arXiv:2607.19729 · IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications

Investigation of STEEP for Secure Communications Over SIMO and MISO Channels Subject to Full-Duplex Jamming and Eavesdropping

Md Saydur Rahman, Yingbo Hua

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations

Abstract

Secure communications over SIMO and MISO channels between wireless nodes are commonly encountered in applications and widely considered in the literature. This paper investigates such a problem by considering a newly proposed scheme called secrecy-message transmission by echoing encrypted probes (STEEP). We focus on a type of heavily eavesdropped channels where an aggressive eavesdropper (Eve) has multiple antennas and is capable of jamming and eavesdropping in the full-duplex mode. Assuming optimal jamming and eavesdropping by Eve, we present the secrecy rates achievable by STEEP in two forms: using SIMO channel in phase 1 and using MISO channel in phase 2, and vice versa. With any given channel condition between every pair of nodes and any finite jamming power by Eve, the secrecy rate of STEEP in either form is shown to be positive subject to a positive power in phase 1 and a sufficiently large power in phase 2. The connections between STEEP in either form and the conventional SIMO and MISO schemes are provided, and their secrecy rates are compared comprehensively subject to random fading channels and finite transmit powers.

DOI: 10.1109/twc.2026.3706983

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