We consider synchronous binary Byzantine agreement among $n$ processes connected by authenticated point-to-point classical and quantum channels. The adversary is computationally unbounded, sees all classical information, adaptively corrupts up to $t\le(1/3-\varepsilon)n$ processes, and may suppress messages sent by a process in the round in which it is corrupted. We give a quantum algorithm that solves Byzantine agreement in this model with probability $1$. It uses $O(\log^4 n)$ rounds, $O(n\log^8 n)$ qubits, and $O(n^2\log^8 n)$ classical bits in expectation, with constants depending on $\varepsilon$. This reduces the quantum communication of the protocol of Ben-Or and Hassidim (STOC~2005), which achieves $O(1)$ expected rounds but whose Byzantine coin implementation requires $Ω(n^4\log n)$ qubits and classical bits. We also extend the quadratic message lower bound of Abraham et al.\ (PODC~2019) to quantum channels, obtaining an $Ω(t^2)$ lower bound on worst-case expected total communication. For $t=Θ(n)$, the communication and round complexity of our algorithm are therefore optimal up to polylogarithmic factors.
We consider synchronous binary Byzantine agreement among n processes connected by authenticated point-to-point classical and quantum channels. The adversary is computationally unbounded, sees all classical information, adaptively corrupts up to t≤(1/3−ε)n processes, and may suppress messages sent by a process in the round in which it is corrupted. We give a quantum algorithm that solves Byzantine agreement in this model with probability 1. It uses O(log4n) rounds, O(nlog8n) qubits, and O(n2log8n) classical bits in expectation, with constants depending on ε. This reduces the quantum communication of the protocol of Ben-Or and Hassidim (STOC2005), which achieves O(1) expected rounds but whose Byzantine coin implementation requires Ω(n4logn) qubits and classical bits. We also extend the quadratic message lower bound of Abraham et al.\ (PODC2019) to quantum channels, obtaining an Ω(t2) lower bound on worst-case expected total communication. For t=Θ(n), the communication and round complexity of our algorithm are therefore optimal up to polylogarithmic factors.
We exhibit that, when given a classical Byzantine agreement protocol designed in the private-channel model, it is feasible to construct a quantum agreement protocol that can effectively handle a full-information adversary. Notably, both protocols have equivalent levels of resilience, round complexity, and communication complexity. In the classical private-channel scenario, participating players are limited to exchanging classical bits, with the adversary lacking knowledge of the exchanged messages. In contrast, in the quantum full-information setting, participating players can exchange qubits, while the adversary possesses comprehensive and accurate visibility into the system's state and messages. By showcasing the reduction from quantum to classical frameworks, this paper demonstrates the strength and flexibility of quantum protocols in addressing security challenges posed by adversaries with increased visibility. It underscores the potential of leveraging quantum principles to improve security measures without compromising on efficiency or resilience. By applying our reduction, we demonstrate quantum advantages in the round complexity of asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocols in the full-information model. It is well known that in the full-information model, any classical protocol requires Ω(n) rounds to solve Byzantine agreement with probability one even against Fail-stop adversary when resilience t=Θ(n). We show that quantum protocols can achieve O(1) rounds (i) with resilience t0, therefore surpassing the classical lower bound.
We study the relative power of public randomness and quantum communication in the multiparty Simultaneous Message Passing (SMP) model. By analyzing a total Boolean function and a relational problem, we establish polynomial and exponential separations between classical public-coin protocols and quantum protocols without shared randomness or prior entanglement.
We first introduce XOR Equality, a total Boolean function in which each of k players receives an unrestricted string xj∈{0,1}n, and the referee must decide whether x1⊕⋯⊕xk=0n. For k≥8 and worst-case error at most 1/3, we prove quantum lower bounds of Ω(min{n,k2}) on total communication and Ω(min{n/k,k}) on maximum message length. A classical public-coin protocol uses two bits per player with error at most 1/4. For n=k2 and worst-case error at most 1/3, we prove that quantum protocols require maximum message length Ω(n) qubits, whereas two public-coin bits per player suffice.
We then turn to relations, for which we obtain exponential separations. Specifically, we study Multiparty Index Coordination, a k-player generalization of the two-player relation studied by Gavinsky, Kempe, Regev, and de Wolf (STOC 2006). We prove an unambiguous quantum lower bound of Ω(n1−1/k) on maximum message length, matched by a classical private-coin protocol. For any fixed error ε∈(0,1/8), we also prove a bounded-error quantum lower bound of Ω(n(k−1)/(k+1)) while we show that public-coin protocols solve the relation unambiguously with maximum message length O(logn), giving exponential separations in both regimes. The implicit constants are independent of k, and both quantum lower bounds become linear when k≥clogn for any fixed c>0.
Fault-tolerant Consensus is about reaching agreement on some of the input values in a limited time by non-faulty autonomous processes, despite of failures of processes or communication medium. This problem is particularly challenging and costly against an adaptive adversary with full information. Bar-Joseph and Ben-Or (PODC'98) were the first who proved an absolute lower bound Ω(√{n/log n}) on expected time complexity of Consensus in any classical (i.e., randomized or deterministic) message-passing network with n processes succeeding with probability 1 against such a strong adaptive adversary crashing processes. Seminal work of Ben-Or and Hassidim (STOC'05) broke the Ω(√{n/log n}) barrier for consensus in the classical (deterministic and randomized) networks by enhancing the model with quantum channels. In such networks, quantum communication between every pair of processes participating in the protocol is also allowed. They showed an (expected) constant-time quantum algorithm for a linear number of crashes t < n/3. In this paper, we improve upon that seminal work by reducing the number of quantum and communication bits to an arbitrarily small polynomial, and even more, to a polylogarithmic number - though, the latter in the cost of a slightly larger polylogarithmic time (still exponentially smaller than the time lower bound Ω(√{n/log n}) for the classical computation models).
Quantum entanglement can be employed in some distributed communication tasks to reduce computation and communication overheads, yielding speedups over their classical counterparts. However, existing quantum Byzantine protocols often entail excessive communication and entanglement resource consumption. Conversely, classical schemes face insecurity with the impending reality of quantum computers. To address these challenges, we present a novel quantum Detectable Weak Byzantine Agreement (DWBA) protocol with high practicability, security and optimal fault-tolerance bound. For all n players, our protocol can complete the consensus of infinite classical information via fixed n + 1 -entangled qubits and a digest function, which requires infinite entanglement resources in previous schemes. Moreover, our protocol can tolerate arbitrary t ( t < n ) faulty players without necessitating any additional initial setup information (e.g., digital signature, private random coins). In terms of efficiency, our protocol only requires O (1) rounds and O ( ( n − t ) 2 ) communication complexity, constituting an order of magnitude improvement over previous protocols. In addition, the DWBA problem solved by our protocol is inherently stronger than the 3-player Detectable Byzantine Agreement (DBA) problem solved by previous protocols, and in a weaker but sufficiently practical model, our protocol can achieve Weak Byzantine Agreement (WBA).
We make progress towards the impossibility of quantum-computation, classical-communication (QCCC) key agreement by giving the first unconditional polynomial-query attacks that tolerate imperfect completeness in the following settings. First, we give a quantum attack on protocols with arbitrarily many rounds in which both parties' oracle queries and communication are classical before the final round, while local computation may be quantum throughout, and the final round may involve quantum oracle queries and one quantum message. Second, we give a classical attack on constant-round QCCC protocols in which Alice has classical oracle access and Bob may make quantum queries throughout. In both settings, the attacker is computationally unbounded and makes poly(λ) queries to recover the key with nonnegligible probability whenever each party's total honest query bound is at most poly(λ) and the valid agreement probability is inverse-polynomial.
As consequences, we rule out query-bounded IND-CPA security for quantum public-key encryption with classical public and secret keys and classical messages of polynomially bounded length in the QROM in either of two settings: (i) key generation has classical oracle access, while encryption, decryption, and the ciphertext may be quantum; or (ii) encryption has classical oracle access and ciphertexts are classical, while key generation and decryption may have quantum oracle access. Both results assume negligible correctness error and polynomial honest query complexity. Combining the constant-round attack with the constructions of Bartusek and Khurana (CRYPTO 2025), we also rule out constant-round oblivious state preparation with polynomial honest query complexity and negligible correctness error in the QROM against computationally unbounded quantum receivers making polynomially many oracle queries.