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arXiv:2609.38835

Average-and Last-Iterate Lower Bounds for Optimistic Matrix Mirror-Prox in Quantum Zero-Sum Games

Yiheng Su, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Pucheng Xiong

quant-phcs.GTcs.LGmath.OCSubmitted Sep 30, 2026• Announced Oct 1, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

Optimistic matrix mirror-prox (OMMP) computes $ε$-approximate Nash equilibria in quantum zero-sum games with an $O(1/\varepsilon)$ average-iterate guarantee [arXiv:2311.10859]. We investigate whether this dependence on accuracy is tight and whether geometric last-iterate convergence can be guaranteed. We study these questions through explicit games with one qubit per player. First, we prove an $Ω(1/\varepsilon)$ lower bound for the uniform-average output that includes the maximally mixed initial state, independently of the regularizer and step size. Second, we construct a fixed game on which optimistic gradient descent-ascent (OGDA), initialized at the maximally mixed state, has last-iterate Frobenius distance to equilibrium $Θ(1/t)$ and duality gap $Θ(1/t^3)$ for every sufficiently small fixed step size. A separate fixed game exhibits arbitrarily long delays in reducing the initial error by a constant factor across a family of initial states. Finally, we give a fixed game with a unique, strictly complementary equilibrium on which optimistic matrix multiplicative weights updates (OMMWU) converge only polynomially from the maximally mixed state for every fixed positive step size. The last-iterate Frobenius distance and quantum relative entropy from the equilibrium to the iterates decay as $Θ(1/t)$, while the duality gap decays as $Θ(1/t^2)$.

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38 pages, 6 figures

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Recent developments in domains such as non-local games, quantum interactive proofs, and quantum generative adversarial networks have renewed interest in quantum game theory and, specifically, quantum zero-sum games. Central to classical game theory is the efficient algorithmic computation of Nash equilibria, which represent optimal strategies for both players. In 2008, Jain and Watrous proposed the first classical algorithm for computing equilibria in quantum zero-sum games using the Matrix Multiplicative Weight Updates (MMWU) method to achieve a convergence rate of O(d/ϵ2) iterations to ϵ -Nash equilibria in the 4d -dimensional spectraplex. In this work, we propose a hierarchy of quantum optimization algorithms that generalize MMWU via an extra-gradient mechanism. Notably, within this proposed hierarchy, we introduce the Optimistic Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update (OMMWU) algorithm and establish its average-iterate convergence complexity as O(d/ϵ) iterations to ϵ -Nash equilibria. This quadratic speed-up relative to Jain and Watrous' original algorithm sets a new benchmark for computing ϵ -Nash equilibria in quantum zero-sum games.
We propose the first online quantum algorithm for solving zero-sum games with O~(1)\widetilde O(1)O(1) regret under the game setting. Moreover, our quantum algorithm computes an ε\varepsilonε-approximate Nash equilibrium of an m×nm \times nm×n matrix zero-sum game in quantum time O~(m+n/ε2.5)\widetilde O(\sqrt{m+n}/\varepsilon^{2.5})O(m+n​/ε2.5). Our algorithm uses standard quantum inputs and generates classical outputs with succinct descriptions, facilitating end-to-end applications. Technically, our online quantum algorithm "quantizes" classical algorithms based on the optimistic multiplicative weight update method. At the heart of our algorithm is a fast quantum multi-sampling procedure for the Gibbs sampling problem, which may be of independent interest.
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