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arXiv:2611.17051

Physical Observables and Superselection

M. P. Vaughan

Published Nov 12, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

It is well-known that a physical state may be represented by a unit vector in a Hilbert space, whilst a physical observable may be represented by a self-adjoint operator on that same space. However, the introduction of a superselection rule on a Hilbert space imposes constraints such that not all self-adjoint operators can represent observables, which has further consequences for the states themselves as well as the physical processes that transform them. In this article, we review the concept of superselection from the view of how such rules would affect what we consider to be physical. Arguments for the existence of a superselection rule due to charge or possibly energy conservation are given and the emergence of effective superselection rules due to decoherence or the lack of a shared reference frame are also discussed.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2611.17051

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It is well-known that a physical state may be represented by a unit vector in a Hilbert space, whilst a physical observable may be represented by a self-adjoint operator on that same space. However, the introduction of a superselection rule on a Hilbert space imposes constraints such that not all self-adjoint operators can represent observables, which has further consequences for the states themselves as well as the physical processes that transform them. In this article, we review the concept of superselection from the view of how such rules would affect what we consider to be physical. Arguments for the existence of a superselection rule due to charge or possibly energy conservation are given and the emergence of effective superselection rules due to decoherence or the lack of a shared reference frame are also discussed.
In quantum theory, physically measurable quantities of a microscopic system are represented by self-adjoint operators. However, not all of the self-adjoint operators correspond to measurable quantities. The superselection rule is a criterion to distinguish measurable quantities. Any measurable quantity must obey the superselection rules. By contraposition, any quantity which does not obey the superselection rules cannot be measured. Although some of superselection rules were proved, the raizon d'être of the superselection rules has been still obscure. In this paper we deduce the superselection rules from an assumption on symmetry property of measurement process. We introduce the notion of covariant indicator, which is a macroscopic observable whose value indicates the value of a microscopic object observable. We prove that if an object system has a quantity that is conserved during the measurement process, other quantities that do not commute with the conserved quantity are non-measurable by the covariant indicator. Our derivation of superselection rules is compared with the uncertainty relation under the restriction by a conservation law. An implication of the color superselection rule for the color confinement is discussed. It is also argued that spontaneous symmetry breaking enables a measurement that the superselection rule prohibits.
Some physicists believe that superselection rules should be implemented to get rid of inconsistencies when a theory is framed in terms of a new mathematical formulation, whilst others think that this new formulation should be modified instead of implementing those rules, at the expense of introducing additional mathematical structure. The outcome, however, is that we are still uncertain whether these rules should be implemented and how they should be interpreted and assessed from the philosophical point of view. Based on a detailed examination of the group-theoretic reformulation of (relativistic and non-relativistic) quantum mechanics that prompts physicists to impose superselection rules, I shall argue that the implementation of these rules involves serious heuristic and epistemological concerns. Considering this argument, I shall conclude that there are suitable philosophical reasons to claim that the implementation of superselection rules should be rejected and that there are certain circumstances when the formulation of a theory should be modified.
For orthodox quantum systems, pure states correspond one-to-one to all one-dimensional subspaces and observables correspond one-to-one to all selfadjoint operators in the state space. A relaxation of this one-to-one correspondence will bring about superselection rules. A general formulation of superselection rules is technically complicated. 1 We shall adopt an intuitive approach here and limit our discussion to some special cases to see how superselection rules can be incorporated in a Hilbert space structure of quantum theory.
The process of dynamical decoherence may cause apparent superselection rules, which are sometimes called `environmentally induced' or `soft'. A natural question is whether such dynamical processes are eventually also responsible for at least some of the superselection rules which are usually presented as fundamentally rooted in the kinematical structure of the theory (so called `hard' superselection rules). With this question in mind, I re-investigate two well known examples where superselection rules are usually argued to rigorously exist within the given mathematical framework. These are (1) the Bargmann superselection rule for the total mass in Galilei invariant quantum mechanics and (2) the charge superselection rule in quantum electrodynamics. I argue that, for various reasons, the kinematical arguments usually given are not physically convincing unless they are based on an underlying dynamical process.
The meaning of superselection rules in Bohm–Bell theories (i.e., quantum theories with particle trajectories) is different from that in orthodox quantum theory. More precisely, there are two concepts of superselection rule, a weak and a strong one. Weak superselection rules exist both in orthodox quantum theory and in Bohm–Bell theories and represent the conventional understanding of superselection rules. We introduce the concept of strong superselection rule, which does not exist in orthodox quantum theory. It relies on the clear ontology of Bohm–Bell theories and is a sharper and, in the Bohm–Bell context, more fundamental notion. A strong superselection rule for the observable G asserts that one can replace every state vector by a suitable statistical mixture of eigenvectors of G without changing the particle trajectories or their probabilities. A weak superselection rule asserts that every state vector is empirically indistinguishable from a suitable statistical mixture of eigenvectors of G . We establish conditions on G for both kinds of superselection. For comparison, we also consider both kinds of superselection in theories of spontaneous wavefunction collapse.