A short history of the development of the mathematics of quantum mechanics, with some comments on the strangeness of the conventional physical interpretation.
Quantum mechanics (QM) is not just a theory of micro-objects: it is our current fundamental theory of motion. It expresses a deeper understanding of Nature than classical mechanics. Precisely as classical mechanics, the conventional formulation of QM describes evolution of states and observables in time. Precisely as classical mechanics, this is not sufficient to deal with general relativistic systems, because these systems do not describe evolution in time; they describe correlations between observables. Therefore, a formulation of QM slightly more general than the conventional one – or a quantum version of the relativistic classical mechanics discussed in the previous chapter – is needed. In this chapter I discuss the possibility of such a formulation. In the last section I discuss the general physical interpretation of QM. QM can be formulated in a number of more or less equivalent formalisms: canonical (Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators), covariant (Feynman's sum-over-histories), algebraic (states as linear functionals over an abstract algebra of observables) and others. Generally, but not always, we are able to translate these formalisms into one another, but often what is easy in one formulation is difficult in another. A generalrelativistic sum-over-histories formalism has been developed by Jim Hartle. Here I focus on the canonical formalism, because the canonical formalism has provided the mathematical completeness and precision needed to explicitly construct the mathematical apparatus of quantum gravity. Later I will consider alternative formalisms.
Paul Benioff was a physicist and mathematician working as a research scientist at the Argonne National Laboratory. He published two papers on Everett interpretation shortly after this letter: Benioff (1977)["Finite and infinite measurement in quantum mechanics and randomness: The Everett interpretation," Journal of Mathematical Physics 18(12), 2289] and Benioff (1978) ["A Note on the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics," Foundations of Physics 8(9/10), 709]. In both cases, Benioff was interested in the role of infinite sequences of measurements in the Everett interpretation. In this letter, Wheeler asks Everett to comment on Benioff's argument.
In this thesis I argue that many problems in the philosophy of science and mathematics (in particular, the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in physics) can only be addressed within a broader metaphysical framework which provides a coherent world view. I attempt to develop such a framework and draw out its consequences. The attempt is in two parts: first, I develop a speculative framework based on an analogy to set theory; then I combine elements of the framework with ideas from Leibnizian monadology and consistent histories quantum theory to introduce (what I call) quantum monadology. The two parts focus on different aspects of the problem and should be viewed as stages on the way to a final formulation. The inspiration for the thesis came from Plato’s Timaeus and Wigner’s comments on quantum mechanics. As it turned out, Leibniz’s Monadology became a third key source.