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Lecture notes in computer science

Improved Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge for the ISIS Problem, and Applications

San Ling, Khoa Nguyen, Damien Stehlé, Huaxiong Wang

Published Jan 1, 2013• 169 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-36362-7_8

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Improved Zero-knowledge Proofs of Knowledge for the ISIS Problem, and Applications.

San Ling, Khoa Nguyen, Damien Stehlé +1 more

Abstract. In all existing efficient proofs of knowledge of a solution to the infinity norm Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution (ISIS ∞ ) problem, the knowledge extractor outputs a solution vector that is only guaranteed to be Õ(n) times longer than the witness possessed by the prover. As a consequence, in many cryptographic schemes that use these proof systems as building blocks, there exists a gap between the hardness of solving the underlying ISIS ∞ problem and the hardness underlying the security reductions. In this paper, we generalize Stern’s protocol to obtain two statistical zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for the ISIS ∞ problem that remove this gap. Our result yields the potential of relying on weaker security assumptions for various lattice-based cryptographic constructions. As applications of our proof system, we introduce a concurrently secure identity-based identification scheme based on the worst-case hardness of the SIVPÕ(n1.5) problem (in the ℓ2 norm) in general lattices in the random oracle model, and an efficient statistical zero-knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge with small constant gap factor for Regev’s encryption scheme.

•Jan 1, 2012•1 citation
Abstract. In all existing efficient proofs of knowledge of a solution to the infinity norm Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution (ISIS ∞ ) problem, the knowledge extractor outputs a solution vector that is only guaranteed to be Õ(n) times longer than the witness possessed by the prover. As a consequence, in many cryptographic schemes that use these proof systems as building blocks, there exists a gap between the hardness of solving the underlying ISIS ∞ problem and the hardness underlying the security reductions. In this paper, we generalize Stern’s protocol to obtain two statistical zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for the ISIS ∞ problem that remove this gap. Our result yields the potential of relying on weaker security assumptions for various lattice-based cryptographic constructions. As applications of our proof system, we introduce a concurrently secure identity-based identification scheme based on the worst-case hardness of the SIVPÕ(n1.5) problem (in the ℓ2 norm) in general lattices in the random oracle model, and an efficient statistical zero-knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge with small constant gap factor for Regev’s encryption scheme.