IntroductionSecurity is an increasingly growing concern for network communications and video is an emerging segment of network traffic that uses large amounts of bandwidth.Streaming video, vs. downloading a video for later viewing, requires a continuous, high data rate.The data rate will vary depending on the quality of the video.Video surveillance is a streaming video application that in addition may require securing the data stream to prevent others from viewing it as well as prevent any tampering of that video stream.There are two parts to secure communication, key distribution and ciphers.A cipher requires a secret key that is used to encrypt data (plaintext), transforming it into an unreadable form (ciphertext) and then to decrypt it back into its original form.Key distribution is the method used to exchange the secret key between the desired end users and no one else.Current block ciphers are relatively slow compared to existing bandwidth because they require a substantial amount of processing that must compete for CPU cycles with the video encoding and compression processing.Frequently changing keys is thought to increase security, but the public key exchange method requires even more processing than the cipher.Cipher and key exchange processing can be off-loaded from the CPU, when the communication end point is the other end of the link, by using dedicated hardware called a link encryptor.Current classical security algorithms are based on the perceived computational complexity of certain mathematical functions and have not been proved secure.The public key algorithm is at risk from future quantum computers, whereas block ciphers are only weakened and an easy fix is to double the length of the key.Both are constantly at risk from a potential break through algorithm.Communications channels that exploit properties unique to quantum systems have been shown to enable functionality that cannot be achieved by classical means.If a high level of security is deemed necessary for the video stream, one might consider the use of a One-Time-Pad cipher [Wikipedia 2010], the only provably secure cipher, along with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), also a provably secure method of exchanging the secret keys used by a cipher.QKD is a protocol based on the quantum laws of physics and is provably information theoretically secure to accomplish key distribution [Gisin, et al., 2002].QKD keys, when used with a One-Time-Pad cipher, can provide secure communications.A One-Time-Pad cipher algorithm performs an Exclusive OR (XOR) on a random secret key and the message.This is a simple operation that incurs little overhead compared to the more common www.intechopen.comVideo Surveillance 74 computationally intensive ciphers, but it requires the key to be the same length as the message and discarded once used.For video, that requires a continuous stream of random secret keys, which is one of the features of QKD.Because of that feature, QKD is considered to have a long-term security perspective because of its "perfect forward security" attribute.The term perfect forward security means that any compromised keys cannot be used to determine other keys, either past or future.Since QKD keys are random strings and are not produced by a mathematical function, any compromised keys cannot be used to determine other keys.QKD is still a technology under development even though a few commercial systems are available [Ouellette, 2004].Some of the limitations of QKD are speed, distance and cost.Distance is a major concern, since without a break-through in developing a quantum repeater the quantum signal is limited to a few 100 km at best.Amplification is not possible since the quantum "no cloning law" specifies that a quantum state cannot be copied.If trusted, intermediate nodes are acceptable, then longer distances are possible via a multihop propagation of the key over multiple QKD links.This is not always acceptable and for these situations a quantum repeater would be required.It is currently under development, but none have yet been demonstrated.Speed, the ability to produce secure keys at a high rate is important to cope with the large amount of communication traffic over high-speed connections and hardware implementations that off-load the CPU have been demonstrated.Cost is an ever-present constraint and designs that use lower cost components and share rather than replicate components reduce the cost.In some cases, designs that share rather than duplicate components help to reduce concerns of side channel attacks upon engineered components (vs theoretical ones), but usually at the detriment of speed.This chapter includes a short summary of the BB84 QKD protocol and its various stages.We then present a section on the configuration of a QKD system targeted for short distances and how a number of innovations lowered the cost and evolved that core design for longer distance communication and current infrastructure use.Another section will discuss hardware support for the data handling necessary to implement high-speed QKD.Extending QKD point-to-point systems to form QKD networks makes it even more attractive for applications such as video surveillance and we will discuss early networking demonstrations.In closing, we will discuss initial QKD standards efforts currently being conducted How to referenceIn order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
IntroductionSecurity is an increasingly growing concern for network communications and video is an emerging segment of network traffic that uses large amounts of bandwidth.Streaming video, vs. downloading a video for later viewing, requires a continuous, high data rate.The data rate will vary depending on the quality of the video.Video surveillance is a streaming video application that in addition may require securing the data stream to prevent others from viewing it as well as prevent any tampering of that video stream.There are two parts to secure communication, key distribution and ciphers.A cipher requires a secret key that is used to encrypt data (plaintext), transforming it into an unreadable form (ciphertext) and then to decrypt it back into its original form.Key distribution is the method used to exchange the secret key between the desired end users and no one else.Current block ciphers are relatively slow compared to existing bandwidth because they require a substantial amount of processing that must compete for CPU cycles with the video encoding and compression processing.Frequently changing keys is thought to increase security, but the public key exchange method requires even more processing than the cipher.Cipher and key exchange processing can be off-loaded from the CPU, when the communication end point is the other end of the link, by using dedicated hardware called a link encryptor.Current classical security algorithms are based on the perceived computational complexity of certain mathematical functions and have not been proved secure.The public key algorithm is at risk from future quantum computers, whereas block ciphers are only weakened and an easy fix is to double the length of the key.Both are constantly at risk from a potential break through algorithm.Communications channels that exploit properties unique to quantum systems have been shown to enable functionality that cannot be achieved by classical means.If a high level of security is deemed necessary for the video stream, one might consider the use of a One-Time-Pad cipher [Wikipedia 2010], the only provably secure cipher, along with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), also a provably secure method of exchanging the secret keys used by a cipher.QKD is a protocol based on the quantum laws of physics and is provably information theoretically secure to accomplish key distribution [Gisin, et al., 2002].QKD keys, when used with a One-Time-Pad cipher, can provide secure communications.A One-Time-Pad cipher algorithm performs an Exclusive OR (XOR) on a random secret key and the message.This is a simple operation that incurs little overhead compared to the more common www.intechopen.comVideo Surveillance 74 computationally intensive ciphers, but it requires the key to be the same length as the message and discarded once used.For video, that requires a continuous stream of random secret keys, which is one of the features of QKD.Because of that feature, QKD is considered to have a long-term security perspective because of its "perfect forward security" attribute.The term perfect forward security means that any compromised keys cannot be used to determine other keys, either past or future.Since QKD keys are random strings and are not produced by a mathematical function, any compromised keys cannot be used to determine other keys.QKD is still a technology under development even though a few commercial systems are available [Ouellette, 2004].Some of the limitations of QKD are speed, distance and cost.Distance is a major concern, since without a break-through in developing a quantum repeater the quantum signal is limited to a few 100 km at best.Amplification is not possible since the quantum "no cloning law" specifies that a quantum state cannot be copied.If trusted, intermediate nodes are acceptable, then longer distances are possible via a multihop propagation of the key over multiple QKD links.This is not always acceptable and for these situations a quantum repeater would be required.It is currently under development, but none have yet been demonstrated.Speed, the ability to produce secure keys at a high rate is important to cope with the large amount of communication traffic over high-speed connections and hardware implementations that off-load the CPU have been demonstrated.Cost is an ever-present constraint and designs that use lower cost components and share rather than replicate components reduce the cost.In some cases, designs that share rather than duplicate components help to reduce concerns of side channel attacks upon engineered components (vs theoretical ones), but usually at the detriment of speed.This chapter includes a short summary of the BB84 QKD protocol and its various stages.We then present a section on the configuration of a QKD system targeted for short distances and how a number of innovations lowered the cost and evolved that core design for longer distance communication and current infrastructure use.Another section will discuss hardware support for the data handling necessary to implement high-speed QKD.Extending QKD point-to-point systems to form QKD networks makes it even more attractive for applications such as video surveillance and we will discuss early networking demonstrations.In closing, we will discuss initial QKD standards efforts currently being conducted How to referenceIn order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Quantum secure communication technology, grounded in the principles of quantum mechanics, has revolutionized traditional cryptographic methods, which predominantly rely on mathematical algorithms and logical transformations. Quantum key distribution (QKD) facilitates the secure sharing of symmetric keys between legitimate parties, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of information in communication channels. Among various QKD schemes, continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) has emerged as a viable alternative to the more established discrete variable quantum key distribution (DV-QKD). CV-QKD boasts several advantages, including straightforward deployment, reduced operational costs, and stable signal quality, positioning it as a significant component of the quantum communication landscape. Quantum noise stream cipher (QNSC) represents a technique that employs redundant data streams to encrypt plaintext. Notably, QNSC shares structural similarities with the optical path used in quantum key distribution, allowing for compatibility with existing QKD infrastructure. Furthermore, the keys generated through quantum key distribution ensure absolute security, enabling them to substitute the data streams produced by pseudo-random sequences traditionally used in classical encryption schemes. This substitution enhances the overall security framework of the quantum noise stream encryption approach. The quantum access network (QAN) extends quantum key distribution capabilities from point-to-point connections to point-to-multipoint configurations, thereby becoming an essential component of contemporary network architectures. By interlinking multiple end users with a network backbone, quantum access networks can seamlessly integrate with quantum key distribution protocols. This integration offers a cost-effective and scalable solution for user access to the network. Extensive experimental verifications have demonstrated the viability of downstream access networks, indicating that the merging of quantum access network structures with quantum stream encryption technologies can yield a comprehensive quantum experimental platform. On this platform, security keys are derived through quantum key distribution, which subsequently facilitates the encryption of plaintext information. Notably, experimental validations involving eight users have been successfully executed on this platform, underscoring its practical applicability and effectiveness.
Quantum key distribution is an innovative technique to distribute encryption keys without compromise. This paper focuses on the application of this technique to achieve reliable communication in an ever-evolving and increasingly vulnerable environment. Designers of cryptosystems have three basic objectives; designing cryptographic algorithms that adequately scramble the target data, developing strong encryption keys to lock and unlock the algorithm, and securely distributing the keys between communicating devices. The advance of quantum computing technologies threatens to expose the world's most prolific key method overnight. Though quantum computing is not yet a reality, the basic principles have been proven in laboratories. Furthermore, quantum computing has been shown to be especially suited for computations of complex mathematic equations; such as distilling the private keys from the public keys used in public key infrastructures (PKI). In this environment, it's comforting to know that the most advanced technology in the broad field of quantum communications just happens to be a new method of creating and distributing encryption keys. This technology is referred to as quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD technologies shift the current paradigm on two plains. The first is that it uses quantum principles, rather than conventional means, for distributing keys between devices. The quantum principles guarantee the key can not be intercepted during transmission without alerting the users of a compromise. The second shift is derived from the fact that encrypted data can not be intercepted today and decrypted at a later date when the computing power exists to crack the code. This shift is dependant on the use of a combination of QKD and one-time pad. Because of the quantum principles that QKD relies on, when a key is successfully created and shared, it can not be cracked using intercepted data. The keys are derived from a convergence of random operations conducted at the sender and receiver stations. Indeed, neither the sender nor the receiver can determine what the key will be until the entire process is completed. As a piece of our security infrastructure, QKD significantly raises our security posture. This paper explains the application of quantum principals used to enable QKD systems.
The practical implementation of quantum information technologies requires, for the most part, highly advanced and currently experimental procedures. One exception is quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution, which has been successfully demonstrated in many laboratories and has reached an advanced level of development. It will probably become the first commercial application of quantum information. In quantum key distribution, Alice and Bob exploit a quantum channel to create a secret shared key comprising a random string of binary digits. This key can then be used to protect a subsequent communication between them. The principal idea is that the secrecy of the key distribution is ensured by the laws of quantum physics. Proving security for practical communication systems is a challenging problem and requires techniques that are beyond the scope of this book. At a fundamental level, however, the ideas are simple and may readily be understood with the knowledge we have already acquired. Quantum cryptography is the latest idea in the long history of secure (and not so secure) communications and, if it is to develop, it will have to compete with existing technologies. For this reason we begin with a brief survey of the history and current state of the art in secure communications before turning to the possibilities offered by quantum communications. The history of cryptography is a long and fascinating one. As a consequence of the success or, more spectacularly, the failure of ciphers, wars have been fought, battles decided, kingdoms won, and heads lost. In the information age, ciphers and cryptosystems have become part of everyday life; we use them to protect our computers, to shop over the Internet, and to access our money via an ATM (automated teller machine). One of the oldest and simplest of all ciphers is the transposition or Caesarean cipher (attributed to Julius Caesar), in which the letters are shifted by a known (and secret) number of places in the alphabet. If the shift is 1, for example, then A is enciphered as B, B→C, · · ·, Y→Z, Z→A. A shift of five places leads us to make the replacements A→F, B→G, · · ·, Y→D, Z→E.
The development of quantum computers presents a threat to the security of modern communication systems; with Shor’s algorithm, all currently used asymmetric cryptography schemes can be broken. Fortunately, secure communication is still possible in the post-quantum era using symmetric encryption algorithms, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or the provably secure one-time pad (OTP). However, the main problem of symmetric cryptography, the key distribution, has to be solved. Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics to distribute encryption keys in a provably secure manner. In this thesis, the practical applicability of QKD is examined. This is achieved by testing the performance, stability, and usability of one of the few commercially available QKD platforms, ID Quantique’s Clavis 2. The tested system was stable for multiple months in normal operation and did not require any intervention from the user. The maximum distance with the test platform was 54 km. However, at these distances, the secret key rate was only tens of bits per second. For distances below 25 km, secret key rates in the kilobits per second range were achieved. Thus, if high data rates or communication distances close to 50 km are desired, ciphers less secure than OTP have to be used. Additionally, two flaws were discovered in the tested system, one making the system unstable, and the other preventing the key distribution process from starting. Fortunately, neither issue reduces the security of the system, and both could be fixed by modifying the software. Our results show that QKD can be considered as a mature technology that is ready for practical applications and even for commercial use.
The emergence of quantum computing poses significant risks to conventional network security, prompting researchers to focus on developments in quantum cryptography, particularly Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).According to research, it has been found that traditional security methods, like RSA encryption, could potentially be at risk from quantum algorithms.On the other hand, quantum cryptography is a field of study that leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to improve the security of communication.One of the techniques used in quantum cryptography is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which makes use of the unique properties of quantum particles such as photons to securely distribute encryption keys and detect any potential eavesdropping attempts, thanks to the uncertainty principle.Nevertheless, the integration of QKD into current network infrastructures poses significant challenges due to the required technological advancements.This study offers a comprehensive analysis of the fundamental principles underlying quantum cryptography, the obstacles that arise during its implementation, and its potential prospects for protecting against the risks posed by advancements in quantum computing.Furthermore, this study delves into the potential consequences of these technological advancements across different industries and emphasizes the need to create algorithms that can withstand quantum attacks to guarantee strong data security in the age of digitalization.
The work is devoted to the study of the problems of using the technology of quantum distribution of secret keys, namely the problems of using and forming new secret keys, based on the generation of quantum keys and the distribution of new keys in networks of complex topologies. In secure communication systems, information is transmitted over public networks, and thus is available to a potential attacker for carrying out various types of attacks. A potential attacker is able to store encrypted data transmitted over network channels, and attempt to decrypt it later, when technical means and attacks on information protection algorithms will allow, in an acceptable time, to carry out decryption. This is the basic principle of "Store now, decrypt later", which is one of the problems of information protection systems. For block ciphers, there is a parameter - the key load, which limits the amount of information that one key can process using the data protection algorithm. NIST recommends a time frame for using secret keys, calculated in years. In the field of information security, there are more significant restrictions on the key load, related to the number of blocks that can be processed by one key, caused by attacks on block ciphers. With these restrictions, there is a need to regularly change the secret key used, and search for options for generating and delivering keys between two network nodes that organize a secure information transmission channel. Changing the secret key to a new key, independent of the previous one, allows you to protect the transfer of confidential information when the key used is compromised. The technology of creating a quantum computer allows you to effectively attack known algorithms for generating secret keys based on the factorization of large numbers or the complexity of calculating a discrete logarithm. The quantum Shor algorithm [5, 6] allows you to solve these problems in polynomial time, so it is necessary to look for alternative solutions to the problem of regular changes in the network channel of the secret key in a pair of nodes. It is important to take into account the need to ensure the quality of Perfect forward secrecy, when the master key is compromised, all subsequent secret keys must not be compromised. To achieve this property of modern encryption algorithms, there is a periodic update of master keys. To prevent the accumulation of information, to successfully carry out attacks by the attacker and to comply with the load requirement on the secret key, it is necessary to solve the problem of regular changes of the secret, and regular generation/delivery of keys to network nodes. Given the urgent needs that are intensively developing today in the secure and high-speed transmission of information, and no less, the rapid growth of technical capabilities, there is a need to develop options in advance that will ensure the security of information during transmission. Regular change, in geographically dispersed data protection systems, of common secret keys, in the case of ensuring the independence of secret keys, allows successfully solving the task.