Randomness amplification, the task of extracting uniform private bits from biased seeds that may be partly known by a malicious third party, is of central importance in cryptography. The highest security in this task is provided by a class of quantum protocols known as device-independent, which however are challenging to integrate into scalable devices. Semi-device-independent (SDI) protocols are a promising alternative that guarantees security under few natural assumptions, such as bounds on the amount of energy used by the devices. Here, we provide the first demonstration of SDI randomness amplification on an integrated silicon photonic chip, achieving a throughput rate of 20 Mbps suitable for practical applications. This rate is achieved through a novel technique for SDI entropy certification, which delivers strictly tighter von Neumann entropy bounds compared to existing methods and remains valid even if the preparation and measurement devices share quantum correlations. Overall, the methods developed in this work enable the integration of SDI technology into portable telecom devices, opening up a new generation of quantum cryptographic hardware.
Randomness amplification, the task of extracting uniform private bits from biased seeds that may be partly known by a malicious third party, is of central importance in cryptography. The highest security in this task is provided by a class of quantum protocols known as device-independent, which however are challenging to integrate into scalable devices. Semi-device-independent (SDI) protocols are a promising alternative that guarantees security under few natural assumptions, such as bounds on the amount of energy used by the devices. Here, we provide the first demonstration of SDI randomness amplification on an integrated silicon photonic chip, achieving a throughput rate of 20 Mbps suitable for practical applications. This rate is achieved through a novel technique for SDI entropy certification, which delivers strictly tighter von Neumann entropy bounds compared to existing methods and remains valid even if the preparation and measurement devices share quantum correlations. Overall, the methods developed in this work enable the integration of SDI technology into portable telecom devices, opening up a new generation of quantum cryptographic hardware.
Quantum resources offer intrinsic randomness that is valuable for applications such as cryptography, scientific simulation, and computing. Silicon-based photonics chips present an excellent platform for the cost-effective deployment of next-generation quantum systems on a large scale, even at room temperature. Nevertheless, the potential susceptibility of these chips to hacker control poses a challenge in ensuring security for on-chip quantum random number generation, which is crucial for enabling extensive utilization of quantum resources. Here, we introduce and implement an on-chip source-device-independent quantum random number generator (SDI-QRNG). The randomness of this generator is achieved through distortion-free on-chip detection of quantum resources, effectively eliminating classical noise interference. The security of the system is ensured by employing on-chip criteria for estimating security entropy in a practical chip environment. By incorporating a photoelectric package, the SDI-QRNG chip achieves a secure bit rate of 146.2 Mbps and a bare chip rate of 248.47 Gbps, with all extracted secure bits successfully passing the randomness test. Our experimental demonstration of this chip-level SDI-QRNG shows significant advantages in practical applications, paving the way for the widespread and cost-effective implementation of room-temperature secure QRNG, which marks a milestone in the field of QRNG chips.
The rapid rise of quantum computing and quantum internet highlights the irreplaceable importance of high-speed, scalable quantum randomness certification (QRC). However, existing QRC implementations are constrained by quantum measurement limits and integration bottlenecks, leaving both high-speed operation and monolithic implementation unrealized. Here, we demonstrate a monolithically integrated photonic–electronic on-chip source device-independent (SDI) quantum random number generator (QRNG) that achieves a secure bit rate of 583.2 Gbps within a compact 3 mm ×11 mm ×11 mm footprint, marking an advance in both integration and speed, nearly 30 times faster than the best existing integrated SDI implementations. By harnessing measurement-induced quantum uncertainty as a resource for quantum certification, this study resolves the challenge of uniting high-speed certified entropy bounds with full monolithic integration in SDI QRC. A universal entropy bound incorporating high-bandwidth physical constraints enables accurate entropy estimation under integrated conditions. This theoretical framework supports a four-path multi-interference measurement scheme that improves entropy yield and fills a critical gap in digital-layer security under coherent attacks. These contributions are experimentally embodied in a compact photonic–electronic chip that performs NIST-compliant secure entropy extraction, demonstrating the feasibility of combining high-speed performance with full system integration. Compatible with standard optical communication infrastructure, this study sets a new benchmark for scalable high-speed QRC, enabling robust security and broad applicability across quantum computing, the internet, and cryptography.
Secret and perfect randomness is an essential resource in cryptography. Yet, it is not even clear that such exists. It is well known that the tools of classical computer science do not allow us to create secret and perfect randomness from a single weak public source. Quantum physics, on the other hand, allows for such a process, even in the most paranoid cryptographic sense termed “device-independent quantum cryptography”. We propose and prove the security of a new device-independent protocol that takes any single public Santha-Vazirani source as input and creates a secret close to uniform string in the presence of a quantum adversary. Our work is the first to achieve randomness amplification with all the following properties: (1) amplification and “privatization” of a public Santha-Vazirani source with arbitrary bias (2) the use of a device with only two components (3) non-vanishing extraction rate and (4) maximal noise tolerance. In particular, this implies that our protocol is the first protocol that can possibly be implemented with reachable parameters. We achieve these by combining three new tools: a particular family of Bell inequalities, a proof technique to lower bound entropy in the device-independent setting, and a framework for quantum-proof multi-source extractors.
We present a semi-device-independent quantum random number generator (QRNG) based on the violation of a contextuality inequality, implemented by the integration of two silicon photonic chips. Our system combines a heralded single-photon source with a reconfigurable interferometric mesh to implement qutrit state preparation, transformations, and measurements suitable for testing a KCBS contextuality inequality. This architecture enables the generation of random numbers from the intrinsic randomness of single-photon interference in a complex optical network, while simultaneously allowing a quantitative certification of their security without requiring entanglement. We observe a contextuality violation exceeding the classical bound by more than 10σ, unambiguously confirming non-classical behavior. From this violation, we certify a conditional min-entropy per experimental round of Hmin = 0.077 +- 0.002, derived via a tailored semidefinite-programming-based security analysis. Each measurement outcome therefore contains at least 0.077 +- 0.002 bits of extractable genuine randomness, corresponding to an asymptotic generation rate of 21.7 +- 0.5 bits/s. These results establish a viable route towards general-purpose, untrusted quantum random number generators compatible with practical integrated photonic quantum networks.
Abstract Device-Independent (DI) security is the gold standard of quantum cryptography, providing information-theoretic security based on the very laws of nature. In its highest form, security is guaranteed against adversaries limited only by the no-superluminal signalling rule of relativity. The task of randomness amplification, to generate secure fully uniform bits starting from weakly random seeds, is of both cryptographic and foundational interest, being important for the generation of cryptographically secure random numbers as well as bringing deep connections to the existence of free-will. DI no-signalling proof protocols for this fundamental task have thus far relied on esoteric proofs of non-locality termed pseudo-telepathy games, complicated multi-party setups or high-dimensional quantum systems, and have remained out of reach of experimental implementation. In this paper, we construct the first practically relevant no-signalling proof DI protocols for randomness amplification based on the simplest proofs of Bell non-locality and illustrate them with an experimental implementation in a quantum optical setup using polarised photons. Technically, we relate the problem to the vast field of Hardy paradoxes, without which it would be impossible to achieve amplification of arbitrarily weak sources in the simplest Bell non-locality scenario consisting of two parties choosing between two binary inputs. Furthermore, we identify a deep connection between proofs of the celebrated Kochen-Specker theorem and Hardy paradoxes that enables us to construct Hardy paradoxes with the non-zero probability taking any value in (0,1]. Our methods enable us, under the fair-sampling assumption of the experiment, to realize up to 25 bits of randomness in 20 hours of experimental data collection from an initial private source of randomness 0.1 away from uniform.
Device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography aims at providing secure cryptography with minimal trust in, or characterisation of, the underlying quantum devices. A key step in DI protocols is randomness extraction (or privacy amplification), which typically requires a seed of additional bits with sufficient entropy and statistical independence from any bits generated during the protocol. In this work, we propose a method for extraction in DI protocols that does not require a seed and is secure against computationally unbounded quantum adversaries. The core idea is to use the Bell violation of the raw data, rather than its min-entropy, as the extractor promise. We present a complete security proof in a model where the experiment uses memoryless measurement devices acting on an arbitrary joint (across all rounds) state. Our results mark a first step in this alternative, seedless, approach to extraction in DI protocols.