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arXiv:2507.18744 · Quantum Information Processing

Secure one-sided device-independent quantum key distribution under collective attacks with enhanced robustness

Pritam Roy, Subhankar Bera, A. S. Majumdar

Published Jan 31, 2026• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s11128-026-05073-9

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