Card-based cryptography is a research area that realizes cryptographic protocols such as secure computation by applying shuffles to sequences of cards that encode input values. A single-cut full-open protocol is one that obtains an output value by applying a random cut to an input sequence of cards, after which all cards are opened. In this paper, we propose three single-cut full-open protocols: two protocols for three-variable functions and one protocol for a four-variable function.
Card-based cryptography is a research area that realizes cryptographic protocols such as secure computation by applying shuffles to sequences of cards that encode input values. A single-cut full-open protocol is one that obtains an output value by applying a random cut to an input sequence of cards, after which all cards are opened. In this paper, we propose three single-cut full-open protocols: two protocols for three-variable functions and one protocol for a four-variable function.
A card-based secure computation protocol is a method for n parties to compute a function f on their private inputs (x1,…,xn) using physical playing cards, in such a way that the suits of revealed cards leak no information beyond the value of f(x1,…,xn). A \textit{single-shuffle full-open} protocol is a minimal model of card-based secure computation in which, after the parties place face-down cards representing their inputs, a single shuffle operation is performed and then all cards are opened to derive the output. Despite the simplicity of this model, the class of functions known to admit single-shuffle full-open protocols has been limited to a few small examples. In this work, we prove for the first time that every function admits a single-shuffle full-open protocol. We present two constructions that offer a trade-off between the number of cards and the complexity of the shuffle operation. These feasibility results are derived from a novel connection between single-shuffle full-open protocols and a cryptographic primitive known as \textit{Private Simultaneous Messages} protocols, which has rarely been studied in the context of card-based cryptography. We also present variants of single-shuffle protocols in which only a subset of cards are revealed. These protocols reduce the complexity of the shuffle operation compared to existing protocols in the same setting.
Card-based cryptography is an area involving cryptographic techniques that use a deck of physical cards to implement secure computation. In this paper, we study card-based cryptographic protocols for symmetric functions f: {0, 1}n → R, where R is an arbitrary finite set. Any symmetric Boolean function has the property that its output value is determined only by the sum of input bits, and the class of them includes many interesting functions such as the AND and equality functions. In 2020, Ruangwises and Itoh proposed a protocol which uses 2n + 2 cards to securely compute any symmetric function f: {0, 1}n → R; reducing the number of cards to less than 2n + 2 was left as an open problem. While the Ruangwises–Itoh protocol uses a two-colored deck of cards, this paper considers using three-colored and four-colored decks: to give a partial answer to the open problem, we propose three protocols for symmetric functions using 2n + 1 cards or less. Specifically, we first propose a protocol using 2n + 1 cards from a three-colored deck. We then propose two protocols using 2n cards from a four-colored deck; one is a simpler protocol and the other is a more shuffle-efficient protocol.
In card-based cryptography, a commitment to a Boolean value is usually represented by two face-down cards of different colors or numbers, whose order specifies the one-bit value (namely, 0 or 1). One of the most important primitives in card-based cryptography is a "copy protocol," which is supposed to make two identical copies of a given commitment. In the literature, there are several copy protocols, which can be categorized by kinds of shuffles they use; this paper focuses on those using only the so-called random cut, which is the simplest shuffle, and we propose two copy protocols that are more efficient than the existing ones. Specifically, we first work on a standard deck of cards and design a six-card copy protocol using three random cuts (on average). Since the previous protocol needs 5.5 random cuts, our protocol improves upon it. Next, we shift our attention to the case of a two-colored deck of cards, and construct a six-card copy protocol using three random cuts (on average). Because the previous protocol requires eight cards, our protocol uses two cards fewer than the previous one (although it uses one more shuffle). In addition, going back to the standard-deck setting, we provide a four-card XOR protocol using only one random cut for the first time.
Card-based protocols are cryptographic protocols that use a deck of physical cards. In this paper, we deal with card-based protocols using a standard deck of playing cards, which are commonly and commercially available. For finite-runtime committed-format protocols, Mizuki (CANS 2016) proposed an eight-card AND protocol with four random bisection cuts and a six-card COPY protocol with one random bisection cut. In this paper, we propose a partial-open action, which reveals any position of the face of cards, by generalizing the half-open action introduced by Miyahara and Mizuki (IJTCS-FAW 2022). Using the partial-open action, we propose four-card AND protocols with three random cuts, a four-card COPY protocol with three random cuts, and a four-card base conversion protocol with a random cut. We note that, without partial-open actions, these AND and COPY protocols with random cuts only are known to be impossible to construct using four cards. Therefore, the partial-open actions are inherently necessary to obtain our results.
In card-based cryptography, the numbers of cards and shuffles are the complexity measures of protocols for secure computations, and the smaller these values are, the better. As the state-of-the-art study to minimize the latter measure, Shinagawa and Nuida showed a surprising result that any n-input logical function can be securely computed with only one shuffle, based on the idea of Yao's garbled circuit. When executing their protocol, the number of required cards is 2n+24q, where the n-input logical function to be computed is represented by q gates. For example, when applied to the n-input AND and XOR functions, the number of gates is n-1, and hence, 26n-24 cards are required. In this paper, we show that the number of required cards can be reduced by focusing on these two specific functions. Specifically, we construct a single-shuffle protocol for the n-input AND function using 4n-2 cards, and construct a single-shuffle protocol for the n-input XOR function using 2n cards.
Cryptographic protocols enable participating parties to compute any function of their inputs without leaking any information beyond the output. A card-based protocol is a cryptographic protocol implemented by physical cards. In this paper, for constructing protocols with small numbers of shuffles, we introduce a new type of cards, regular polygon cards, and a new protocol, oblivious conversion. Using our cards, we construct an addition protocol on non-binary inputs with only one shuffle and two cards. Furthermore, using our oblivious conversion protocol, we construct the first protocol for general functions in which the number of shuffles is linear in the number of inputs.