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Coherent Phenomena

Amplifier Noise Based Optical Steganography with Coherent Detection

Ben Wu, Matthew P. Chang, Naomi R. Caldwell, M. Caldwell, Paul R. Prucnal

Published Jan 23, 2014• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract We summarize the principle and experimental setup of optical steganography based on amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise. Using ASE noise as the signal carrier, optical steganography effectively hides a stealth channel in both the time domain and the frequency domain. Coherent detection is used at the receiver of the stealth channel. Because ASE noise has short coherence length and random phase, it only interferes with itself within a very short range. Coherent detection requires the stealth transmitter and stealth receiver to precisely match the optical delay,which generates a large key space for the stealth channel. Several methods to further improve optical steganography, signal to noise ratio, compatibility with the public channel, and applications of the stealth channel are also summarized in this review paper.

DOI
10.2478/coph-2014-0003

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Abstract We summarize the principle and experimental setup of optical steganography based on amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise. Using ASE noise as the signal carrier, optical steganography effectively hides a stealth channel in both the time domain and the frequency domain. Coherent detection is used at the receiver of the stealth channel. Because ASE noise has short coherence length and random phase, it only interferes with itself within a very short range. Coherent detection requires the stealth transmitter and stealth receiver to precisely match the optical delay,which generates a large key space for the stealth channel. Several methods to further improve optical steganography, signal to noise ratio, compatibility with the public channel, and applications of the stealth channel are also summarized in this review paper.
We propose and experimentally demonstrate an optical steganography method in which a data signal is transmitted using amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise as a carrier. The ASE serving as a carrier for the private signal has an identical frequency spectrum to the existing noise generated by the Erbium doped fiber amplifiers (EDFAs) in the transmission system. The system also carries a conventional data channel that is not private. The so-called "stealth" or private channel is well-hidden within the noise of the system. Phase modulation is used for both the stealth channel and the public channel. Using homodyne detection, the short coherence length of the ASE ensures that the stealth signal can only be recovered if the receiver closely matches the delay-length difference, which is deliberately changed in a dynamic fashion that is only known to the transmitter and its intended receiver.
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a wavelength-division multiplexed (WDM) optical stealth transmission system carried by amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise. The stealth signal is hidden in both time and frequency domains by using ASE noise as the signal carrier. Each WDM channel uses part of the ASE spectrum, which provides more flexibility to apply stealth transmission in a public network and adds another layer of security to the stealth channel. Multi-channel transmission also increases the overall channel capacity, which is the major limitation of the single stealth channel transmission based on ASE noise. The relations between spectral bandwidth and coherence length of ASE carrier have been theoretically analyzed and experimentally investigated.
A temporal phase mask encryption method is proposed and experimentally demonstrated to improve the security of the stealth channel in an optical steganography system. The stealth channel is protected in two levels. In the first level, the data is carried by amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise, which cannot be detected in either the time domain or spectral domain. In the second level, even if the eavesdropper suspects the existence of the stealth channel, each data bit is covered by a fast changing phase mask. The phase mask code is always combined with the wide band noise from ASE. Without knowing the right phase mask code to recover the stealth data, the eavesdropper can only receive the noise like signal with randomized phase.
The threat and defend model of optical steganography based on amplified spontaneous emission noise is experimentally demonstrated. Although the optical delays in a steganography system generate large key space to hide and recover the stealth signals, delays in interferometer introduce spectral fringes that can be identified by the coherent detection attack and thus expose the stealth channel. To defend such attacks, the spectral fringes are removed by with stealth data rate that is beyond the response speed of the coherent detection. Experimental results show that the spectral signatures can be protected by both wideband property of spontaneous emission noise and setting up the optical delays and data rate within the secure range. Such defending method can guide the design of a secure optical steganography system.
The system tolerance to the dispersion of optical steganography and the deployment of dispersion to enhance secure transmission has been experimentally demonstrated and theoretically studied. Since the stealth signal is carried by amplified spontaneous emission noise, which has a much wider bandwidth compared with the laser carrier, the stealth channel is more sensitive to dispersion and has less tolerance to the uncompensated dispersion. On the other hand, the dispersion effect in the stealth channel can be employed to hide the stealth signal in the time domain. The extra dispersion at the transmitter and the receiver functions as a key pair for the optical encryption and the optical steganography.
In fiber-optic networks, optical steganographic communication hides the existence of stealth signals in public channels. The previous security analyses assumed threat models in which eavesdroppers rely only on the real-time key search in the optical domain for signal recovery. In this letter, we study a new threat model that uses coherent detection and offline digital signal processing (DSP) to recover the stealth signal, and we show the robustness of optical steganographic communication under this attack. We find that eavesdroppers equipped with the state-of-the-art coherent detectors and DSP technologies fail to estimate the secret key. In addition, even if the eavesdroppers are given the secret key, the stealth signal cannot be recovered from the signal using DSP. The histogram of the received signal after DSP displays a noise-like form which prevents eavesdroppers from detecting the existence of the stealth signal. We attribute the system robustness to the unique features of using amplified spontaneous emission noise as the signal carrier, including wide bandwidth, large phase variance, and fast phase fluctuation.