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Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria (Philosophical Review - New Series)

Everett's Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics in the Light of Everett's Modal Realism and Kripke's Semantics

Katarzyna Kuś, Marek Kuś

Published Jan 1, 2008• 0 citations
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•Jan 1, 2006•3 citations
In this paper, we present a (propositional) modal-logic approximation to Quantum Mechanics from a reduced and characteristic number of crucial experi ments and so independently of the lattice of subspaces of Hilbert s'pace. Kripke's semantics, which determinates this system, allows to define, from a new point of view, the notions of process and virtual world and admits a natural interpretation which in turn can help us to understand the measurement problem. In this way, we can attempt a many-worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, in the way of Everett.
Recognizing that syntactic and semantic structures of classical logic are not sufficient to understand the meaning of quantum phenomena, we propose in this paper a new interpretation of quantum mechanics based on evidence theory. The connection between these two theories is obtained through a new language, quantum set theory, built on a suggestion by J. Bell. Further, we give a modal logic interpretation of quantum mechanics and quantum set theory by using Kripke's semantics of modal logic based on the concept of possible worlds. This is grounded on previous work of a number of researchers (Resconi, Klir, Harmanec) who showed how to represent evidence theory and other uncertainty theories in terms of modal logic. Moreover, we also propose a reformulation of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of Kripke's semantics. We thus show how three different theories — quantum mechanics, evidence theory, and modal logic — are interrelated. This opens, on one hand, the way to new applications of quantum mechanics within domains different from the traditional ones, and, on the other hand, the possibility of building new generalizations of quantum mechanics itself.
Recent work on probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a decision-theoretic derivation of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, and hence a general metaphysical theory of probability; part 1 is a discussion of this remarkable result. I defend the claim that the ‘subjective uncertainty’ principle is required for the derivation to succeed, arguing that it amounts to a theoretical identification of chance. In part 2, I generalize this account, and suggest that the Everett interpretation, in combination with a plausible view of natural laws, has the potential to provide a reductive theory of metaphysical modality. I defend the resulting naturalistic modal realism, and outline some of its implications for other parts of metaphysics.