Abstract This paper develops an agent-centric account of measurement that treats the preferred-basis problem as fundamentally perspectival. On this view, the system–apparatus–environment decomposition and the observables that are apt to become classically robust are determined by the physical constitution and epistemic constraints of an embodied class of agents. Decoherence then stabilises those agent-specified observables, yielding facts that are stable for us without positing an absolute, observer-independent basis. On this picture, ‘measurements’ are public not because they are metaphysically privileged, but because agents like us share the relevant sensorimotor and operational structure. I motivate this account through a discussion of two recent no-go results for relational quantum mechanics (RQM) [1, 2], and a subsequent response [3]: my aim is not to defend RQM per se, but to refine the relational insight with a principled account of basis selection rooted in embodiment. I provide a phenomenological gloss, drawing on body-schema considerations, to argue that quantum mechanics is best understood as an idiosyncratically human description of interactions with the physical world—a structurally constrained, agent-indexed framework within which classicality emerges.
Abstract This paper develops an agent-centric account of measurement that treats the preferred-basis problem as fundamentally perspectival. On this view, the system–apparatus–environment decomposition and the observables that are apt to become classically robust are determined by the physical constitution and epistemic constraints of an embodied class of agents. Decoherence then stabilises those agent-specified observables, yielding facts that are stable for us without positing an absolute, observer-independent basis. On this picture, ‘measurements’ are public not because they are metaphysically privileged, but because agents like us share the relevant sensorimotor and operational structure. I motivate this account through a discussion of two recent no-go results for relational quantum mechanics (RQM) [1, 2], and a subsequent response [3]: my aim is not to defend RQM per se, but to refine the relational insight with a principled account of basis selection rooted in embodiment. I provide a phenomenological gloss, drawing on body-schema considerations, to argue that quantum mechanics is best understood as an idiosyncratically human description of interactions with the physical world—a structurally constrained, agent-indexed framework within which classicality emerges.
Quantum mechanics reveals that physical quantities and informational states are not absolute but relational, depending on the context of interaction between systems. While classical physics already contained relational elements—most clearly in Galilean relativity and Einstein’s relational spacetime—the quantum domain extends relationality to physical properties and facts themselves. In this paper, I develop an info-computational perspective on relational quantum mechanics (RQM), conceiving observers as informational agents embedded within physical processes. Quantum states are understood as constraints on possible interactions rather than intrinsic attributes of isolated systems. I review key relational, perspectival, and information-theoretic approaches—including QBism, perspectival quantum realism, reference-frame–dependent observables, categorical quantum mechanics, and graph-based formalisms—and argue that they converge on a view of physics grounded in relations and information flow. Relational objectivity emerges through inter-agent translation rules rather than observer independence, providing a unified framework for understanding quantum measurement, inter-observer agreement, and physical ontology.
The role of the observer remains a central conceptual challenge in the foundationsof quantum mechanics. This work examines the observer as an agent whoseparticipation is structurally indispensable for the emergence of physical facts. RelationalQuantum Mechanics and QBism—two influential agent-centered interpretations—recast quantum states, measurement outcomes, and objectivity as relationalor personalist rather than observer-independent. By analyzing their conceptualcommitments, we clarify how these frameworks illuminate the problem of subjectivityand the limits of classical realism.The discussion extends beyond physics to the broader question of whether agencyand subjectivity can be eliminated from scientific and technological practices. Drawingon insights from Pauli, Stapp, and d’Espagnat, we argue that attempts tofully operationalize the observer obscure essential features of experience and understanding.Contemporary artificial intelligence systems exemplify this tension: theydemonstrate high functional performance while lacking subjectivity, intentionality,and responsibility.We suggest that the displacement of the subject—from quantum interpretationto algorithmic decision-making—reflects a deeper structural shift in modern knowledge.Treating the observer as an agent is not merely an interpretive option but aconceptual requirement for coherent accounts of measurement, understanding, andresponsible action in an age increasingly shaped by operational intelligence withoutsubjects.
The relational approach to quantum states asserts that the physical description of quantum systems is always relative to something or someone. In relational quantum mechanics (RQM) it is relative to other quantum systems, in the (neo-)Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory to measurement contexts, and in QBism to the beliefs of the agents. In contrast to the other two interpretations, in RQM any interaction between two quantum systems counts as a "measurement", and the terms "observer" and "observed system" apply to arbitrary systems. We show, in the form of a no-go theorem, that in RQM the physical description of a system relative to an observer cannot represent knowledge about the observer in the conventional sense of this term. The problem lies in the ambiguity in the choice of the basis with respect to which the relative states are to be defined in RQM. In interpretations of quantum theory where observations play a fundamental role, the problem does not arise because the experimental context defines a preferred basis.
Quantum mechanics is empirically extraordinarily successful yet continues to admit a wide range of competing interpretations. While the formalism constrains probabilistic relations between preparation procedures, measurements, and outcomes, it does not uniquely determine the ontology that realises those relations. Interpretations such as Everettian quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics, objective collapse theories, relational quantum mechanics, and QBist approaches preserve the predictive structure of the theory while diverging sharply in their metaphysical commitments. At the same time, developments within quantum theory itself weaken the classical ontology of independently existing objects with intrinsic properties. Entanglement, violations of Bell inequalities, and decoherence theory collectively support the view that physical description is fundamentally relational. Structural realism therefore provides a natural interpretive framework, treating the mathematical structure of physical theory as ontologically primary. However, structural realism alone leaves open the question of instantiation: how relational organisation becomes concrete as a determinate world.This paper develops Experiential Structural Ontology (ESO) as a non-interventionist interpretation of quantum mechanics that addresses this problem. ESO retains the relational ontology suggested by quantum theory while proposing that relational constraint organisation is enacted as manifestation within a fundamental experiential field. On this interpretation, the wavefunction represents relational constraint architecture governing transitions within this field, measurement corresponds to the stabilisation of particular regimes within that structure, and decoherence explains the emergence of classical stability without invoking collapse dynamics or ontological branching.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is our most successful and versatile account of the basic constituents of matter, of their interaction and of their compounds. We introduce the theory via a sketch of its history and lay out its mathematical structure in some detail. Before this background we address the important and controversial question of how to interpret that structure. We contextualise our own position, which is linked to our account of ontological emergence as detailed in Chap. 2 , and which is mathematically best expressed in the Heisenberg picture of quantum dynamics. Indeterminism and irreversible processes are fundamental for our approach. We discuss the dialectics of the deterministic challenge to our position and argue that indeterminism in the form of quantum randomness has turned from a philosophical riddle to a technological resource. This claim is supported by a discussion of quantum information science, including some of its basic protocols. Towards the end of the chapter we argue that agency and quantum mechanics come as a package deal. For one, quantum mechanics describes the world as offering open possibilities for the future at a fundamental physical level, which is needed for real higher-order organisation, including agency. Of course, this does not in any way show that the actual existence of agents in our world is guaranteed. But it does show that general agency scepticism has no basis in physics. Second, we show that quantum mechanics is best understood as a theory that describes our agential interactions with nature, and not as a theory that represents nature from the point of view of an inert, detached observer.
Abstract The theories of pre-quantum physics are standardly seen as representing physical systems and their properties. Quantum mechanics in its standard form is a more problematic case: here, interpretational problems have led to doubts about the tenability of realist views. Thus, QBists and Quantum Pragmatists maintain that quantum mechanics should not be thought of as representing physical systems, but rather as an agent-centered tool for updating beliefs about such systems. It is part and parcel of such views that different agents may have different beliefs and may assign different quantum states. What results is a collection of agent-centered perspectives rather than a unique representation of the physical world. In this paper we argue that the problems identified by QBism and Quantum Pragmatism do not necessitate abandoning the ideal of representing the physical world. We can avail ourselves of the same puzzle-solving strategies as employed by QBists and pragmatists by adopting a perspectival quantum realism. According to this perspectivalism (close to the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics) objects may possess different, but equally objective properties with respect to different physically defined perspectives. We discuss two options for such a perspectivalism, a local and a nonlocal one, and apply them to Wigner’s friend and EPR scenarios. Finally, we connect quantum perspectivalism to the recently proposed philosophical position of fragmentalism.