NICE-PAKE: On the Security of KEM-Based PAKE Constructions without Ideal Ciphers
Nouri Alnahawi, Jacob Alperin-Sheriff, Daniel Apon +2 more
We present the No IC Encryption (NICE)-PAKE, a (semi)-generic symmetric Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) framework providing a quantum-safe alternative for the Ideal Cipher (IC), utilizing simpler cryptographic components for the authentication step. To give a formal proof, we introduce the notions of A-Part Secrecy (A-SEC-CCA), Splittable Collision Freeness (A-CFR-CCA) and Public Key Uniformity (SPLIT-PKU) for splittable LWE KEMs. We show the relation of the former to the Non-uniform LWE and the Weak-Hint LWE assumptions, as well as its application to Ring and Module LWE. Finally, we show how to obtain a secure PAKE from our construction with concrete parameter choices for lattice KEMs.
IACR Communications in Cryptology•May 4, 2026•1 citation