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arXiv:2611.14919

Evaluating Quantum Circuit Protection Methods After Compilation: An Empirical Comparison

Ing Muyleang, Leanghok Hour, Youngsun Han

Published Nov 11, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum cloud providers can read the circuits they receive and their outputs, yet methods for hiding a circuit are usually evaluated on the circuit as written, before compilation optimises it. We compare three ObfusQate schemes (inverse, composite and delayed gates), ECQCO and Q-MaskCut under one protocol that compiles every protected circuit at optimisation level 3 before measuring it; the goal is to keep the provider from learning the user's algorithm and answer. Q-MaskCut is one example combination of existing techniques: a one-time-pad key, decoy wires, circuit cutting with a random rotation pair across each cut, and Pauli twirling with dynamical-decoupling masking after compilation. We simulate 11 circuits of 3 to 19 qubits without noise and on two noise models, measure the compiled structure and execution time of 23 circuits of 3 to 127 qubits, and test whether the structural disguise survives a second compilation by the provider. Composite and delayed gates lose most of their structural disguise in compilation and leave the output readable; inverse gates keep a high normalised graph edit distance (normGED) only by making execution 7 to 112 times longer; ECQCO's output could not be decoded with the implementation provided by its authors. Q-MaskCut hides the output (mean total variation distance without the key 0.94), and without noise, with exact fragment probabilities, it decodes exactly. Its compiled normGED of 0.88 comes mostly from the masking, which a second compilation removes, leaving 0.42 from the key, decoys and padlocks. With noise, its fidelity is comparable to the original's; it needs 7 to 91 fragment variants per circuit in the simulations (7 to 61 in a run on ibm_marrakesh) and a classical reconstruction. Protection should therefore be evaluated on the compiled circuit and again after the provider recompiles it.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2611.14919

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Quantum cloud providers can read the circuits they receive and their outputs, yet methods for hiding a circuit are usually evaluated on the circuit as written, before compilation optimises it. We compare three ObfusQate schemes (inverse, composite and delayed gates), ECQCO and Q-MaskCut under one protocol that compiles every protected circuit at optimisation level 3 before measuring it; the goal is to keep the provider from learning the user's algorithm and answer. Q-MaskCut is one example combination of existing techniques: a one-time-pad key, decoy wires, circuit cutting with a random rotation pair across each cut, and Pauli twirling with dynamical-decoupling masking after compilation. We simulate 11 circuits of 3 to 19 qubits without noise and on two noise models, measure the compiled structure and execution time of 23 circuits of 3 to 127 qubits, and test whether the structural disguise survives a second compilation by the provider. Composite and delayed gates lose most of their structural disguise in compilation and leave the output readable; inverse gates keep a high normalised graph edit distance (normGED) only by making execution 7 to 112 times longer; ECQCO's output could not be decoded with the implementation provided by its authors. Q-MaskCut hides the output (mean total variation distance without the key 0.94), and without noise, with exact fragment probabilities, it decodes exactly. Its compiled normGED of 0.88 comes mostly from the masking, which a second compilation removes, leaving 0.42 from the key, decoys and padlocks. With noise, its fidelity is comparable to the original's; it needs 7 to 91 fragment variants per circuit in the simulations (7 to 61 in a run on ibm_marrakesh) and a classical reconstruction. Protection should therefore be evaluated on the compiled circuit and again after the provider recompiles it.
With the rapid advancement of quantum computing, quantum compilation has become a crucial layer connecting high-level algorithms with physical hardware. In quantum cloud computing, compilation is performed on the cloud platforms, which expose user circuits to potential risks such as structural leakage and output predictability. To address these issues, we propose the encrypted-state quantum compilation scheme based on quantum circuit obfuscation (ECQCO), the first secure compilation scheme tailored for the co-location of compilers and quantum hardware for quantum cloud platforms. It applies quantum homomorphic encryption to conceal output states and instantiates a structure obfuscation mechanism based on quantum indistinguishability obfuscation, effectively protecting both functionality and topology of the circuit. Additionally, an adaptive decoupling obfuscation algorithm is designed to suppress potential idle errors while inserting pulse operations. The proposed scheme achieves information-theoretic security and guarantees computational indistinguishability under the quantum random oracle. Experimental results on benchmark datasets demonstrate that ECQCO achieves a total variation distance (TVD) of up to 0.7 and a normalized graph edit distance (GED) of 0.88, enhancing compilation-stage security. Moreover, it introduces only a slight increase in circuit depth, while keeping the average fidelity change within 1.1%, thus achieving a practical balance between security and efficiency.
The success of quantum circuits in providing reliable outcomes for a given problem depends on the gate count and depth in near-term noisy quantum computers. A circuit (that implements a given function) with a low gate count and short depth is more likely to give a correct solution than the circuit variant with a higher gate count and depth. As such, quantum circuit compilers that decompose high-level gates to native gates of the hardware and optimize the circuit play a key role in quantum computing. However, the quality and time complexity of the optimization process can vary significantly especially for practically relevant large-scale quantum circuits. As a result, third-party (often less-trusted/untrusted/unreliable) compilers have emerged, claiming to provide better and faster optimization of complex quantum circuits than so-called trusted compilers. However, untrusted compilers, with their varying adversarial motives ranging from semi-honest to malicious can pose severe security risks such as counterfeiting the sensitive intellectual property (IP) embedded within the quantum circuit. We propose an obfuscation technique for quantum circuits using randomized reversible gates to protect them from such attacks during compilation. The idea is to insert a small random circuit into the original circuit and send it to the untrusted compiler. Since the circuit function is corrupted, the adversary (i.e., an untrusted compiler) may get incorrect IP. However, the user may also get incorrect output post-compilation (even though highly optimized). To circumvent this issue, we concatenate the inverse of the random circuit in the compiled circuit to recover the original functionality. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by conducting exhaustive experiments on a set of benchmark circuits and measuring the quality of obfuscation by calculating the Total Variation Distance (TVD) and Degree of Functional Corruption (DFC) metrics. Our method achieves TVD of up to 1.92, indicating substantial functional corruption, and performs at least2x2 x2xbetter than a previously reported obfuscation method. We also attained a DFC as low as −0.75, approaching the −1 score that represents maximal functional corruption, further ensuring the robustness of our proposed method against counterfeiting. We also propose a novel adversarial reverse engineering (RE) approach and show that the proposed obfuscation is resilient against RE attacks. The proposed technique introduces minimal degradation in fidelity (∼1%\sim 1 \%∼1%to∼3%\sim 3 \%∼3%on average).
Quantum cloud providers can identify a user's algorithm and secret problem structure without ever seeing actual quantum data, simply by analyzing routine metadata collected for billing and system management. Existing confidentiality tools such as blind quantum computation and quantum homomorphic encryption protect the quantum payload itself, but they do not protect this classical orchestration metadata. This leaves an unexplored security risk in the logs generated when a large quantum program is split into smaller pieces to fit onto limited hardware, a process known as circuit cutting. These fragments leak sensitive information through what we term the topological transpilation penalty: the unavoidable depth and gate inflation added when a compiler reorganizes a program for a restricted hardware topology. Tests on a 156-qubit production Quantum Processing Unit (QPU) show that traditional timing side-channels fail in this setting, since hardware control-plane delays mask actual quantum execution time. The unique shape of the transpilation penalty acts instead as a persistent structural fingerprint for the hidden workload. Using 12,000 circuit fragments across eight algorithm families, our attack recovers algorithm family and Hamiltonian k-locality with near-perfect accuracy, achieving instance-disjoint AUC = 1.000 for both. This leakage persists under size-holdout evaluation on unseen circuit scales, with AUC = 0.987 and 0.986 respectively. The cutting mechanism is inferred with AUC = 0.991, and hardware topology is recovered well above chance with AUC = 0.818. These results show that circuit cutting exposes algorithmic intent, and potentially proprietary problem structure, through metadata alone, without any need to observe quantum data.
The success of quantum circuits in providing reliable outcomes for a given problem depends on the gate count and depth in near-term noisy quantum computers. Quantum circuit compilers that decompose high-level gates to native gates of the hardware and optimize the circuit play a key role in quantum computing. However, the quality and time complexity of the optimization process can vary significantly especially for practically relevant large-scale quantum circuits. As a result, third-party (often less-trusted/untrusted) compilers have emerged, claiming to provide better and faster optimization of complex quantum circuits than so-called trusted compilers. However, untrusted compilers can pose severe security risks, such as the theft of sensitive intellectual property (IP) embedded within the quantum circuit. We propose an obfuscation technique for quantum circuits using randomized reversible gates to protect them from such attacks during compilation. The idea is to insert a small random circuit into the original circuit and send it to the untrusted compiler. Since the circuit function is corrupted, the adversary may get incorrect IP. However, the user may also get incorrect output post-compilation. To circumvent this issue, we concatenate the inverse of the random circuit in the compiled circuit to recover the original functionality. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by conducting exhaustive experiments on a set of benchmark circuits and measuring the quality of obfuscation by calculating the Total Variation Distance (TVD) metric. Our method achieves TVD of up to 1.92 and performs at least 2X better than a previously reported obfuscation method. We also propose a novel adversarial reverse engineering (RE) approach and show that the proposed obfuscation is resilient against RE attacks. The proposed technique introduces minimal degradation in fidelity (~1% to ~3% on average).
Current quantum computers suffer from a limited number of qubits and high error rates, limiting practical applicability. Different techniques exist to mitigate these effects and run larger algorithms. In this work, we analyze one of these techniques called quantum circuit cutting. With circuit cutting, a quantum circuit is decomposed into smaller sub-circuits, each of which can be run on smaller quantum hardware. We compare the performance of quantum circuit cutting with different cutting strategies, and then apply circuit cutting to a QAOA algorithm. Using simulations, we first show that Randomized Clifford measurements outperform both Pauli and random unitary measurements. Second, we show that circuit cutting has trouble providing correct answers in noisy settings, especially as the number of circuits increases.
Optimization of quantum circuits using an efficient compiler is key to its success for NISQ computers. Several 3rd party compilers are evolving to offer improved performance for large quantum circuits. These 3rd parties, or just a certain release of an otherwise trustworthy compiler, may possibly be untrusted and this could lead to an adversary to Reverse Engineer (RE) the quantum circuit for extracting sensitive aspects e.g., circuit topology, program, and its properties. In this paper, we propose obfuscation of quantum circuits to hide the functionality. Quantum circuits have inherent margin between correct and incorrect outputs. Therefore, obfuscation (i.e., corruption of functionality) by inserting dummy gates is nontrivial. We insert dummy SWAP gates one at a time for maximum corruption of functionality before sending the quantum circuit to an untrusted compiler. If an untrusted party clones the design, they get incorrect functionality. The designer removes the dummy SWAP gate post-compilation to restore the correct functionality. Compared to a classical counterpart, the quantum chip does not reveal the circuit functionality. Therefore, an adversary cannot guess the SWAP gate and location/validate using an oracle model. Evaluation of realistic quantum circuit with/without SWAP insertion is impossible in classical computers. Therefore, we propose a metric-based SWAP gate insertion process. The objective of the metric is to ensure maximum corruption of functionality measured using Total Variation Distance (TVD). The proposed approach is validated using IBM default noisy simulation model. Our metric-based approach predicts the SWAP position to achieve TVD of upto 50%, and performs 7.5% better than average TVD, and performs within 12.3% of the best obtainable TVD for the benchmarks. We obtain an overhead of < 5% for the number of gates and circuit depth after SWAP addition.