Quantum cryptographic key distribution (QKD) systems1 transmit cryptographic key data encoded in the quantum states of individual optical photons with security of the data guaranteed by the fundamental quantum properties of light, rather than by computational complexity or barriers to interception. Beamsplitter attacks are avoided by using single photons, while attempts to read and replace the photons with copies are thwarted by randomly switching between two non-orthogonal bases for the photon states. This so-called 4-state protocol1 forces an eavesdropper trying to read-and-replace photons to induce errors at a minimum rate of about 25%, which can be readily detected by the parties exchanging the key data. Several groups have performed QKD experiments that demonstrate its feasibility2.
Quantum cryptographic key distribution (QKD) systems1 transmit cryptographic key data encoded in the quantum states of individual optical photons with security of the data guaranteed by the fundamental quantum properties of light, rather than by computational complexity or barriers to interception. Beamsplitter attacks are avoided by using single photons, while attempts to read and replace the photons with copies are thwarted by randomly switching between two non-orthogonal bases for the photon states. This so-called 4-state protocol1 forces an eavesdropper trying to read-and-replace photons to induce errors at a minimum rate of about 25%, which can be readily detected by the parties exchanging the key data. Several groups have performed QKD experiments that demonstrate its feasibility2.
Summary form only given. Quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution (QKD), invented by Bennett and Brassard is a method for creating shared, assuredly secret, cryptographic key data over unsecured optical links. Security is guaranteed by the fundamental quantum properties of light. We describe our system in great detail, and report recent improvements and results obtained in generating error-corrected, privacy-amplified photographic key data over a 10-km single-mode fiber link. Bob transmits two orthogonally-polarized phase coherent pulses.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) employs the laws of quantum mechanics for the purpose of cryptography. Two parties, commonly called Alice and Bob, are able to share a random key which is used to encrypt a message. Any eavesdropper trying to intercept their key will have to make measurements, thereby disturbing the system. This can be detected by Alice and Bob and they will then discard their key. Polarisation encoded QKD protocols use the polarisation of single photons as qubits to generate a cryptographic key. This can be implemented using a fibre optic link between Alice and Bob but the polarisation of light is altered when passed through a fibre due to birefringence caused by asymmetries in the fibre. This causes refractive differences for orthogonal components of the state of polarisation of light, so the polarisation is rotated as the photon is transmitted through the fibre. If the fibre is fixed, the change of polarisation will be unique and constant. This can be compensated by rotating each photon appropriately to its original state. Under typical environmental conditions, such as temperature changes and vibrations, the birefringence effects vary and should be compensated in real time. Therefore, an active polarisation controller is needed in order to maintain the state of polarisation of each qubit. An investigation was done to first track how the state of polarisation changes over time in a natural environment. Both wavelength-division multiplexing and time-division multiplexing were investigated as testing methods for the compensation system. A timedivision multiplexed system was developed to compensate the changes in polarisation. Since QKD protocols such as BB84 and B92 utilise two non-orthogonal bases, two polarisation controllers are usually used for compensation. However, by using a search algorithm, one polarisation controller was able to isolate the plane on the Poincare sphere that passes through both bases, thus compensating non-orthogonal states with one device.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of secure key distribution which provides protection against the tampering and interception of information. Following the Bennet-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol of QKD, we select randomly from a set of bases in which to produce polarized photons and send the photons to a receiver, who measures them in a basis randomly selected from the same set. The fact that quantum mechanics prohibits the exact copying of a photon ensures that any eavesdropper who intercepts, measures, and attempts to pass the photons on to the receiver will be unable to faithfully reproduce that signal. The presence of the eavesdropper can then be detected, prior to any exchange of information, by an examination of the error rate between portions of the keys generated by the sender and receiver. Using a biphoton source, we have constructed a QKD system for use in research towards naval applications.
Quantum cryptographic key distribution (QKD) uses extremely faint light pulses to carry quantum information between two parties (Alice and Bob), allowing them to generate a shared, secret cryptographic key. Autocompensating QKD systems automatically and passively compensate for uncontrolled time-dependent variations of the optical fibre properties by coding the information as a differential phase between orthogonally polarized components of a light pulse sent on a round trip through the fibre, reflected at mid-course using a Faraday mirror. We have built a prototype system based on standard telecom technology that achieves a privacy-amplified bit generation rate of ~1000 bits s -1 over a 10 km optical fibre link. Quantum cryptography is an example of an application that, by using quantum states of individual particles to represent information, accomplishes a practical task that is impossible using classical means.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables secure key exchange, based on fundamental laws of quantum mechanics [1] . There exist various protocols which are mathematically proven to be secure, however, for an actual implementation vulnerabilities, due to non-ideal components, must be considered. For example, the usage of faint lasers instead of single-photon sources undermines the security, as even for mean photon numbers per pulse µ ≪ 1 there is a non-vanishing probability of emitting multiple photons. The decoy protocol [2] , [3] offers a countermeasure. When randomly switching between two or more different pulse intensity levels, by exploiting their non-orthogonality, the so-called photon number splitting (PNS) attack can be revealed.
We have developed a system for quantum key distribution (QKD), based on standard telecommunication lasers, detectors, and optical fiber, that passively compensates for time-dependent variations of the fiber-optic path due to stress, temperature changes, or birefringence. This approach allows information encoded in phase shifts imposed on single-photon-level pulses to be accurately read out after transmission over many kilometers of uncontrolled fiber. Cooled InGaAs avalanche photodiodes, pulse-biased using a special noise canceling circuit, are used to detect single 1.31-/spl mu/m infrared photons with a high efficiency, low dark-count rate, and subnanosecond time resolution. A single optical fiber carries both the quantum information and precise 1.55 /spl mu/m timing pulses between the two end stations. Overall synchronization of end-station activities, public discussion of basis choices, error correction, and privacy amplification have all been implemented over a local area network (LAN). The system at present generates raw, error-corrected, and privacy-amplified key data at rates of /spl sim/1000, 600, and 200 bits/s, respectively, over a 10-km single-mode fiber link.