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Springer eBooks

On Concurrent Identification Protocols (Extended Abstract)

Oded Goldreich

Published Feb 28, 2007• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/3-540-39757-4_27

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We consider communication networks in which it is not possible to identify the source of a message which is broadcastes through the network. A natural question is whether it is possible for two users to identify each other concurrently, through a secure two-party protocol. We show that more than the existence of a secure Public Key Cryptosystem should be assumed in order to present a secure protocol for concurrent identification. We present two concurrent identification protocols: The first one relies on the existence of a center who has distributed "identification tags" two the users; while the second protocol relies on the distribution of "experimental sequences" by instances of a pre-protocol which have taken place between every two users.
In this paper, we propose a new zero-knowledge identification protocol. While the protocol consists of only two message flows, it does not rely on any underlying signature or encryption scheme. Its zero-knowledge property is preserved under concurrent composition and reset settings. It is secure under the strongest attack model which incorporates concurrent attacks, active-intruder attacks and reset attacks. Meanwhile its performance in computation and communication is close to that of the most efficient identification protocols not based on signature or encryption systems, most of which are insecure in this strong attack model.