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arXiv:2502.11842

Noncontextual ontological models of operational probabilistic theories

Sina Soltani, Marco Erba, David Schmid, John H. Selby

Published Feb 17, 2025• 0 citations
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Abstract

An experiment or theory is classically explainable if it can be reproduced by some noncontextual ontological model. In this work, we adapt the notion of ontological models and generalized noncontextuality so it applies to the framework of operational probabilistic theories (OPTs). A defining feature of quotiented OPTs, which sets them apart from the closely related framework of generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs), is their explicit specification of the structure of instruments, these being generalizations of $\textit{quantum instruments}$ (including nondestructive measurements); in particular, one needs to explicitly declare which collections of transformations constitute a valid instrument. We are particularly interested in strongly causal OPTs, in which the choice of a future instrument can be conditioned on a past measurement outcome. This instrument structure might seem to permit the possibility of a contextual kind of ontological representation, where the representation of a given transformation depends on which instrument it is considered a part of. However, we prove that this is not possible by showing that for strongly causal quotiented OPTs the structure of instruments does $\textit{not}$ allow for such a contextual ontological representation. It follows that ontological representations of strongly causal quotiented OPTs are entirely determined by their action on individual transformations, with no dependence on the structure of instruments.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2502.11842

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An experiment or theory is classically explainable if it can be reproduced by some noncontextual ontological model. In this work, we adapt the notion of ontological models and generalized noncontextuality so it applies to the framework of operational probabilistic theories (OPTs). A defining feature of quotiented OPTs, which sets them apart from the closely related framework of generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs), is their explicit specification of the structure of instruments, these being generalizations of quantum instruments\textit{quantum instruments}quantum instruments (including nondestructive measurements); in particular, one needs to explicitly declare which collections of transformations constitute a valid instrument. We are particularly interested in strongly causal OPTs, in which the choice of a future instrument can be conditioned on a past measurement outcome. This instrument structure might seem to permit the possibility of a contextual kind of ontological representation, where the representation of a given transformation depends on which instrument it is considered a part of. However, we prove that this is not possible by showing that for strongly causal quotiented OPTs the structure of instruments does not\textit{not}not allow for such a contextual ontological representation. It follows that ontological representations of strongly causal quotiented OPTs are entirely determined by their action on individual transformations, with no dependence on the structure of instruments.
It is useful to have a criterion for when the predictions of an operational theory should be considered classically explainable. Here we take the criterion to be that the theory admits of a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. Existing works on generalized noncontextuality have focused on experimental scenarios having a simple structure: typically, prepare-measure scenarios. Here, we formally extend the framework of ontological models as well as the principle of generalized noncontextuality to arbitrary compositional scenarios. We leverage a process-theoretic framework to prove that, under some reasonable assumptions, every generalized-noncontextual ontological model of a tomographically local operational theory has a surprisingly rigid and simple mathematical structure — in short, it corresponds to a frame representation which is not overcomplete. One consequence of this theorem is that the largest number of ontic states possible in any such model is given by the dimension of the associated generalized probabilistic theory. This constraint is useful for generating noncontextuality no-go theorems as well as techniques for experimentally certifying contextuality. Along the way, we extend known results concerning the equivalence of different notions of classicality from prepare-measure scenarios to arbitrary compositional scenarios. Specifically, we prove a correspondence between the following three notions of classical explainability of an operational theory: (i) existence of a noncontextual ontological model for it, (ii) existence of a positive quasiprobability representation for the generalized probabilistic theory it defines, and (iii) existence of an ontological model for the generalized probabilistic theory it defines.
To make precise the sense in which the operational predictions of quantum theory conflict with a classical worldview, it is necessary to articulate a notion of classicality within an operational framework.A widely applicable notion of classicality of this sort is whether or not the predictions of a given operational theory can be explained by a generalized-noncontextual ontological model.We here explore what notion of classicality this implies for the generalized probabilistic theory (GPT) that arises from a given operational theory, focusing on prepare-measure scenarios.We first show that, when mapping an operational theory to a GPT by quotienting relative to operational equivalences, the constraint of explainability by a generalized-noncontextual ontological model is mapped to the constraint of explainability by an ontological model.We then show that, under the additional assumption that the ontic state space is of finite cardinality, this constraint on the GPT can be expressed as a geometric condition which we term simplex embeddability.Whereas the traditional notion of classicality for a GPT is that its state space be a simplex and its effect space be the dual of this simplex, simplex embeddability merely requires that its state space be embeddable in a simplex and its effect space in the dual of that simplex.We argue that simplex embeddability constitutes an intuitive and freestanding notion of classicality for GPTs.Our result also has applications to witnessing nonclassicality in prepare-measure experiments.
Generalized contextuality refers to our inability of explaining measurement statistics using a contextindependent probabilistic and ontological model.On the other hand, measurement statistics can also be modeled using the framework of general probabilistic theories (GPTs).Here, starting from a construction of GPTs based on a Gleason-type theorem, we fully characterize these structures with respect to their permission and rejection of generalized (non)contextual ontological models.It follows that in any GPT construction the three insistence of (i) the no-restriction hypothesis, (ii) the ontological noncontextuality, and (iii) multiple nonrefinable measurements for any fixed number of outcomes are incompatible.Hence, any GPT satisfying the no-restriction hypothesis is ontologically noncontextual if and only if it is simplicial.We give a detailed discussion of GPTs for which the no-restriction hypothesis is violated, and show that they can always be considered as subtheories (subGPTs) of GPTs satisfying the hypothesis.It is shown that subGPTs are ontologically noncontextual if and only if they are subtheories of simplicial GPTs of the same dimensionality.Finally, we establish as a corollary the necessary and sufficient condition for a single resourceful measurement or state to promote an ontologically noncontextual (i.e., classical) general probabilistic theory to an ontologically contextual (i.e., nonclassical) one under the no-restriction hypothesis.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
Abstract We introduce a class of probabilistic theories, termed Minimal Strongly Causal Operational Probabilistic Theories, where system dynamics are constrained to the minimal set of operations consistent with the set of states and permitting conditional tests. Specifically, the allowed instruments are limited to those derived from compositions of preparations, measurements, swap transformations, and conditional operations. We demonstrate that minimal theories with conditioning and a spanning set of non-separable states satisfy two quantum no-go theorems: no-information without disturbance and no-broadcasting. As a key example, we construct Minimal Strongly Causal Bilocal Classical Theory, a classical toy-theory that lacks incompatible measurements, preparation uncertainty relations, and is noncontextual (both Kochen–Specker and generalised), yet exhibits irreversibility of measurement disturbance, no-information without disturbance, and no-broadcasting. Therefore, the latter three properties cannot be understood per se as signatures of non-classicality. We further explore distinctions between a theory and its minimal strongly causal counterpart, showing that while the minimal strongly causal version of quantum theory diverges from full quantum theory, the same does not hold for classical theory. Additionally, we establish the pairwise independence of the properties of simpliciality, strong causality, and local discriminability.
Generalized noncontextuality is a well-studied notion of classicality that is applicable to a single system, as opposed to Bell locality. It relies on representing operationally indistinguishable procedures identically in an ontological model. However, operational indistinguishability depends on the set of operations that one may use to distinguish two procedures: we refer to this set as the reference of indistinguishability. Thus, whether or not a given experiment is noncontextual depends on the choice of reference. The choices of references appearing in the literature are seldom discussed, but typically relate to a notion of system underlying the experiment. This shift in perspective then begs the question: how should one define the extent of the system underlying an experiment? Our paper primarily aims at exposing this question rather than providing a definitive answer to it. We start by formulating a notion of relative noncontextuality for prepare-and-measure scenarios, which is simply noncontextuality with respect to an explicit reference of indistinguishability. We investigate how verdicts of relative noncontextuality depend on this choice of reference, and in the process introduce the concept of the noncontextuality graph of a prepare-and-measure scenario. We then discuss several proposals that one may appeal to in order to fix the reference to a specific choice, and relate these proposals to different conceptions of what a system really is. With this discussion, we advocate that whether or not an experiment is noncontextual is not as absolute as often perceived.