Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Pauli, de Broglie, and others (in particular at the Solvay meetings [1–3], where Bohr's point of view had successfully resisted Einstein's extremely clever attacks). The majority of physicists did not know the details of the arguments. They nevertheless thought that the standard “Copenhagen interpretation” had clearly emerged from the infancy of quantum mechanics as the only sensible attitude for good scientists. This interpretation includes the idea that modern physics must contain indeterminacy as an essential ingredient: it is fundamentally impossible to predict the outcome of single microscopical events; it is impossible to go beyond the formalism of the wave function (or its generalization, the state vector ∣ψ) and complete it.
The reduction of the state vector is rightly held as one of the most puzzling aspects of quantum theory. Before adding a few more pages to the inflatory literature on the subject, I wish to voice a somewhat sobering remark. Namely, there is a striking contrast between the amount of theoretical discussions about the nature and significance of this notion, and its practical import. Indeed, the so-called “axiom” of reduction of the state vector has a rather limited use in the effective working of quantum theory. There are very few situations where we really need to assert that, after a measurement, the state vector has been reduced to the eigenvector of the physical property corresponding to the eigenvalue resulting from the measurement (“observed”). Most of the time, in effect, the system under investigation is forgotten or discarded after the measurement - or even destroyed by it (photons). We rarely make successive observations of the same system, so that we do not usually need to know what the state of a system is after a measurement. One might argue that the reduction of the state vector is operationally used mainly to describe the preparation of a system before acting upon it, that is, to ensure that we are indeed dealing with spin up electrons or velocity selected protons such as we wish to experiment about. Anyway, the statement of reduction is to be considered more as a kind of consistency condition to be required at the beginning or end of a theoretical analysis than as an effective tool of this analysis - such as, for instance, the statement of unitary evolution, which leads to the concrete construction of the evolution operator, hence the S-matrix, cross-sections, etc. In other words, the practical status of the state vector reduction, even if it is considered as an axiom of quantum theory, is different enough from that of the constructive axioms of the theory.
The quantum theory of measurement has been widely regarded, since the 1940s, as an esoteric subject of little relevance to “real” physics. Quite the opposite was true in the 1920s and 1930s when Niels Bohr, John von Neumann, and others were struggling, by means of gedankin experiments, to develop an understanding of how measurements on single quantum objects were to be incorporated into quantum theory. However, the understanding they achieved turned out to be of little use in the quantum mechanical applications that commanded the attention of physicists between 1940 and 1980: the interaction of photons, atomic nuclei, and elementary particles, the theory of masers and lasers, the properties of matter (superfluidity, superconductivity, semiconductors), etc. In each of these applications, although the phenomena studied were quantum mechanical at heart, the measurements used to probe them were so far removed from the quantum domain that the only feature of the quantum theory of measurement which entered into the experiments was the probability interpretation of squared amplitudes. There was no need to invoke what soon came to be regarded as an esoteric, problematic, dubious “collapse (reduction) of the wave function.” Fundamentally, the reason for this irrelevance of the quantum theory of measurement was technological.
This article presents a general discussion of several aspects of our present understanding of quantum mechanics. The emphasis is put on the very special correlations that this theory makes possible: They are forbidden by very general arguments based on realism and local causality. In fact, these correlations are completely impossible in any circumstance, except for very special situations designed by physicists especially to observe these purely quantum effects. Another general point that is emphasized is the necessity for the theory to predict the emergence of a single result in a single realization of an experiment. For this purpose, orthodox quantum mechanics introduces a special postulate: the reduction of the state vector, which comes in addition to the Schrödinger evolution postulate. Nevertheless, the presence in parallel of two evolution processes of the same object (the state vector) may be a potential source for conflicts; various attitudes that are possible to avoid this problem are discussed in this text. After a brief historical introduction, recalling how the very special status of the state vector has emerged in quantum mechanics, various conceptual difficulties are introduced and discussed. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) theorem is presented with the help of a botanical parable, in a way that emphasizes how deeply the EPR reasoning is rooted into what is often called “scientific method.” In another section the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger argument, the Hardy impossibilities, as well as the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem are introduced in simple terms. The final two sections attempt to give a summary of the present situation: One section discusses nonlocality and entanglement as we see it presently, with brief mention of recent experiments; the last section contains a (nonexhaustive) list of various attitudes that are found among physicists, and that are helpful to alleviate the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.