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The frontiers collection

The World According to de Finetti: On de Finetti’s Theory of Probability and Its Application to Quantum Mechanics

Joseph Berkovitz

Published Aug 13, 2011• 7 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-21329-8_16

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Bruno de Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjectivist school of probability, where probabilities are interpreted as rational degrees of belief. His work on the relation between the theorems of probability and rationality is among the corner stones of modern subjective probability theory. De Finetti maintained that rationality requires that degrees of belief be coherent, and he argued that the whole of probability theory could be derived from these coherence conditions. De Finetti’s interpretation of probability has been highly influential in science. This paper focuses on the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics. We argue that de Finetti held that the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events depend on their verifiability. Accordingly, the standard coherence conditions of degrees of belief that are familiar from the literature on subjective probability only apply to degrees of belief in events which could (in principle) be jointly verified; and the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events that cannot be jointly verified are weaker. While the most obvious explanation of de Finetti’s verificationism is the influence of positivism, we argue that it could be motivated by the radical subjectivist and instrumental nature of probability in his interpretation; for as it turns out, in this interpretation it is difficult to make sense of the idea of coherent degrees of belief in, and accordingly probabilities of unverifiable events. We then consider the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics, concentrating on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment and Bell’s theorem.

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We present an elementary proof of the quantum de Finetti representation theorem, a quantum analog of de Finetti’s classical theorem on exchangeable probability assignments. This contrasts with the original proof of Hudson and Moody [Z. Wahrschein. verw. Geb. 33, 343 (1976)], which relies on advanced mathematics and does not share the same potential for generalization. The classical de Finetti theorem provides an operational definition of the concept of an unknown probability in Bayesian probability theory, where probabilities are taken to be degrees of belief instead of objective states of nature. The quantum de Finetti theorem, in a closely analogous fashion, deals with exchangeable density-operator assignments and provides an operational definition of the concept of an “unknown quantum state” in quantum-state tomography. This result is especially important for information-based interpretations of quantum mechanics, where quantum states, like probabilities, are taken to be states of knowledge rather than states of nature. We further demonstrate that the theorem fails for real Hilbert spaces and discuss the significance of this point.

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Bruno de Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjectivist school of probability, where probabilities are interpreted as rational degrees of belief. His work on the relation between the theorems of probability and rationality is among the corner stones of modern subjective probability theory. De Finetti maintained that rationality requires that degrees of belief be coherent, and he argued that the whole of probability theory could be derived from these coherence conditions. De Finetti’s interpretation of probability has been highly influential in science. This paper focuses on the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics. We argue that de Finetti held that the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events depend on their verifiability. Accordingly, the standard coherence conditions of degrees of belief that are familiar from the literature on subjective probability only apply to degrees of belief in events which could (in principle) be jointly verified; and the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events that cannot be jointly verified are weaker. While the most obvious explanation of de Finetti’s verificationism is the influence of positivism, we argue that it could be motivated by the radical subjectivist and instrumental nature of probability in his interpretation; for as it turns out, in this interpretation it is difficult to make sense of the idea of coherent degrees of belief in, and accordingly probabilities of unverifiable events. We then consider the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics, concentrating on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment and Bell’s theorem.
We present an elementary proof of the quantum de Finetti representation theorem, a quantum analog of de Finetti’s classical theorem on exchangeable probability assignments. This contrasts with the original proof of Hudson and Moody [Z. Wahrschein. verw. Geb. 33, 343 (1976)], which relies on advanced mathematics and does not share the same potential for generalization. The classical de Finetti theorem provides an operational definition of the concept of an unknown probability in Bayesian probability theory, where probabilities are taken to be degrees of belief instead of objective states of nature. The quantum de Finetti theorem, in a closely analogous fashion, deals with exchangeable density-operator assignments and provides an operational definition of the concept of an “unknown quantum state” in quantum-state tomography. This result is especially important for information-based interpretations of quantum mechanics, where quantum states, like probabilities, are taken to be states of knowledge rather than states of nature. We further demonstrate that the theorem fails for real Hilbert spaces and discuss the significance of this point.
de Finetti-type theorems enable a substantially simplified analysis of information-processing tasks in various areas, such as quantum cryptography and quantum tomography. The idea is that instead of carrying out the analysis for any possible state it is sufficient to consider one particular de Finetti state, that is, a convex combination of i.i.d. states. It is thus interesting to see whether such de Finetti-type theorems are unique for quantum theory or whether they hold for more general theories. Here we prove a de Finetti-type theorem in the framework of conditional probability distributions. In this framework, a system is described by a conditional probability distribution P_A|X where X denotes the measurement and A the outcome. We show that any permutation invariant system P_A|X can be reduced to a de Finetti system. We then demonstrate how the theorem can be applied to security proofs of device independent cryptographic protocols.