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arXiv:2606.13946

Chosen-Plaintext Attacks of Double Random Phase Encryption with Nonlinear Optical Media

Yan Cheng, Yiwei Chen, Kui Ren, Nathan Soedjak

Published Jun 11, 2026• 0 citations

Abstract

This paper studies an inverse problem in nonlinear optical encryption. We examine chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) on a nonlinear optical encryption strategy that integrates double random phase encryption (DRPE) into a nonlinear optical propagation model to enhance the security of the combined system. We first demonstrate that the system's phase information can be decoded from carefully designed differential CPA data. We then demonstrate that the strength of the optical device's nonlinearity can also be recovered from CPA data, indicating that including this parameter as an additional security key does not enhance protection against CPA attacks, although numerical simulations show that strong nonlinearity still poses significant challenges for CPA attacks. Finally, we provide a stability analysis to demonstrate that small errors in decoded security keys result in only small errors in the decrypted text, even though the encryption process is nonlinear.

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2606.13946

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