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Lecture notes in computer science

On Adaptive vs. Non-adaptive Security of Multiparty Protocols

Ran Canetti, Ivan Damgaard, Stefan Dziembowski, Yuval Ishai, Tal Malkin

Published Jan 1, 2001• 39 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/3-540-44987-6_17

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On adaptive vs. non-adaptive security of multiparty protocols.

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Security analysis of multiparty cryptographic protocols distinguishes between two types of adversarial settings: In the non-adaptive setting, the set of corrupted parties is chosen in advance, before the interaction begins. In the adaptive setting, the adversary chooses who to corrupt during the course of the computation. We study the relations between adaptive security (i.e., security in the adaptive setting) and non-adaptive security, according to two definitions and in several models of computation. While affirming some prevailing beliefs, we also obtain some unexpected results. Some highlights of our results are: . According to the definition of Dodis-Micali-Rogaway (which is set in the information-theoretic model), adaptive and non-adaptive security are equivalent. This holds for both honest-but-curious and Byzantine adversaries, and for any number of parties. . According to the definition of Canetti, for honest-but-curious adversaries, adaptive security is equivalent to...

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Adaptively-secure Multiparty Non-interactive Key Exchange

Vanishree Rao

Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a fundamental notion in Cryptography.This notion was introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. They proposed thewell-known 2-party NIKE protocol and left open the generic question of whetherNIKE could be realized in the multiparty setting. NIKE has since then been anactive area of research with an ultimate goal of obtaining best possible security inthe multiparty setting. Although this has evaded researchers for many decades,advancements have been made through relaxations in multiple directions such asrestricting to 3-parties, static/semi-static model (where the adversary needs tocommit to the set of parties he wishes to be challenged upon ahead of time),random-oracle model, allowing initial setup, etc.This dissertation provides a solution to the open question: it provides a multipartyNIKE protocol that is adaptively secure with no setup and in the standardmodel.The solution employs novel techniques of using indistinguishability obfuscation,which are interesting in their own right and which seem promising in findingwider applications in other settings. One such technique pertains overcoming thesomewhat inherent drawback of non-adaptivity of the puncturing technique introduced by Sahai and Waters [STOC'14].

•Jan 1, 2015•0 citations
Security analysis of multiparty cryptographic protocols distinguishes between two types of adversarial settings: In the non-adaptive setting, the set of corrupted parties is chosen in advance, before the interaction begins. In the adaptive setting, the adversary chooses who to corrupt during the course of the computation. We study the relations between adaptive security (i.e., security in the adaptive setting) and non-adaptive security, according to two definitions and in several models of computation. While affirming some prevailing beliefs, we also obtain some unexpected results. Some highlights of our results are: . According to the definition of Dodis-Micali-Rogaway (which is set in the information-theoretic model), adaptive and non-adaptive security are equivalent. This holds for both honest-but-curious and Byzantine adversaries, and for any number of parties. . According to the definition of Canetti, for honest-but-curious adversaries, adaptive security is equivalent to...
Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a fundamental notion in Cryptography.This notion was introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. They proposed thewell-known 2-party NIKE protocol and left open the generic question of whetherNIKE could be realized in the multiparty setting. NIKE has since then been anactive area of research with an ultimate goal of obtaining best possible security inthe multiparty setting. Although this has evaded researchers for many decades,advancements have been made through relaxations in multiple directions such asrestricting to 3-parties, static/semi-static model (where the adversary needs tocommit to the set of parties he wishes to be challenged upon ahead of time),random-oracle model, allowing initial setup, etc.This dissertation provides a solution to the open question: it provides a multipartyNIKE protocol that is adaptively secure with no setup and in the standardmodel.The solution employs novel techniques of using indistinguishability obfuscation,which are interesting in their own right and which seem promising in findingwider applications in other settings. One such technique pertains overcoming thesomewhat inherent drawback of non-adaptivity of the puncturing technique introduced by Sahai and Waters [STOC'14].