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Lecture notes in computer science

Enhancing the Resistance of a Provably Secure Key Agreement Protocol to a Denial-of-Service Attack

Shoichi Hirose, Kanta Matsuura

Published Jan 1, 1999• 16 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-47942-0_15

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SUMMARY In this manuscript, two key agreement protocols which are resistant to a denial-of-service attack are constructed from a key agreement protocol in [9] provably secure against passive and active attacks. The denial-of-service attack considered is the resource-exhaustion attack on a responder. By the resource-exhaustion attack, a malicious initiator executes a key agreement protocol simultaneously as many times as possible to exhaust the responder’s resources and to disturb executions of it between honest initiators and the responder. The resources are the storage and the CPU. The proposed protocols are the first protocols resistant to both the storage-exhaustion attack and the CPU-exhaustion attack. The techniques used in the construction are stateless connection, weak key confirmation, and enforcement of heavy computation. The stateless connection is effective to enhancing the resistance to the storage-exhaustion attack. The weak key confirmation and the enforcement of heavy computation are effective to enhancing the resistance to the CPU-exhaustion attack.

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Hirose and Yoshida proposed an authenticated key agreement protocol based on the intractability of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Recently, Hirose and Matsuura pointed out that Hirose and Yoshida's protocol is vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. And they proposed two key agreement protocols which are resistant to the DoS attacks. Their protocols are the first authenticated key agreement protocols resistant to both the storage exhaustion attack and the CPU exhaustion attack. In this paper we show that Hirose and Matsuura's DoS-resistant key agreement protocols and Hirose and Yoshida's key agreement protocol are vulnerable to impersonation attacks. We make suggestions for improvements.

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SUMMARY A fault‐tolerant group key agreement is an essential infrastructure for Internet communication among all involved participants; it can establish a secure session key no matter how many malicious participants exit simultaneously in an effort to disrupt the key agreement process. Recently, Zhao et al. proposed an efficient fault‐tolerant group key agreement protocol named efficient group key agreement that can resist denial‐of‐service attacks, reply attacks, man‐in‐middle attacks, and common modulus attacks; it can also preserve forward secrecy with lower computational cost than previous protocols. We show that it is still vulnerable to active attacks by malicious participants and modify the corresponding security weakness adaptively. Furthermore, we propose an efficient fault‐tolerant group key agreement based on a binary tree structure and enhance it to a dynamic setting where participants can leave or join the group arbitrarily according to their preferences with instant session key refreshment. Additionally, our session key refreshment is based on secure key updating to protect forward/backward confidentiality and is resistant to active/passive attacks. The performance analysis shows that our proposed protocol has lower computational cost and little additional communication cost exploiting dynamic setting. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Unconditionally Secure Key Agreement Protocol

Cyril Prissette

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2001•1 citation
SUMMARY In this manuscript, two key agreement protocols which are resistant to a denial-of-service attack are constructed from a key agreement protocol in [9] provably secure against passive and active attacks. The denial-of-service attack considered is the resource-exhaustion attack on a responder. By the resource-exhaustion attack, a malicious initiator executes a key agreement protocol simultaneously as many times as possible to exhaust the responder’s resources and to disturb executions of it between honest initiators and the responder. The resources are the storage and the CPU. The proposed protocols are the first protocols resistant to both the storage-exhaustion attack and the CPU-exhaustion attack. The techniques used in the construction are stateless connection, weak key confirmation, and enforcement of heavy computation. The stateless connection is effective to enhancing the resistance to the storage-exhaustion attack. The weak key confirmation and the enforcement of heavy computation are effective to enhancing the resistance to the CPU-exhaustion attack.
Hirose and Yoshida proposed an authenticated key agreement protocol based on the intractability of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Recently, Hirose and Matsuura pointed out that Hirose and Yoshida's protocol is vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. And they proposed two key agreement protocols which are resistant to the DoS attacks. Their protocols are the first authenticated key agreement protocols resistant to both the storage exhaustion attack and the CPU exhaustion attack. In this paper we show that Hirose and Matsuura's DoS-resistant key agreement protocols and Hirose and Yoshida's key agreement protocol are vulnerable to impersonation attacks. We make suggestions for improvements.
SUMMARY A fault‐tolerant group key agreement is an essential infrastructure for Internet communication among all involved participants; it can establish a secure session key no matter how many malicious participants exit simultaneously in an effort to disrupt the key agreement process. Recently, Zhao et al. proposed an efficient fault‐tolerant group key agreement protocol named efficient group key agreement that can resist denial‐of‐service attacks, reply attacks, man‐in‐middle attacks, and common modulus attacks; it can also preserve forward secrecy with lower computational cost than previous protocols. We show that it is still vulnerable to active attacks by malicious participants and modify the corresponding security weakness adaptively. Furthermore, we propose an efficient fault‐tolerant group key agreement based on a binary tree structure and enhance it to a dynamic setting where participants can leave or join the group arbitrarily according to their preferences with instant session key refreshment. Additionally, our session key refreshment is based on secure key updating to protect forward/backward confidentiality and is resistant to active/passive attacks. The performance analysis shows that our proposed protocol has lower computational cost and little additional communication cost exploiting dynamic setting. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.