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Beyond Fapp: Three Approaches to Improving Orthodox Quantum Theory and An Experimental Test

Nicholas Maxwell

Published Jan 1, 1993• 4 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Because it fails to solve the wave-particle problem, orthodox quantum theory is obliged to be about observables and not beables. As a result the theory is imprecise, ambiguous, ad hoc, lacking in explanatory power, restricted in scope and resistant to unification. A new version of quantum theory is needed that is about quantum beables.

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Oxford University Press eBooks•Jan 16, 2003•0 citations
According to orthodox quantum mechanics, state vectors change in two incompatible ways: “deterministically” in accordance with Schr0̈dinger's time-dependent equation, and probabilistically if and only if a measurement is made. It is argued here that the problem of measurement arises because the precise, mutually exclusive conditions for these two types of transitions to occur are not specified within orthodox quantum mechanics. Fundamentally, this is due to an inevitable ambiguity in the notion of “measurement” itself. Hence, if the problem of measurement is to be resolved, a new, fully objective version of quantum mechanics needs to be developed which does not incorporate the notion of measurement in its basic postulates at all.
The call to supplement the quantum wave function with local beables is almost as old as quantum mechanics. But what exactly is the problem with the wave function as the representation of a quantum system? I canvass three potential problems with the wave function: the well-known problems of incompleteness and dimensionality, and the lesser known problem of non-locality introduced recently by Myrvold. Building on Myrvold's insight, I show that the standard ways of introducing local beables into quantum mechanics are unsuccessful. I consider whether we really need local beables, and assess the prospects for a new theory of local beables.
What are quantum entities? Is the quantum domain deterministic or probabilistic? Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) fails to answer these two fundamental questions. As a result of failing to answer the first question, OQT is very seriously defective: it is imprecise, ambiguous, ad hoc, non-explanatory, inapplicable to the early universe, inapplicable to the cosmos as a whole, and such that it is inherently incapable of being unified with general relativity. It is argued that probabilism provides a very natural solution to the quantum wave/particle dilemma and promises to lead to a fully micro-realistic, testable version of quantum theory that is free of the defects of OQT. It is suggested that inelastic interactions may induce quantum probabilistic transitions.
In this paper I put forward a new micro realistic, fundamentally probabilistic, propensiton version of quantum theory. According to this theory, the entities of the quantum domain - electrons, photons, atoms - are neither particles nor fields, but a new kind of fundamentally probabilistic entity, the propensiton - entities which interact with one another probabilistically. This version of quantum theory leaves the Schroedinger equation unchanged, but reinterprets it to specify how propensitons evolve when no probabilistic transitions occur. Probabilisitic transitions occur (...) when new "particles" are created as a result of inelastic interactions. All measurements are just special cases of this. This propensiton version of quantum theory, I argue, solves the wave/particle dilemma, is free of conceptual problems that plague orthodox quantum theory, recovers all the empirical success of orthodox quantum theory, and at the same time yields as yet untested predictions that differ from those of orthodox quantum theory
This chapter first examines the four ways in which quantum theory poses a challenge for aim-oriented empiricism. It then enumerates the six defects of the orthodox quantum theory. It also looks into the nature of the propensiton quantum theory. The last three sections of the chapter discuss one approach to developing a fully micro-realistic version of quantum theory, free of the defects which deface orthodox quantum theory. The chapter notes that this plausible view would not have been ignored if aim-oriented empiricism had been generally accepted. It argues that these defects result from failure to solve the wave/particle dilemma. The chapter suggests that theoretical physics should seriously consider the two interrelated questions in which orthodox quantum theory is so evasive: What is the nature of quantum objects? Is Nature probabilistic or deterministic?