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arXiv:2510.11544 · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

French on London and Bauer, and QBism

Jacques Pienaar

Published Oct 22, 2025• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102084

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In 1939 London and Bauer published a 'little book' that shaped the debate over the role of consciousness in resolving the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Mistakenly understood as merely summarising von Neumann's account, both sides in the debate failed to appreciate its phenomenological underpinnings. London not only originally studied phenomenology but continued thinking about and discussing this approach in the years leading up to the publication of his work with Bauer, most notably with Gurwitsch, who likewise had a dual background in phenomenological philosophy and physics. In the book, A Phenomenological Approach to Quantum Mechanics: Cutting the Chain of Correlations (French, 2023), the historical background to London and Bauer's work is set out prior to situating it within the context of Husserl's philosophy as a whole. It is concluded that the London and Bauer phenomenological account offers a potentially fruitful way forward through various dichotomies, such as that between psi-ontic and psi-epistemic accounts and between interpretational and reconstructive approaches more generally, as well as with regard to understanding quantum physics more generally. In this paper London and Bauer's insistence that quantum mechanics should be seen as a theory of knowledge in its own right is emphasized, where this must be taken as phenomenologically grounded. Hopefully this work will be viewed as contributing to a revised phenomenological understanding of modern physics, standing alongside Ryckman's The Reign of Relativity (Ryckman, 2005) and Berghofer and Wiltsche's edited collection Phenomenological Approaches to Physics (Berghofer & Wiltsche, 2020).

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Oxford University Press eBooks•Nov 23, 2023•0 citations
In 1939 London and Bauer published a 'little book' that shaped the debate over the role of consciousness in resolving the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Mistakenly understood as merely summarising von Neumann's account, both sides in the debate failed to appreciate its phenomenological underpinnings. London not only originally studied phenomenology but continued thinking about and discussing this approach in the years leading up to the publication of his work with Bauer, most notably with Gurwitsch, who likewise had a dual background in phenomenological philosophy and physics. In the book, A Phenomenological Approach to Quantum Mechanics: Cutting the Chain of Correlations (French, 2023), the historical background to London and Bauer's work is set out prior to situating it within the context of Husserl's philosophy as a whole. It is concluded that the London and Bauer phenomenological account offers a potentially fruitful way forward through various dichotomies, such as that between psi-ontic and psi-epistemic accounts and between interpretational and reconstructive approaches more generally, as well as with regard to understanding quantum physics more generally. In this paper London and Bauer's insistence that quantum mechanics should be seen as a theory of knowledge in its own right is emphasized, where this must be taken as phenomenologically grounded. Hopefully this work will be viewed as contributing to a revised phenomenological understanding of modern physics, standing alongside Ryckman's The Reign of Relativity (Ryckman, 2005) and Berghofer and Wiltsche's edited collection Phenomenological Approaches to Physics (Berghofer & Wiltsche, 2020).
In his book, A Phenomenological Approach to Quantum Mechanics: Cutting the Chain of Correlations, Steven French argues that quantum mechanics, understood through the phenomenological lens of London and Bauer, turns physics into a "genuine science", and thus completes the project Edmund Husserl had started in his last major publication, The Crisis of European Sciences. What makes quantum mechanics a genuine science, according to French, is that it is fully grounded in the "lifeworld and transcendental subjectivity", just as Husserl dreamt. While we agree with French that London and Bauer's reading of quantum mechanics is inspired by and thus makes a step towards Husserl's phenomenology, we argue that a more encompassing phenomenological investigation is still needed if we are to avoid another crisis. More specifically, our claim is that French underestimates the "constitutional history" of the kinds of mathematical idealities that underlie quantum mechanics.
Abstract Phenomenology has also been brought to bear on QM in the context of recent discussions over the approach known as ‘QBism’. This takes the theoretical formalism to be simply a device for predicting an agent’s future experiences, rather than as representing the world. Such a first-person perspective has been widely taken to mesh with the phenomenological stance, as usually understood. However, although advocates of QBism maintain that any slide into solipsism can be resisted, they struggle to accommodate what has been called the ‘kicks from the world’. Here it is argued that in order do so while remaining within a phenomenological framework, the correlationist feature identified by London and Bauer should be incorporated. Interestingly, one of the phenomenologist philosophers who is often cited in this specific context, Merleau-Ponty, took classes with Gurwitsch and drew on London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ in his own analysis of quantum physics.