Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world, existing throughout the universe. One problem with panpsychism is that it is a purely theoretical concept so far. For progress towards an operationalization of the idea, this paper suggests to make use of an ontological dierence involved in the mind-matter distinction. The mode in which mental phenomena exist is called presence. The mode in which matter and radiation exist is called reality. Physical theory disregards presence in both the form of mental presence and the form of the temporal present. In contrast to mental presence, the temporal present is objective in the perspective of the third person. This relative kind of objectivity waits to be utilized for a hypothesis of how the mental and the physical are interrelated. In order to do so, this paper translates the mind-matter distinction into the distinction between mental and physical time and addresses the problem that panpsychism tries to attack head-on in these temporal terms. There are, in particular, two issues thus getting involved: (1) discussions about a time observable and (2) the quantum Zeno eect.
Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world, existing throughout the universe. One problem with panpsychism is that it is a purely theoretical concept so far. For progress towards an operationalization of the idea, this paper suggests to make use of an ontological dierence involved in the mind-matter distinction. The mode in which mental phenomena exist is called presence. The mode in which matter and radiation exist is called reality. Physical theory disregards presence in both the form of mental presence and the form of the temporal present. In contrast to mental presence, the temporal present is objective in the perspective of the third person. This relative kind of objectivity waits to be utilized for a hypothesis of how the mental and the physical are interrelated. In order to do so, this paper translates the mind-matter distinction into the distinction between mental and physical time and addresses the problem that panpsychism tries to attack head-on in these temporal terms. There are, in particular, two issues thus getting involved: (1) discussions about a time observable and (2) the quantum Zeno eect.
Abstract. Two fundamental issues raised by Lothar Schäfer are considered: (1) the question of a suitable paradigm within which the findings of quantum physics can be optimally interpreted and (2) the question of the assessment of the presence and importance of mind and consciousness in the universe. In regard to the former, I contend that the ideal of science is to interpret its findings in an optimally consistent and minimally speculative framework. In this context Schäfer's assertion that certain findings in quantum physics (those that relate to virtual states) indicate the presence of mind at the quantum level implies a dualistic and hence unnecessarily speculative assumption. In regard to the assessment of mind and consciousness, a consistent and parsimonious paradigm suggests that mind and consciousness are not part of a chain of events consisting of an admixture of physical and mental events but that physical events form a single, coherent set of events, and mental events another set, with the two sets related, as Teilhard (and a number of other philosophers, including White head) affirmed, as the “within” and the “without” (or the “mental pole” and the “physical pole”) of one and the same fundamental reality. This panpsychist as contrasted with Schäfer's dualist paradigm provides a single self‐consistent framework for the interpretation of quantum (and all natural) events while recognizing the presence of mind in the universe as the least speculative realist implication of our immediate experience of consciousness.
Metaphysics, as discipline dealing with the most fundamental aspects of reality, studies the essence of entities, leaving to particular sciences the study of empirical, specific, changeable and unstable aspects. In this sense metaphysics is close to ontology, tackling problems as the existence of God, the being in himself, the immortality of consciousness, the origin and meaning of the universe. Speculative physics pushes its interest to metaphysical questions too, both at atechnical (mathematical) level, and at the level of thought (in relation to philosophy). In recentyears interesting concepts and ideas have been considered and developed, involving the latest unified quantum-relativistic theories and the consequences on reality deriving from them.The search for a meaning of life, one of Anscombe’s themes, finds ferment in the search for meaning about the existence of our universe in itself and as a possible part of a multiverse containing it.The problem of measurement in quantum mechanics appears from the application of themathematical formalism to macroscopic situations and the central position of the observer in this process has produced a deviation towards a metaphysical subjectivism. There are controversial aspects about the role of consciousness in the process of reducing the wave function of quantum mechanics. This narrows the field of validity of some fundamental principles during the interaction between microsystems and macrosystems, with consequent diversification of thedefinition of the ontological state of consciousness and reality. (Local) holism has often been linked to Wittgenstein. From Wittgenstein’s answers to the paradoxes of communication and conceptual relativism, a tension emerges in his vision of linguistic games and in his mental experiments, traditionally interpreted in contrasting ways. This tension can be better understoodthrough some reflections by Wittgenstein on Einstein and his theory of relativity.
Although this book is about the implications for social science of a quantum approach to the mind, much of that potential stems from its ability to integrate consciousness – a particular aspect of the mind – into a naturalistic worldview. And when it comes to the hard problem, quantum brain theory is only a necessary condition for such integration, not sufficient. Necessary, because it would enable the body to exploit for macro-level purposes a physical but non- material space for consciousness at the quantum level – collapse of the wave function – that does not exist in classical physics. Insufficient, however, because quantum brain theory embodies an objective, third-person standpoint and as such can tell us no more than classical brain theory can about why brains have a subjective, first-person point of view in the first place. The explanatory gap is still there, in other words, only now pushed down into quantum theory. To cross this gap, therefore, in addition to a new physics of the brain we will need a new meta -physics as well. As I argue in this chapter, it is this metaphysics that does the real work in solving the mind–body problem. Most social scientists have an instinctive aversion to ‘metaphysics,’ which in our world connotes wooly-headed and speculative thinking that has no place in science. Yet in moving onto this terrain the situation is both worse and better than that. It is worse because we have no choice. The Neuron Doctrine itself is based on a metaphysic, materialism, which looks increasingly unlikely to ever explain consciousness; and in thinking about the meaning of quantum theory metaphysical debate can hardly be avoided, precisely because physics provides little guidance for choosing among its interpretations. So the only question is whether to change our metaphysics of the brain from classical to quantum.
The aim of this paper is to construct an ontology to account consistently for both the objective and subjective worlds. First, I will determine the fundamental properties of consciousness from a first-person perspective and derive from them a subjective definition of consciousness. Second, I will infer from their existence at a macroscopic level some expectations about the empirical world and show that these expectations can be identified with quantum properties of matter. This will lead to the construction of an ontology and to a physical counterpart of the former subjective definition of consciousness, which accounts for the existence of a continuum between conscious and unconscious states. Finally, I will go beyond the common objections to quantum mind to propose a simple yet suitable model of mind which explains why consciousness arises specifically inside the nervous systems of living creatures.
In 2005, an essay was published in Nature asserting that the universe is mental and that we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things. Since then, experiments have confirmed that — as predicted by quantum mechanics — reality is contextual, which contradicts at least intuitive formulations of realism and corroborates the hypothesis of a mental universe. Yet, to give this hypothesis a coherent rendering, one must explain how a mental universe can — at least in principle — accommodate (a) our experience of ourselves as distinct individual minds sharing a world beyond the control of our volition; and (b) the empirical fact that this world is contextual despite being seemingly shared. By combining a modern formulation of the ontology of idealism with the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, the present paper attempts to provide a viable explanatory framework for both points. In the process of doing so, the paper also addresses key philosophical qualms of the relational interpretation.
The aim of this paper is to construct an ontology to account consistently for both the objective and subjective worlds. First, I will determine the fundamental properties of consciousness from a first-person perspective and derive from them a subjective definition of consciousness. Second, I will infer from their existence at a macroscopic level some expectations about the empirical world and show that these expectations can be identified with quantum properties of matter. This will lead to the construction of an ontology and to a physical counterpart of the former subjective definition of consciousness, which accounts for the existence of a continuum between conscious and unconscious states. Finally, I will go beyond the common objections to quantum mind to propose a simple yet suitable model of mind which explains why consciousness arises specifically inside the nervous systems of living creatures.