In this thesis, I argue that, contrary to the historical opposition between Niels Bohr and Hugh Everett's respective interpretations of quantum mechanics, their views share several common goals and metaphysical similarities. Their theories, while they have their disagreements, make many compatible claims with one another, although the conclusions they reach are different. They went about modeling physical reality in distinct ways, but I argue first that these apparent incompatibilities are not so dissimilar as commonly believed and second that Everett manages to improve upon Bohr's theory for a more coherent account of physical reality. I demonstrate this by 1) looking at Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics, as understood by Karen Barad, and his solution to (or perhaps more appropriately, his denial of) the measurement problem; 2) looking at Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics, in part as made popular by Bryce DeWitt, and his solution to (or denial of) the measurement problem; and 3) comparing and contrasting Bohr and Everett's interpretations in order to show that Bohr's view can be understood as laying down the metaphysical framework for Everett's view, which ultimately leads to a more cogent, consistent, and compelling understanding not only of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, but also of the nature of the multiverse.
In this thesis, I argue that, contrary to the historical opposition between Niels Bohr and Hugh Everett's respective interpretations of quantum mechanics, their views share several common goals and metaphysical similarities. Their theories, while they have their disagreements, make many compatible claims with one another, although the conclusions they reach are different. They went about modeling physical reality in distinct ways, but I argue first that these apparent incompatibilities are not so dissimilar as commonly believed and second that Everett manages to improve upon Bohr's theory for a more coherent account of physical reality. I demonstrate this by 1) looking at Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics, as understood by Karen Barad, and his solution to (or perhaps more appropriately, his denial of) the measurement problem; 2) looking at Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics, in part as made popular by Bryce DeWitt, and his solution to (or denial of) the measurement problem; and 3) comparing and contrasting Bohr and Everett's interpretations in order to show that Bohr's view can be understood as laying down the metaphysical framework for Everett's view, which ultimately leads to a more cogent, consistent, and compelling understanding not only of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, but also of the nature of the multiverse.
Hugh Everett III was an American physicist best known for his many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, which formed the basis of his PhD thesis at Princeton University in 1957. Although counterintuitive, Everett's revolutionary formulation of quantum mechanics offers the most direct solution to the infamous quantum measurement problem--that is, how and why the singular world of our experience emerges from the multiplicities of alternatives available in the quantum world. The many-worlds interpretation postulates the existence of multiple universes. Whenever a measurement-like interaction occurs, the universe branches into relative states, one for each possible outcome of the measurement, and the world in which we find ourselves is but one of these many, but equally real, possibilities. Everett's challenge to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics was met with scorn from Niels Bohr and other leading physicists, and Everett subsequently abandoned academia to conduct military operations research. Today, however, Everett's formulation of quantum mechanics is widely recognized as one of the most controversial but promising physical theories of the last century. In this book, Jeffrey Barrett and Peter Byrne present the long and short versions of Everett's thesis along with a collection of his explanatory writings and correspondence. These primary source documents, many of them newly discovered and most unpublished until now, reveal how Everett's thinking evolved from his days as a graduate student to his untimely death in 1982. This definitive volume also features Barrett and Byrne's introductory essays, notes, and commentary that put Everett's extraordinary theory into historical and scientific perspective and discuss the puzzles that still remain.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics - better known as the Many-Worlds Theory - has had a rather uneven reception. Mainstream philosophers have scarcely heard of it, save as science fiction. In philosophy of physics it is well known but has historically been fairly widely rejected. Among physicists (at least, among those concerned with the interpretation of quantum mechanics in the first place), it is taken very seriously indeed, arguably tied for first place in popularity with more traditional operationalist views of quantum mechanics. In this article, I provide a fairly short (15,000 words) and self-contained introduction to the Everett interpretation as it is currently understood. I use little technical machinery, although I do assume the reader has encountered the measurement problem already (at about the level of the well-known discussions by Penrose or Albert).
abstract: This thesis attempts to explain Everettian quantum mechanics from the ground up, such that those with little to no experience in quantum physics can understand it. First, we introduce the history of quantum theory, and some concepts that make up the framework of quantum physics. Through these concepts, we reveal why interpretations are necessary to map the quantum world onto our classical world. We then introduce the Copenhagen interpretation, and how many-worlds differs from it. From there, we dive into the concepts of entanglement and decoherence, explaining how worlds branch in an Everettian universe, and how an Everettian universe can appear as our classical observed world. From there, we attempt to answer common questions about many-worlds and discuss whether there are philosophical ramifications to believing such a theory. Finally, we look at whether the many-worlds interpretation can be proven, and why one might choose to believe it. (abstract)
I distinguish two senses in which one can take a given physical theory to be `complete'. On the first, a complete physical theory is one that, in principle, completely describes physical reality. On the second, a complete physical theory is one that provides all of the conceptual resources one needs to describe any (in general probabilistic) physical phenomenon to any level of detail one likes, in principle. I argue that while the (neo-)Everettian approach to interpreting quantum mechanics aims to show that it is complete in the first sense, the (neo-)Bohrian approach begins from an understanding of quantum mechanics as being complete in the second sense. I then discuss some of the essential differences between how classical and quantum theory describe phenomena, and the way in which the quantum description can be thought of as a ``natural generalisation'' (to use Bohr's phrase) of the classical description. Finally, I elaborate upon the two visions of physics from which one can motivate the first and the second sense of completeness, respectively: \emph{metaphysical realism}, on the one hand, and what I will call \emph{methodological realism}, on the other -- and discuss what one can say about the significance of the differences between quantum and classical description from each of these points of view. I suggest that there is a sense in which the views of (neo-)Everett and the views of (neo-)Bohr can be understood to be mutually supporting positions, from their respective perspectives, even though they are diametrically opposed.
It has been 61 years since Hugh Everett III's PhD dissertation, {\it On the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics}, was submitted to the Princeton University Physics Department. After more than a decade of relative obscurity it was resurrected by Bryce DeWitt as {\it The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics} and since then has become an active topic of discussion, reinterpretation, and modification, especially among philosophers of science, quantum cosmologists, and advocates of quantum decoherence and quantum computing. Many of these analyses are quite sophisticated and considered to be important contributions to physics and philosophy. I am primarily an experimental physicist and my pragmatic ruminations on the subject might viewed with some suspicion. Indeed, Bohr's pragmatic {\it Copenhagen Interpretation} is often disparaged by this same cohort. Still, I think that my experimentalist's vantage point has something to offer and I here offer it to you.
Hugh Everett III was an American physicist best known for his many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, which formed the basis of his PhD thesis at Princeton University in 1957. Although counterintuitive, Everett's revolutionary formulation of quantum mechanics offers the most direct solution to the infamous quantum measurement problem--that is, how and why the singular world of our experience emerges from the multiplicities of alternatives available in the quantum world. The many-worlds interpretation postulates the existence of multiple universes. Whenever a measurement-like interaction occurs, the universe branches into relative states, one for each possible outcome of the measurement, and the world in which we find ourselves is but one of these many, but equally real, possibilities. Everett's challenge to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics was met with scorn from Niels Bohr and other leading physicists, and Everett subsequently abandoned academia to conduct military operations research. Today, however, Everett's formulation of quantum mechanics is widely recognized as one of the most controversial but promising physical theories of the last century.
In this book, Jeffrey Barrett and Peter Byrne present the long and short versions of Everett's thesis along with a collection of his explanatory writings and correspondence. These primary source documents, many of them newly discovered and most unpublished until now, reveal how Everett's thinking evolved from his days as a graduate student to his untimely death in 1982. This definitive volume also features Barrett and Byrne's introductory essays, notes, and commentary that put Everett's extraordinary theory into historical and scientific perspective and discuss the puzzles that still remain.