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Principia an international journal of epistemology

Hypotheses on the a priori rational necessity of quantum mechanics DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p393

G. Gouesbet

Published Aug 27, 2011• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

There is a huge number of laments concerning the lack of intelligibility of quantum mechanics. Some ingredients of quantum mechanics may however be possibly understood by referring to first principles, that is to say to basic principles (or postulates) which are clear and distinct to the intuition. In particular, if we rely on a first principle called non-singularity principle, which may be viewed as a hypothesis, we claim that quantum mechanics can be viewed as the a priori consequence of a rational demand. The status of the non-singularity principle, obvious to most physicists, may however be criticized, on the basis that there is no universal intuition and that any statement is in principle revisable.

DOI
10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p393

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There is a huge number of laments concerning the lack of intelligibility of quantum mechanics. Some ingredients of quantum mechanics may however be possibly understood by referring to first principles, that is to say to basic principles (or postulates) which are clear and distinct to the intuition. In particular, if we rely on a first principle called non-singularity principle, which may be viewed as a hypothesis, we claim that quantum mechanics can be viewed as the a priori consequence of a rational demand. The status of the non-singularity principle, obvious to most physicists, may however be criticized, on the basis that there is no universal intuition and that any statement is in principle revisable.
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Our main claim is that Bohr adopted a principle-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics in order to reconcile two principles: the distinction principle, which asserts the necessity of a clear epistemic distinction between a classical apparatus and a quantum system, and the non-separability principle, which asserts that the two systems are ontologically non-separable in any measurement process. The latter principle is a consequence of Bohr's argument that, during a measurement interaction, the quantum system and the measurement apparatus form a 'new kind of individuality'. To support our argument, we first demonstrate the overlooked fact that, according to Bohr, the measurement interaction is a physical, irreversible process and not merely an epistemic acquisition of new information. In this respect, quantum mechanics must be regarded not only as a universal theory, but also as revealing no non-arbitrary difference between a quantum realm and a classical realm; the distinction is purely pragmatic. The tension between the epistemic necessity to rely on a neatly distinguishable classical realm and the ontic non-separability of the quantum system and the classical apparatus inclined Bohr to refuse to provide a constructive account of the measurement process, such as that later proposed, for instance, by spontaneous dynamical reduction models.
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Why should anyone think that what is so deeply puzzling about the quantum world is really a matter of logic? Why should anyone think that studying the logic of quantum mechanics should be a route to a proper understanding of quantum mechanics? There is a tradition in the philosophy of quantum mechanics, a tradition stronger among philosophical commentators than among physicists, which sees the subject as the business of understanding quantum mechanical language and the way that language relates to the world. It is an idea more strongly held by philosophers – it comes much more naturally to them – because the analytic tradition, in which most Anglo-American philosophers of science are raised, is generally much exercised about words and how they hook on to things. The analytic tradition in the philosophy of quantum mechanics is not unreasonable. Everyone admits that we cannot picture the microphysical world, that a graphic or iconic representation of quantum systems is impossible. Therefore understanding quantum mechanics must be a matter of understanding the logic of the words and the mathematics of quantum mechanics. If this seems implausible, it is because of an ambiguity in our use of the verb ‘to understand’. We understand the physical world, and we understand physics. But physics is not the physical world. It is something of an entirely different sort, a human product, a way of representing the world.