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arXiv:2609.28136

Unbounded Operators, Physicality, and Modality in Quantum Theories

Zhonghao Lu

quant-phphysics.hist-phSubmitted Sep 23, 2026• Announced Sep 24, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

In this paper, I address the problem regarding the physicality of Hilbert space in quantum mechanics, a topic brought into focus by Carcassi et al.'s paper "The unphysicality of Hilbert spaces" recently. I argue for the physicality of the Hilbert space in quantum mechanics, and demonstrate that there are inevitable ambiguity and arbitrariness if we want to identify the set of physical states with a proper subset of it. Moreover, I distinguish the ontological and modal reading of physicality from the pragmatic and operational reading of physicality, and then develop what I call the hierarchical view of physicality. According to this view, physicality is not a monolithic concept, but a layered one that admits degrees. I show the connection between the concept of physicality and modal metaphysics, and finally explain how it can be used to address the interpretational problem of quantum field theory brought by the existence of inequivalent representations.

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In this paper, I address the problem regarding the physicality of Hilbert space in quantum mechanics, a topic brought into focus by Carcassi et al.'s paper "The unphysicality of Hilbert spaces" recently. I argue for the physicality of the Hilbert space in quantum mechanics, and demonstrate that there are inevitable ambiguity and arbitrariness if we want to identify the set of physical states with a proper subset of it. Moreover, I distinguish the ontological and modal reading of physicality from the pragmatic and operational reading of physicality, and then develop what I call the hierarchical view of physicality. According to this view, physicality is not a monolithic concept, but a layered one that admits degrees. I show the connection between the concept of physicality and modal metaphysics, and finally explain how it can be used to address the interpretational problem of quantum field theory brought by the existence of inequivalent representations.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
We introduce a realist, unextravagant interpretation of quantum theory that builds on the existing physical structure of the theory and allows experiments to have definite outcomes, but leaves the theory's basic dynamical content essentially intact. Much as classical systems have specific states that evolve along definite trajectories through configuration spaces, the traditional formulation of quantum theory asserts that closed quantum systems have specific states that evolve unitarily along definite trajectories through Hilbert spaces, and our interpretation extends this intuitive picture of states and Hilbert-space trajectories to the case of open quantum systems as well. We provide independent justification for the partial-trace operation for density matrices, reformulate wave-function collapse in terms of an underlying interpolating dynamics, derive the Born rule from deeper principles, resolve several open questions regarding ontological stability and dynamics, address a number of familiar no-go theorems, and argue that our interpretation is ultimately compatible with Lorentz invariance. Along the way, we also investigate a number of unexplored features of quantum theory, including an interesting geometrical structure---which we call subsystem space---that we believe merits further study. We include an appendix that briefly reviews the traditional Copenhagen interpretation and the measurement problem of quantum theory, as well as the instrumentalist approach and a collection of foundational theorems not otherwise discussed in the main text.
Abstract According to a regnant criterion of physical equivalence for quantum theories, a quantum field theory (QFT) typically admits continuously many physically inequivalent realizations. This, the second of a two‐part introduction to topics in the philosophy of QFT, continues the investigation of this alarming circumstance. It begins with a brief catalog of quantum field theoretic examples of this non‐uniqueness, then presents the basics of the algebraic approach to quantum theories, which discloses a structure common even to ‘physically inequivalent’ realizations of a QFT. Finally, it introduces and evaluates a handful of strategies for interpreting quantum theories in the face of the non‐uniqueness of their Hilbert space representations.
In this paper we discuss the relation of quantum theory to the problem of metaphysics.Based on metaphysical and anti-metaphysical stances, we put forward an 'interpretational map' of quantum mechanics in general and of the modal interpretation in particular.Thus, within the modal interpretation, we distinguish between: Modal Interpretations (which start from) the Mathematical Formalism (MIMF) and Modal Interpretations (which start from) Metaphysical Principles (MIMP).Finally, we argue for a middle path in between metaphysical principles and the formal conditions imposed on quantum mechanics.
The received view in the philosophy of physics is that a quantum theory is given its mathematical formulation in a so-called Hilbert space, with the states of a quantum system given by the elements of this space and observables—measurable quantities of the system—given by so-called operators on this space. But the status of this fundamental postulate becomes threatened when one moves to complex systems, like the quantum fields underlying fundamental particle physics or statistical systems composed of infinite collections of quantum particles. In these more complex cases, one finds many inequivalent Hilbert space representations that appear to be competing quantum theories. In looking for a mathematical structure of the theory to interpret as representing the physical world, one is faced with a choice: either arbitrarily pick one Hilbert space representation (out of the many competing representations) as a Hilbert Space Conservative, or else look for the abstract algebraic structure that all of these competing representations have in common as an Algebraic Imperialist. This dissertation provides an extended argument for the second route.
The existence of ontologically different but empirically indistinguishable versions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is one of the most serious and widely discussed cases of metaphysical underdetermination. I argue that this problem is unlikely to disappear when we turn to the next more fundamental theory, namely relativistic quantum field theory. The problem is merely overshadowed by yet another interpretational controversy, but it persists regardless of the outcome of this latter debate. I further argue that one should not be too optimistic about transferring ontological lessons learned in the context of one physical theory to the context of a more fundamental theory.