Roman Schnabel's article argues that the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox can be resolved by identifying a flaw in what the author calls the "EPR implication" and by using radioactive alpha decay as an example showing that predictability does not exclude genuine randomness. The paper is clearly written and addresses an important foundational question. In our view, however, its main conclusion does not follow. The article narrows the original EPR argument, attributes too much to Bell-inequality violations, and replaces the central EPR structure - which involves incompatible observables and locality-based reasoning - with a simpler case of correlated random events. The result is an interesting interpretive remark, but not, we think, a satisfactory scientific resolution of the EPR problem.
Roman Schnabel's article argues that the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox can be resolved by identifying a flaw in what the author calls the "EPR implication" and by using radioactive alpha decay as an example showing that predictability does not exclude genuine randomness. The paper is clearly written and addresses an important foundational question. In our view, however, its main conclusion does not follow. The article narrows the original EPR argument, attributes too much to Bell-inequality violations, and replaces the central EPR structure - which involves incompatible observables and locality-based reasoning - with a simpler case of correlated random events. The result is an interesting interpretive remark, but not, we think, a satisfactory scientific resolution of the EPR problem.
More than 70 years after its publication, the article by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) [88] is still cited hundreds of times every year in the literature; this is a very exceptional case of longevity for a scientific article! There is some irony in this situation since, for a long time, the majority of physicists did not pay much attention to the EPR reasoning. They considered it as historically interesting, but with no precise relevance to modern quantum mechanics; the argument was even sometimes completely misinterpreted. Astriking example is given in the Einstein-Born correspondence [89] where Born, even in comments that he wrote after Einstein's death, clearly shows that he never completely understood the nature of the objections raised by EPR. Born went on thinking that the point of Einstein was a stubborn rejection of indeterminism (“look, Albert, indeterminism is not so bad!”), while actually the major concern of EPR was locality and/or separability (we come back later to these terms, which are related to the notion of space-time). If giants like Born could be misled in this way, no surprise that, later on, many others made similar mistakes! This is why, in what follows, we will take an approach that may look elementary, but at least has the advantage of putting the emphasis on the logical structure of the arguments and their generality. Doing so, we will closely follow neither the historical development of the ideas nor the formulation of the original article, but rather will emphasize the generality of the EPR reasoning.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox was enunciated in 1935 and since then it has made a lot of ink flow. Being a subtle result, it has also been largely misunderstood. Indeed, if questioned about its solution, many physicists will still affirm today that the paradox has been solved by the Bell-test experimental results, which have shown that entangled states are real. However, this remains a wrong view, as the validity of the EPR ex-absurdum reasoning is independent from the Bell-test experiments, and the possible structural shortcomings it evidenced cannot be eliminated. These were correctly identified by the Belgian physicist Diederik Aerts, in the eighties of last century, and are about the inability of the quantum formalism to describe separate physical systems. The purpose of the present article is to bring Aerts' overlooked result to the attention again of the physics' community, explaining its content and implications.
Most physicists agree that the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bell paradox exemplifies much of the strange behavior of quantum mechanics, but argument persists about what assumptions underlie the paradox. To clarify what the debate is about, we employ a simple and well-known thought experiment involving two correlated photons to help us focus on the logical assumptions needed to construct the EPR and Bell arguments. The view presented in this paper is that the minimal assumptions behind Bell’s inequality are locality and counterfactual definiteness but not scientific realism, determinism, or hidden variables as are often suggested. We further examine the resulting constraints on physical theory with an illustration from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics—an interpretation that we argue is deterministic, local, and realist but that nonetheless violates the Bell inequality.
In 1935, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen (EPR) published a thought experiment that is entirely correct, has been demonstrated in real experiments, and is now the most famous in quantum physics. Their pioneering work described, for the first time, quantum correlations and can be regarded as a very early glimpse into today's 'deep' quantum technologies, by which I mean those that enhance functionality by making use of quantum correlations. However, their work also contains a paradox that Erwin Schroedinger had already recognised as such in 1935 and which has since been cemented by the so-called Bell experiments. Here, I am now able to pinpoint the origin of the paradox within the chain of reasoning, which ultimately resolves the paradox.
I give an analysis of what happens in the case of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiment according to the creation-discovery view. According to many physicists the correlations in the experiment indicating a violations of Bell-inequalities are cases of outcome-dependence and not parameter dependence. It is shown that we can interpret the outcome independence violating correlations as an indication that quantum entities do not always exist in space, and that the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiment involves a localization of one entity, that in the course of this localization is ‘broken’ into two entities.
A generalization of the 1935 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument for measurements with continuous variable outcomes is presented to establish criteria for the demonstration of the EPR paradox, for situations where the correlation between spatially separated subsystems is not perfect. Two types of criteria for EPR correlations are determined. The first type are based on measurements of the variances of conditional probability distributions and are necessary to reflect directly the situation of the original EPR paradox. The second weaker set of EPR criteria are based on the proven failure of (Bell-type) local realistic theories which could be consistent with a local quantum description for each subsystem. The relationship with criteria sufficient to prove entanglement is established, to show that any demonstration of EPR correlations will also signify entanglement. It is also shown how a demonstration of entanglement between two spatially separated subsystems, if not able to interpreted as a violation of a Bell-type inequality, may be interpreted as a demonstration of the EPR correlations. In particular it is explained how the experimental observation of two-mode squeezing using spatially separated detectors will signify not only entanglement but EPR correlations defined in a general sense.